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Simulations, Models, and Theories: Complex Physical Systems and Their Representations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Eric Winsberg*
Affiliation:
University of South Florida
*
Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of South Florida, 4202 East Fowler Avenue, FAO 226, Tampa, FL 33620.

Abstract

Using an example of a computer simulation of the convective structure of a red giant star, this paper argues that simulation is a rich inferential process, and not simply a “number crunching” technique. The scientific practice of simulation, moreover, poses some interesting and challenging epistemological and methodological issues for the philosophy of science. I will also argue that these challenges would be best addressed by a philosophy of science that places less emphasis on the representational capacity of theories (and ascribes that capacity instead to models) and more emphasis on the role of theory in guiding (rather than determining) the construction of models.

Type
Theories, Models and Analogies
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

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Footnotes

Some of the ideas discussed here come from my dissertation, and I am grateful to members of my committee, especially Frederick Suppe, Michael Friedman, and Michael Dickson, for feedback. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Northwestern University and in Vancouver, and many attendees made helpful comments, especially Arthur Fine, Mathias Frisch, Steven Kellert, and Mauricio Suarez. Some of the research for this project was supported by a postdoctoral fellowship at Northwestern University.

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