Summary
|
For Full-Text PDF, please login, if you are a member of IEICE, or go to Pay Per View on menu list, if you are a nonmember of IEICE. |
|
On the Importance of Protecting Δ in SFLASH against Side Channel Attacks Katsuyuki OKEYA Tsuyoshi TAKAGI Camille VUILLAUME Publication IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences Vol.E88-A No.1 pp.123-131 Publication Date: 2005/01/01 Online ISSN: DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.1.123 Print ISSN: 0916-8508 Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security) Category: Tamper-Resistance Keyword: asymmetric signature, SFLASH, side channel attacks, SHA-1, C*, C*--, hidden monomial problem, Full Text: PDF(294.3KB)>>
Summary: SFLASH was chosen as one of the final selection of the NESSIE project in 2003. It is one of the most efficient digital signature scheme and is suitable for implementation on memory-constrained devices such as smartcards. Side channel attacks (SCA) are a serious threat to memory-constrained devices. If the implementation on them is careless, the secret key may be revealed. In this paper, we experimentally analyze the effectiveness of a side channel attack on SFLASH. There are two different secret keys for SFLASH, namely the proper secret key (s,t) and the random seed Δ used for the hash function SHA-1. Whereas many papers discussed the security of (s,t), little is known about that of Δ. Steinwandt et al. proposed a theoretical DPA for finding Δ by observing the XOR operations. We propose another DPA on Δ using the addition operation modulo 232, and present an experimental result of the DPA. After obtaining the secret key Δ, the underlying problem of SFLASH can be reduced to the C* problem broken by Patarin. From our simulation, about 1408 pairs of messages and signatures are needed to break SFLASH. Consequently, SHA-1 must be carefully implemented in order to resist SCA on SFLASH. | ||||||||||
| ||||||||||
