Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-c47g7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T00:40:08.865Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

William T. Bianco ,
Ivan Jeliazkov  and
Itai Sened
William T. Bianco
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, 107 Burrowes Building, University Park, PA 16801. e-mail: wbianco@psu.edu
Ivan Jeliazkov
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA
Itai Sened
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We present a simulation technique for sorting out the size, shape, and location of the uncovered set to estimate the set of enactable outcomes in “real-world” social choice situations, such as the contemporary Congress. The uncovered set is a well-known but underexploited solution concept in the literature on spatial voting games and collective choice mechanisms. We explain this solution concept in nontechnical terms, submit some theoretical observations to improve our theoretical grasp of it, and provide a simulation technique that makes it possible to estimate this set and thus enable a series of tests of its empirical relevance.

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , Summer 2004 , pp. 256 - 276
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Political Methodology 2004 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adams, James, and Samuel Merrill, III. 2003. “Voter Turnout and Candidate Strategies in American Elections.” Journal of Politics 65: 161–189.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aldrich, John H., and Rohde, David W. 2001. “The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection.” In Congress Reconsidered, eds. Dodd, Lawrence and Oppenheimer, Bruce. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, pp. 269–292.Google Scholar
Austen-Smith, David, and Banks, Jeffrey. 2001. Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Banks, Jeffrey S., Duggan, John, and Breton, Michel Le. 2002. “Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Spatial Model of Elections.” Journal of Economic Theory 103: 88–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, David P. 1994. “A Sequential Choice Theory Perspective on Legislative Organization.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: 267–296.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, David P. 2000. “Legislative Organization with Informational Committees.” American Journal of Political Science 44: 485–505.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, David P., and Ferejohn, John A. 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 83: 1181–1206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bianco, William T., and Sened, Itai. 2003. “Uncovering Majority Party Influence in Legislatures.” Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Calvert, Randall. 1985. “Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence.” American Journal of Political Science 29: 69–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, Gary. 1987. “The Uncovered Set and the Core.” American Journal of Political Science 3: 408–422.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Donder, Philipe. 2000. “Majority Voting Solution Concept and Redistributive Taxation.” Social Choice and Welfare 17: 601–627.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Epstein, David. 1997. “Uncovering Some Subtleties of the Uncovered Set: Social Choice Theory and Distributive Politics.” Social Choice and Welfare 15: 81–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feld, Scott, Grofman, Bernard, Hartly, Richard, Kilgour, Marc, Miller, Nicholas, and Noviello, Nicholas. 1987. “The Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Games.” Theory and Decisions 23: 129–155.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feld, Scott, Grofman, Bernard, and Miller, Nicholas. 1989. “The Geometry of Majority Rule.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1: 379–406.Google Scholar
Friedman, Jeffrey. 1997. The Rational Choice Controversy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Grofman, Bernard, Owen, Guillermo, Noviello, Nicholas, and Glazer, Amihai. 1987. “Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context.” American Political Science Review 8: 539–553.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Groseclose, Tim, and Snyder, James M. Jr. 2000. “Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 44: 193–211.Google Scholar
Hartley, Richard, and Kilgour, Marc D. 1987. “The Geometry of the Uncovered Set in the Three-Voter Spatial Model.” Mathematical Social Sciences 14: 175–183.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ingberman, Daniel, and Villani, John. 1993. “An Institutional Theory of Divided Government and Party Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 37: 429–471.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackman, Simon. 2001. “Multidimensional Analysis of Roll Call Data via Bayesian Simulation: Identification, Estimation, Inference, and Model Checking.” Political Analysis 9: 227–241 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. 1999. “Paradoxes of Parties in Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 24: 31–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. 2000. “Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship.” American Journal of Political Science 44: 212–227.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKelvey, Richard D. 1976. “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control.” Journal of Economic Theory 12: 472–482.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKelvey, Richard D. 1979. “General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models.” Econometrica 47: 1085–1112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKelvey, Richard D. 1986. “Covering Dominance and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice.” American Journal of Political Science 30: 283–314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKelvey, Richard D., and Schofield, Norman. 1987. “Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core.” Econometrica 55: 923–933.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miller, Nicholas. 1980. “A New Solution Set for Tournament and Majority Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 24: 68–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miller, Nicholas R. 2002. “Notes on the Covering Relation.” Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Ordeshook, Peter C. 1986. Game Theory and Political Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ordeshook, Peter C., and Schwartz, Thomas. 1987. “Agenda and the Control of Political Outcomes.” American Political Science Review 81: 179–199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plott, Charles R. 1967. “A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule.” American Economic Review 57: 787–806.Google Scholar
Poole, Keith T., and Rosenthal, Howard. 2000. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schofield, Norman. 1978. “Instability of Simple Dynamic Games.” Review of Economic Studies 45: 575–594.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibria in Multidimensional Voting Models.” American Journal of Political Science 23: 27–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1986. “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Voting Models.” In Political Science: The Science of Politics, ed. Weisberg, Herbert F. New York: Agathon, pp. 27–60.Google Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth, and Weingast, Barry R. 1984. “Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions.” American Journal of Political Science 28: 49–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R. 1994. “Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: 149–181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weingast, Barry, and Marshall, William. 1987. “The Industrial Organization of Congress.” Journal of Political Economy 96: 132–165.CrossRefGoogle Scholar