Abstract
We analyzed the security of the secure direct communication protocol based on the secret transmitting order of particles recently proposed by Zhu, Xia, Fan, and Zhang[Phys. Rev. A 73, 022338 (2006)] and found that this scheme is insecure if an eavesdropper, say Eve, wants to steal the secret message with Trojan horse attack strategies. The vital loophole in this scheme is that the two authorized users check the security of their quantum channel only once. Eve can insert another spy photon, an invisible photon, or a delay one in each photon which the sender Alice sends to the receiver Bob, and capture the spy photon when it returns from Bob to Alice. After the authorized users check the security, Eve can obtain the secret message according to the information about the transmitting order published by Bob. Finally, we present a possible improvement of this protocol.
- Received 16 August 2006
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.74.054302
©2006 American Physical Society