Disordered environments in spatial games

Mendeli H. Vainstein and Jeferson J. Arenzon
Phys. Rev. E 64, 051905 – Published 22 October 2001
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Abstract

The Prisoner’s dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in heterogeneous ecosystems in spatial evolutionary games by considering site diluted lattices. The main result is that, due to disorder, the fraction of cooperators in the population is enhanced. Moreover, the system presents a dynamical transition at ρ*, separating a region with spatial chaos from one with localized, stable groups of cooperators.

  • Received 4 April 2001

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.64.051905

©2001 American Physical Society

Authors & Affiliations

Mendeli H. Vainstein and Jeferson J. Arenzon*

  • Instituto de Física Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Caixa Postal 15051, 91501-970 Porto Alegre, RS – Brazil

  • *Email address: arenzon@if.ufrgs.br

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Issue

Vol. 64, Iss. 5 — November 2001

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