Transition from Gaussian to Levy distributions of stochastic payoff variations in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Transition from Gaussian to Levy distributions of stochastic payoff variations in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

Matjaž Perc

Phys. Rev. E 75, 022101 – Published 2 February 2007

Abstract

We study the impact of stochastic payoff variations with different distributions on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that Gaussian-distributed payoff variations are most successful in promoting cooperation irrespective of the temptation to defect. In particular, the facilitative effect of noise on the evolution of cooperation decreases steadily as the frequency of rare events increases. Findings are explained via an analysis of local payoff ranking violations. The relevance of results for economics and sociology is discussed.

Received 26 September 2006

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.75.022101

Authors & Affiliations

Matjaž Perc^*

Department of Physics, Faculty of Education, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia

^*Address for correspondence: University of Maribor, Department of Physics, Faculty of Education, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia. FAX: +386 2 2518180. Electronic address: matjaz.perc@uni-mb.si

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Issue

Vol. 75, Iss. 2 — February 2007

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Physical Review E

covering statistical, nonlinear, biological, and soft matter physics