Coevolution of Strategy and Structure in Complex Networks with Dynamical Linking

Jorge M. Pacheco, Arne Traulsen, and Martin A. Nowak
Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 258103 – Published 19 December 2006

Abstract

We introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. We provide analytic results for the limiting cases where linking dynamics is much faster than evolutionary dynamics and vice versa, and show how the individual capacity of forming new links or severing inconvenient ones maps into the problem of strategy evolution in a well-mixed population under a different game. For intermediate ranges, we investigate numerically the detailed interplay determined by these two time scales and show that the scope of validity of the analytical results extends to a much wider ratio of time scales than expected.

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  • Received 9 June 2006

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.97.258103

©2006 American Physical Society

Authors & Affiliations

Jorge M. Pacheco1,2, Arne Traulsen1, and Martin A. Nowak1,3

  • 1Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
  • 2Departamento de Física da Faculdade de Ciências, Centro de Física Teórica e Computacional, P-1649-003 Lisboa Codex, Portugal
  • 3Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA

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Issue

Vol. 97, Iss. 25 — 22 December 2006

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