The regulation of statutory auditing: an institutional theory approach

This paper aims to examine the recent evolution of the regulation of statutory auditing since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the USA by comparing the regulatory structures for auditing in the USA, France and Canada.

Using publicly available documents, the paper seeks to understand how the regulatory structures for statutory auditing have changed in the period since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The USA, France and Canada were chosen for analysis because prior to Sarbanes-Oxley the regulatory structures of these three countries were relatively distinct, whereas subsequent to the Act they appear to be becoming similar.

The authors interpret the increasing apparent similarity in the regulatory structures for statutory auditing in these three countries to be the result of external pressures from global capital markets for standardized regulatory practices. However, this apparent similarity may also be a form of “decoupling”, whereby actors in the institutional field of professional regulation, under pressures from powerful external forces, seek to enhance their legitimacy while maintaining internal flexibility and a certain capacity for resistance against external pressures in the institutional field.

The paper relies on a qualitative analysis of regulatory structures based on a review and analysis of publicly available documents and legislation. As such, it has limitations similar to other qualitative studies.

The regulation of statutory auditing is important to society both to assure the proper functioning of capital markets and to provide reliable information to the general public. Gaining a better understanding of the regulatory structures for statutory auditing advances the public interest.

There have been few prior research efforts that have examined the regulation of statutory auditing through the lens of new institutional theory.