skip to main content
article
Free Access

Detection and prevention of stack buffer overflow attacks

Published:01 November 2005Publication History
Skip Abstract Section

Abstract

How to mitigate remote attacks that exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities on the stack and enable attackers to take control of the program.

References

  1. Aleph One. Smashing the stack for fun and Profit. Phrack Magazine 7, 49 (Fall 1997); www.phrack.com/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  2. Baratloo, A., Singh, N., and Tsai, T. Transparent fun-time defense against stack smashing attacks. In Proceedings of the 2000 USENIX Technical Conference (San Diego, CA, June 2000). Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  3. Chiueh, T. and Hsu, F.-H. RAD: A compile-time solution to buffer overflow attacks. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (Mesa, AZ, Apr. 2001). Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  4. Cowan, C., Pu, C., Maier, D., Hinton, H., Bakke, P., Beattie, S., Grier, A., Wagle, P., and Zhang, Q. StackGuard: Automatic adaptive detection and prevention of buffer-overflow attacks. In Proceedings of the Seventh USENIX Security Conference (San Antonio, TX, Jan. 1998). Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  5. Jim, T., Morrisett, G., Grossman, D., Hicks, M., Cheney, J., and Wang, Y. Cyclone: A safe dialect of C. In Proceedings of the 2002 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (Monterey, CA, June 2002), 275--288; www.research.att.com/projects/cyclone/. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  6. Kiriansky, V., Bruening, D., and Amarasinghe, S. Secure execution via program shepherding. In Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium (Aug. 2002). Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  7. Larochelle, D. and Evans, D. Statically detecting likely buffer overflow vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the 2001 USENIX Security Symposium (Aug. 2001). Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  8. Necula, G. Proof-carrying code. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (Jan. 1997), 106--119. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  9. Newsham, T. Format String Attacks. White paper, Guardent, Inc., Sept. 2000; www.lava.net/~newsham/format-string-attacks.pdf.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  10. Ozdoganoglu, H., Brodley, C., Vijaykumar, T., Jalote, A., and Kuperman, B. SmashGuard: A Hardware Solution to Prevent Security Attacks on the Function Return Address. Tech. Rep. TR-ECE 03-13, Purdue University School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Nov. 2003; www.smashguard.org/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  11. Prasad, M. and Chiueh, T. A binary rewriting defense against stack-based buffer overflow attacks. In Proceedings of the 2003 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (San Antonio, TX, June 2003).Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  12. Xu, J., Kalbarczyk, Z., Patel, S., and Iyer, R. Architecture support for defending against buffer overflow attacks. In Proceedings of the 2002 Workshop on Evaluating and Architecting System dependabilitY (EASY-2002) (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Oct. 2002).Google ScholarGoogle Scholar

Index Terms

  1. Detection and prevention of stack buffer overflow attacks

        Recommendations

        Comments

        Login options

        Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.

        Sign in

        Full Access

        • Published in

          cover image Communications of the ACM
          Communications of the ACM  Volume 48, Issue 11
          November 2005
          87 pages
          ISSN:0001-0782
          EISSN:1557-7317
          DOI:10.1145/1096000
          Issue’s Table of Contents

          Copyright © 2005 ACM

          Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

          Publisher

          Association for Computing Machinery

          New York, NY, United States

          Publication History

          • Published: 1 November 2005

          Permissions

          Request permissions about this article.

          Request Permissions

          Check for updates

          Qualifiers

          • article

        PDF Format

        View or Download as a PDF file.

        PDF

        eReader

        View online with eReader.

        eReader

        HTML Format

        View this article in HTML Format .

        View HTML Format