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Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Credit Cards Without the PIN

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Published:03 November 2014Publication History

ABSTRACT

In this paper we present an attack, which allows fraudulent transactions to be collected from EMV contactless credit and debit cards without the knowledge of the cardholder. The attack exploits a previously unreported vulnerability in EMV protocol, which allows EMV contactless cards to approve unlimited value transactions without the cardholder's PIN when the transaction is carried out in a foreign currency. For example, we have found that Visa credit cards will approve foreign currency transactions for any amount up to ∈999,999.99 without the cardholder's PIN, this side-steps the £20 contactless transaction limit in the UK. This paper outlines our analysis methodology that identified the flaw in the EMV protocol, and presents a scenario in which fraudulent transaction details are transmitted over the Internet to a "rogue merchant" who then uses the transaction data to take money from the victim's account. In reality, the criminals would choose a value between ∈100 and ∈200, which is low enough to be within the victim's balance and not to raise suspicion, but high enough to make each attack worthwhile. The attack is novel in that it could be operated on a large scale with multiple attackers collecting fraudulent transactions for a central rogue merchant which can be located anywhere in the world where EMV payments are accepted.

References

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  1. Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Credit Cards Without the PIN

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                    cover image ACM Conferences
                    CCS '14: Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
                    November 2014
                    1592 pages
                    ISBN:9781450329576
                    DOI:10.1145/2660267

                    Copyright © 2014 ACM

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                    Publication History

                    • Published: 3 November 2014

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                    CCS '14 Paper Acceptance Rate114of585submissions,19%Overall Acceptance Rate1,261of6,999submissions,18%

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