Shaheen S. Fatima
Michael Wooldridge
Nicholas R. Jennings
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. In this model the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously as part of the bargaining equilibrium. We show that the sequential implementation of the equilibrium agreement gives a better outcome than a simultaneous implementation when agents have like, as well as conflicting, time preferences. We also show that the equilibrium solution possesses the properties of uniqueness and symmetry, although it is not always Pareto-optimal.
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Index Terms
- Multi-issue negotiation under time constraints
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