Stefan Köpsell
ABSTRACT
We are developing a blocking resistant, practical and usable system for anonymous web surfing. This means, the system tries to provide as much reachability and availability as possible, even to users in countries where the free flow of information is legally, organizationally and physically restricted. The proposed solution is an add-on to existing anonymity systems. First we give a classification of blocking criteria and some general countermeasures. Using these techniques, we outline a concrete design, which is based on the JAP-Web Mixes (aka AN.ON).
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Index Terms
- How to achieve blocking resistance for existing systems enabling anonymous web surfing
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