Jason Reid
ABSTRACT
Distance-bounding protocols have been proposed as a means of detecting relay attacks, also known as mafia fraud. In this paper we present the first symmetric key based distance-bounding protocol that is also resistant to so-called terrorist fraud, a variant of mafia fraud. Distance-bounding protocols require a communication channel that can exchange single bits with extremely low latency. This unconventional communication requirement has prompted Hancke and Kuhn to assert in a recent publication that ultra wide band (UWB) radio is necessary to achieve a useful distance-bounding resolution for RF security devices (contactless smart cards, RFID tags and the like). We analyse this assertion and present an alternative, novel communication approach that leverages the phenomena of side channel leakage to deliver a low latency channel. Our proposal is capable of detecting sophisticated relay attacks without resorting to the considerable expense and complexity of UWB radio. We present experimental results to support our arguments.
- D. Ballo. Measuring absolute group delay of multistage converters. In Proceedings of 33rd European Microwave Conference, volume 1, pages 89--92. IEEE, 2003.]]Google Scholar
- S. Brands and D. Chaum. Distance-bounding protocols. In Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT'93, LNCS 765, pages 344--359. Springer-Verlag, 1993.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- L. Bussard. Trust Establishment Protocols for Communicating Devices. PhD thesis, Institut Eurécom, Télécom, Paris, 2004.]]Google Scholar
- S. Capkun, L. Buttyan, and J.-P. Hubaux. Sector: secure tracking of node encounters in multi-hop wireless networks. In SASN '03: Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks, pages 21--32, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM Press.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- Y. Desmedt. Major security problems with the 'unforgeable' (Feige)-Fiat-Shamir proofs of identity and how to overcome them. In SecuriCom '88, pages 15--17, SEDEP Paris, France, 1988.]]Google Scholar
- Y. Dodis, R. Genaro, J. H. stad, H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin. Randomness extraction and key derivation using the CBC, cascade and HMAC modes. In Advances in Cryptology CRYPT0 2004, LNCS 3152, pages 344--359. Springer-Verlag, 2004.]]Google Scholar
- K. Finkenzeller. RFID Handbook. John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, NJ, 2nd edition, 2003.]]Google Scholar
- L. Francis, W. G. Sirett, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis. Countermeasures for attacks on satellite TV cards using open receivers. In CRPIT '44: Proceedings of the 2005 Australasian workshop on Grid computing and e-research, pages 153--158, 2005.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- G. Hancke. A practical relay attack on ISO 14443 proximity cards. Manuscript, February 2005. Available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/gh275/relay.pdf accessed October 2005.]]Google Scholar
- G. Hancke and M. Kuhn. An RFID distance bounding protocol. In Proceedings of the IEEE, SecureComm 2005, September 2005.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- Infineon. Device and method for supplying a data transfer unit with energy. US Patent Application 20050252972, 17 November 2005.]]Google Scholar
- ISO/IEC. 14443 Identification cards-contactless integrated circuit(s) cards-proximity cards. International Organisation for Standardisation, Geneva, 2001.]]Google Scholar
- A. Jones and J. McManus. The measurement of group delay using a microwave system analyser. Microwave Journal, 43(8):106--113, 2000.]]Google Scholar
- Z. Kfir and A. Wool. Picking virtual pockets using relay attacks on contactless smartcard systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE, SecureComm 2005, September 2005.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun. Differential power analysis. In Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO 99, page pages 388397, 1999.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- N. Sastry, U. Shankar, and D. Wagner. Secure verification of location claims. In WiSe '03: Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Wireless security, pages 1--10, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM Press.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- D. Singelee and B. Preneel. Location verification using secure distance bounding protocols. In Proceedings of Second IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems (MASS'05). IEEE Computer Society, 2005.]]Google ScholarCross Ref
Index Terms
- Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols
Recommendations
Collusive attacks to "circle-type" multi-party quantum key agreement protocols
We find that existing multi-party quantum key agreement (MQKA) protocols designed for fairness of the key are, in fact, unfair. Our analysis shows that these protocols are sensitive to collusive attacks; that is, dishonest participants can collaborate ...
Modeling key compromise impersonation attacks on group key exchange protocols
Two-party key exchange (2PKE) protocols have been rigorously analyzed under various models considering different adversarial actions. However, the analysis of group key exchange (GKE) protocols has not been as extensive as that of 2PKE protocols. ...
Modeling Key Compromise Impersonation Attacks on Group Key Exchange Protocols
Irvine: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: PKC '09A key exchange protocol allows a set of parties to agree upon a secret session key over a public network. Two-party key exchange (2PKE) protocols have been rigorously analyzed under various models considering different adversarial actions. However, the ...
Comments