ABSTRACT
Modern smartphone operating systems support the development of third-party applications with open system APIs. In addition to an open API, the Android operating system also provides a rich inter-application message passing system. This encourages inter-application collaboration and reduces developer burden by facilitating component reuse. Unfortunately, message passing is also an application attack surface. The content of messages can be sniffed, modified, stolen, or replaced, which can compromise user privacy. Also, a malicious application can inject forged or otherwise malicious messages, which can lead to breaches of user data and violate application security policies.
We examine Android application interaction and identify security risks in application components. We provide a tool, ComDroid, that detects application communication vulnerabilities. ComDroid can be used by developers to analyze their own applications before release, by application reviewers to analyze applications in the Android Market, and by end users. We analyzed 20 applications with the help of ComDroid and found 34 exploitable vulnerabilities; 12 of the 20 applications have at least one vulnerability.
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Index Terms
- Analyzing inter-application communication in Android
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