Tom Coffey
Abstract
Non-repudiation allows an exchange of data between two principals in such a manner that the principals cannot subsequently deny their participation in the exchange. Current non-repudiation schemes, while providing a mandatory proof of origin service, generally provide only discretionary proof of receipt since it is difficult to enforce the return of the proof of receipt by the recipient.In this paper a new scheme for achieving mandatory mutual non-repudiation is proposed, encompassing both mandatory proof of origin and mandatory proof of receipt. The fundamental feature of the scheme is that the proofs of origin and receipt are not exchanged until both principals have submitted their digitally signed evidence to a trusted third party intermediary. This ensures that if the non-repudiation protocol is not completed, neither principal can gain from the exchange. An added advantage is that the process of dispute arbitration is considerably simplified since a small number of rules are required to decide whether an alleged data exchange took place.
- {Barb91} Barbut, Jean-Louis, ETEBAC 5: The standard for secure data exchange between banks and their corporate customers. SECURICOM'91, 9th Worldwide Congress on Computer and Communications Security and Protection, (March 1991), 199- 214.Google Scholar
- {CCITT88} CCITT. The directory - authentication framework. CCITT Rec. X.509, (1988).Google Scholar
- {CS95} Coffey, T. and Saidha, P. A logical verification of a non-repudiation protocol. Report #67/95, Department of Electronics & Computer Engineering, University of Limerick, Ireland, (1995).Google Scholar
- {DH76} Diffe, W. and Hellman, M. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. IT-22, No. 6, (Nov. 1976), 644-654.Google Scholar
- {GGKL89} Gasser, M., Goldstein, A., Kaufman, C. and Lampson, B. The Digital distributed system security architecture, 1989 National Computer Security Conference, (1989).Google Scholar
- {Herd95} Herda, S. Non-repudiation: constituting evidence and proof in digital cooperation, Computer Standards and Interfaces, Vol. 17, No. 1, (January 1995), 69-79. Google ScholarDigital Library
- {ISO89} ISO. Information processing systems - open systems interconnection - basic reference model - part 2: security architecture, ISO 7498-1, (1989).Google Scholar
- {KBN88} Karp, B.C., Barker, L.K. and Nelson, L.D. The secure data network system, AT&T Technical Journal, (May/June 1988), 19-27.Google Scholar
- {Linn91} Linn, J. Privacy-enhanced electronic mail: from architecture to implementation, Information Security, (1991), 233-243.Google Scholar
- {WC92} Wang, W. and Coffey, T. Network security: design of a global secure link, Proceedings of the International Federation of Information Processing (IFIP) TC11 8th International Conference on Information Security, Singapore, (1992), 103-113. Google ScholarDigital Library
Index Terms
- Non-repudiation with mandatory proof of receipt
Recommendations
Analysing the security of a non-repudiation communication protocol with mandatory proof of receipt
ISICT '03: Proceedings of the 1st international symposium on Information and communication technologiesNon-repudiation is a security service concerned with preventing a denial by one of the principals involved in a communication of having participated in all or part of the communication. Principals exchange evidence information, which proves their ...
Games for non-repudiation protocol correctness
The aim of this paper is to investigate the correctness of non-repudiation protocols without a Trusted Third Party (TTP) with respect to the fairness property. We first present sufficient syntactic conditions under which probabilistic fairness can be ...
An intensive survey of fair non-repudiation protocols
With the phenomenal growth of the Internet and open networks in general, security services, such as non-repudiation, become crucial to many applications. Non-repudiation services must ensure that when Alice sends some information to Bob over a network, ...
Comments