Hongliang Tian
ABSTRACT
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is an emerging trusted hardware technology. SGX enables user-level code to allocate regions of trusted memory, called enclaves, where the confidentiality and integrity of code and data are guaranteed. While SGX offers strong security for applications, one limitation of SGX is the lack of system call support inside enclaves, which leads to a non-trivial, refactoring effort when protecting existing applications with SGX. To address this issue, previous works have ported existing library OSes to SGX. However, these library OSes are suboptimal in terms of security and performance since they are designed without taking into account the characteristics of SGX.
In this paper, we revisit the library OS approach in a new setting---Intel SGX. We first quantitatively evaluate the performance impact of enclave transitions on SGX programs, identifying it as a performance bottleneck for any library OSes that aim to support system-intensive SGX applications. We then present the design and implementation of SGXKernel, an in-enclave library OS, with highlight on its switchless design, which obviates the needs for enclave transitions. This switchless design is achieved by incorporating two novel ideas: asynchronous cross-enclave communication and preemptible in-enclave multi-threading. We intensively evaluate the performance of SGXKernel on microbenchmarks and application benchmarks. The results show that SGXKernel significantly outperforms a state-of-the-art library OS that has been ported to SGX.
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Index Terms
- SGXKernel: A Library Operating System Optimized for Intel SGX
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