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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2024
The meanings of tolerance nowadays form a complex and ambiguous maze that far exceeds the scope of this essay. To clarify the following pages, however, we propose a preliminary distinction between original tolerance and modern tolerance.
By original tolerance we mean the attitude that consists of putting up with, or not preventing, that which should not by law take place. It is motivated by prudence or condescension with regard to human failings. It is a sort of last resource. In any event, it is neither a permission nor an authorization: it is a favor, subject to revocation. As far back as one goes in human history, one finds traces of this elementary social practice.
By modern tolerance, we mean the form of tolerance that has developed in modern times and is formulated by Castellion, Spinoza, Locke and in particular Pierre Bayle. To tolerate is to consent to the idea that in the name of freedom, in principle recognized by all, other men think and act according to principles that we do not share or with which we do not agree. In other words, tolerance is the corollary of freedom.
1. On the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the conditions of its drafting, see, among others, M.Gauchet, La Révolution des droits de l'homme, Paris, 1989; J. Morange, La Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, Paris, 1988. As the lat ter is a jurist, he gives us interesting insights into the juridical signification and bearing of the Declaration, from the time of its proclamation up to our day.
2. Quoted in: M.Gauchet, La Révolution, p. 170.
3. Such as J.Morange, La Déclaration.
4. Rabaut Saint-Etienne, Mirabeau, Pétion, Bouche and especially Talleyrand expressed such an opinion, with the latter using a remarkable eloquence whose effect was reinforced by his status as a prelate.
5. The marquis of Clermont-Lodève in particular.
6. Quoted in: M.Gauchet, La Révolution, p. 172. Marcel Gauchet's text demon strates very well that at the time the article was generally interpreted as a vic tory for the clergy. See also B. Kriegel, La Politique de la raison, Paris, 1994, and in particular, "La Déclaration des droits de l'homme et la liberté de conscience."
7. Of course this is not the only manifestation possible.
8. Hence the radical absurdity of the 1968 slogan of: "Il est interdit d'interdire" (It is forbidden to forbid); this is absurd not only from a logical point of view (if it is forbidden to forbid, it is forbidden to forbid to forbid), but also from the point of view of reason: there is no freedom imaginable without the forbidden.
9. The exegesis is powerless to delineate the uncertainty. Alternately, the same assembly, the same parties and, at times, the same orators attributed opposing natures to the Preamble, from a veritable juridical text of a constitutional nature, to a simple profession of political faith (See J. Rivero and G. Vedel, Les Problèmes économiques et sociaux de la Constitution du 27 octobre 1946, Paris, 1947).
10. For some examples of the decisions of the Constitutional Council, see J. Morange, La Révolution, pp. 108-11.
11. The term comes from E.Weil, Philosophie politique, 24, Paris, 1956.
12. Krishnaswami, who in 1955 was commissioned by the sub-committee of human rights of the United Nations to draw up a report on intolerance and discrimination notes: "although religions or convictions favorably welcome- and in certain cases even encourage - the conversion of people belonging to other faiths, it is very difficult for them to admit that their own members con vert to another religion. Apostasy is judged harshly; it is often forbidden by their religious codes."
13. See Les Droits de l'homme, Paris, 1978, p.87.
14. J.-B. Marie, "Le Droit international, une ressource pour lutter contre l'in tolérance," in: L'Intolérance et le droit de l'autre, Geneva, 1992, p. 103.
15. The first article of the optional Protocol reads as folllows: "Every county sign ing the Pact that also signs the Protocol recognizes that the Committee is com petent to receive and examine the communications presented by individuals under its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation, by the signing country, of any of the rights set forth in the Pact."
16. The United States signed (in 1922) only the International Pact on Civic and Political Rights. To our knowledge, the Pact On Ecomonic, Social and Cultural Rights has not yet been signed by the United States.
17. See J. Walkate, "Aperçu historique sur la Déclaration des Nations-Unies sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de l'intolérance et de discrimination," in: Conscience et liberté, No.43,1991, p. 14.
18. A Convention, like a Pact, shares a juridically restrictive character; a Declara tion, in international law, is a simple profession of faith.
19. It also adds the expression "any … whatsoever" before and after the word conviction. The insertion of the indefinite pronoun here reflects a pressing demand from the countries of the former Communist black to underscore the legitimacy of atheism.
20. See J.Walkate,(note 17 above), p. 15.
21. These observations were formulated by Iraq (in the name of the organizations of the Islamic Conference), Syria and Iran. We should add that certain Eastern European countries and Russia expressed reservations of a similar sort, insist ing on the incompatibility of certain specifications of the Declaration with their national legislation.
22. J.Mourgeon, Les Droits de l'homme, Paris, 1978, p. 55.
23. As suggested by Iwo Kôyama, cited by Bernard Stevens in his article "Ambi tions japonaises, nouvel asiatisme et dépassement de la modernité," pub lished in the magazine Esprit, No. 213 (July 1995). Iwao Kôyama was one of the leaders of nationalist thought in the 1930s in Japan. His ideas have been revived today, according to Bernard Stevens, by a significant number of Japanese intellectuals.
24. J.-B. Marie, (note 14 above), p. 10.
