Chaos promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Published 23 August 2006 2006 EDP Sciences
, , Citation M. Perc 2006 EPL 75 841 DOI 10.1209/epl/i2006-10217-3

0295-5075/75/6/841

Abstract

We introduce chaotic variations, modelled by a spatially extended Lorenz system, to the payoffs of the spatial prisoner's dilemma game and study their effects on the evolution of cooperation. We show that chaotic variations of appropriate amplitude promote cooperation over a wide range of payoff parameters at which defection is the only strategy in a sterile environment. An appropriately pronounced chaotic environment can assure permanent domination of cooperation by full anonymity of players and without the aid of secondary strategies, thus designating chaotic payoff variations as a general and stand-alone mechanism for cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.

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