Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning

Authors

  • David Godden Old Dominion University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v35i2.4124

Keywords:

argumentation, basing relations, bounded rationality, dual–process theory, justification, psychology of reasoning, rationality, reasoning, spectatorial conception

Abstract

This paper explicates an account of argumentative rationality by articulating the common, basic idea of its nature, and then identifying a collection of assumptions inherent in it. Argumentative rationality is then contrasted with dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality prevalent in the psychology of reasoning. It is argued that argumentative rationality properly corresponds only with system-2 reasoning in dual-process theories. This result challenges the prescriptive force of argumentative norms derives if they derive at all from their descriptive accuracy of our cognitive capacities. In response, I propose an activity-based account of reasoning which retains the assumptions of argumentative rationality while recontextualizing the relationship between reasoning as a justificatory activity and the psychological states and processes underlying that activity.

Author Biography

David Godden, Old Dominion University

Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department

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Published

2015-05-29

Issue

Vol. 35 No. 2 (2015)

Section

Articles

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