1 The “Jewish State” suggested in the Partition Plan of Palestine (adopted by the UN General Assembly by Resolution 181(11) Nov. 29, 1947, GAOR, 2nd Sess., Resolutions, 31–50, UN Doc. A/519) was to cover an area of about 5,655 sq. miles, compared to about 907 sq. m. owned by Jewish settlers and agencies at the time and to about 10,249 sq. m. which formed the total area of Palestine under British Mandate. Territories of Palestine controlled by Israel after the 1949 Armistice Agreements covered, however, 8,017 sq. m., while territories of Arab States occupied by Israel in June 1967 covered 26,476 sq. m., including 23,622 sq. m. in Egypt, 2,270 sq. m. in Jordan (other than the Arab city of Jerusalem) and 444 sq. m. in Syria. See The Middle East and North Africa 398 (19th ed., 1972).

2 For a comprehensive list of these resolutions, see United Nations Resolutions on Palestine 1947–1972, at 176–79, 195–98 (Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut & Center for Documentation and Studies, Abu Dhabi, 1973). These resolutions have affirmed, in particular, the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes, to compensation for those who opt not to return, to respect for their immovable properties in Palestine, for their human rights, self-determination, and the legitimacy of their struggle for it.

3 See, e.g., statements of Saudi Arabia’s Oil Minister Sheikh Zaki Yamani, Washington Post, April 17, 1973, at 1, confirmed by King Faisal, id., July 6, 1973, at 1 and Newsweek, Sept. 10, 1973. In the latter magazine’s interview, King Faisal explicitly explained that “cooperation requires action on both sides: not sacrifices on one side and negative, if not hostile attitudes on the other side.”

4 Ironically, however, the first cutback in Arab oil production was a direct result of Israeli military action. Two of the four East Mediterranean terminals—Banias and Tartus in Syria—were targets of Israeli air and sea raids which damaged considerably their loading facilities. A third terminal—Sidon in Lebanon—remained open but was not visited by tankers. As a result, throughput from Saudi Arabia and Iraq had to be reduced to a trickle before the cutback decisions on the Arab side were actually issued. See 17 Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), No. 1, Oct. 26, 1973, at 2. Israel also suspended operations at the Ashkelon terminal as of Oct. 6, 1973 thus halting a potential 500,000 b/d of exports. See Middle East Oil Emergency, 40 Petroleum Press Service, No. 11, at 407, 408 (Nov. 1973).

5 16 MEES, No. 51, Oct. 12, 1973, at 4.

6 Law No. 70, Oct. 7, 1973. English translation in id., at i–iii.

7 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, and Qatar.

8 16 MEES, No. 52, Oct. 19, 1973, at iii-iv. The communiqué was signed by all participants excepting the Oil Minister of Iraq.

9 Coinciding with this step, a Ministerial Committee representing the six Gulf member states of OPEC (five Arab countries plus Iran) decided on October 16, 1973, to abandon negotiations with oil companies on the price of crude and announced new posting pricse adding about 70 percent to the posting for Arabian light crude. Id., at (i). This measure was already under consideration before the flare-up of Arab-Israeli hostilities and was particularly espoused by Iran, a non-Arab country. The establishment of its legality is therefore beyond the scope of this paper.

10 17 MEES, No. 4, Nov. 16, 1973, at (iii). First published as an advertisement, in The Guardian (London), Nov. 10, 1973. The resolution was not signed by the Oil Minister of Iraq.

11 See also the communiqué of Arab Oil Ministers dated March 18, 1974, where this objective is reiterated as quoted in note 30 infra. Other wild objectives propagated by the Western press and quoted in Paust, and Blaustein, , The Arab Oil Weapon—A Threat to International Peace, 68 AJIL 427ff. (1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar never figured in the original cutback decision or in subsequent official Arab joint statements.

12 Estimates in 17 MEES, No. 4, Nov. 16, 1973, at 3–4.

13 English translation of text in id., at iv.

14 For the attitude of each Arab country see, 17 MEES, No. 1, Oct. 26, 1973, at 3–7.

15 Law No. 90, Oct. 21, 1973. For English translation of the text, see id., at 12. The reasons stated by the Iraqi News Agency for this action include the use of Dutch territory as “a bridgehead for assistance sent to the enemy,” the supply by the Netherlands to Israel of crude oil from its imported stock, the continuous flights of KLM to “transport mercenaries and assistance to the enemy,” the initial opposition of the Netherlands to the issue of an unbiased communiqué by EEC members, the declaration of the Dutch Foreign Minister to Arab Ambassadors of his country’s support for Israel, the personal participation of the Dutch Minister of Defense in a demonstration staged in the Dutch capital to express support for Israel during the war, and the participation of various Dutch establishments and companies in collecting contributions for the Israeli war effort. Id., at 13.

16 Id., at 5.

17 See id., at 6–7 and 17 id., No. 2, Nov. 2, 1973, at 3–4. It was later explained however that the embargo did not cover oil shipped to Rotterdam for the purposes of refining and reexportation to nonembargoed countries.

18 Ibid.

19 Id., 16, No. 52, Oct. 19, 1973, at 4, and 17 id., No. 22, March 18, 1974, at 13.

20 Id., No. 2, Nov. 2, 1973, at 1.

21 Id., Supp. Nov. 6, 1973, at 2, 5.

22 Id., at 2.

23 Id., at 4.

24 Id., No. 5, Nov. 23, 1973, at 5. Iraq did not attend the meeting.

26 Considering that oil prices (excluding dollar depreciation adjustments) have risen by 70 percent since 1972, this ceiling meant that oil producing Arab states could in fact reduce output to some 45 percent of the 1972 level before reaching the minimum 75 percent of 1972 revenue level. 17 MEES, No. 6, Nov. 30, 1973, at 1.

26 OAU Doc, ECM/RES 21 (viii) Nov. 21, 1973.

27 For an English translation of the Conference “Resolution on Oil,” see 17 MEES, No. 6, Nov. 30, 1973, at 9. The Conference was attended by Heads of States of 16 Arab countries. Iraq and Libya were not represented, while Jordan sent a lower level delegation.

28 Id., No. 11, Jan. 4, 1974, at 1.

29 Id., No. 7, Dec. 7, 1973, at 13.

30 Id., No. 22, March 22, 1974, at 1, 6. The Ministers’ communiqué reiterated the “basic objective” of the Arab oil measures which is “to draw world attention to the Arab question in order to create an atmosphere conducive to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 calling for total withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” and referred to “the new direction” in American official policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. The communiqué provided however that the decision would be subject to review on June 1, 1974. Algeria expressed the view that the lifting of the embargo was “provisional in nature and limited to the period expiring 1 June 1974.” Syria and Libya dissented to the decision altogether. See a translation of the text of the communiqué in Ibid.

31 Compare a quadripartite classification in 17 id., No. 11, Jan. 4, 1974, at 1.

32 See, e.g., 8 Whiteman, , Digest of International Law 376–82 (1967)Google Scholar; 3 Hackworth, , Digest of International Law 555, 645 (1943)Google Scholar; Fatouros, , Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors 249–51 (1962)Google Scholar; Friedman, S., Expropriation in International Law 189–93 (1953)Google Scholar; Charpentier, , De la non-discrimination dans les investissements, 9 Anntjaire Français de Droit International 35–63 (1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 Kuwait limited the annual production of its crude oil to 3 million b/d as from 1972 (15 MEES, No. 25, April 14, 1972, at 12), while Libya introduced several successive cutbacks on the production of oil companies operating in its territory beginning in 1968 (12 id., No. 4, Nov. 22, 1968), and continuing in 1970 (13 id., No. 33, June 12, 1970) and in 1972 (15 id., No. 19, March 3, 1972).

834 For enumeration of such legal issues, see Wright, Quincy, The Middle East: Prospects for Peace (1969)Google Scholar; Wright, Quincy, Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, 33 L. & Contemp. Prob. 24 (1968)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. And see a comprehensive, but partisan, discussion of these issues, in Martin, , Le Confltt Israelo-Arabs (1973)Google Scholar.

35 Occupied Jordanian territory and the Gaza Strip are excluded from discussion only because of their irrelevance to the topic of this article.

36 The shaky arguments presented in Bloomfield, L. M., Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba in International Law (1957)Google Scholar and reproduced in Stone, , The Middle East Undeh Cease Fire 13 (1967)Google Scholar and in Blum, , Secure Boundaries and Middle East Peace 8 (1971)Google Scholar, disputing the long established Egyptian title over Sinai, were wisely not quoted by responsible Israeli officials.

37 See, e.g., Israel’s statement dated April 2, 1969 on its conception of secure and recognized boundaries in answer to Question No. 5 submitted by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, in UN Doc. S/10070, Annex 1, at 6; and its statement of February 26, 1971 in response to Ambassador Jarring’s proposal of withdrawal of Israeli forces beyond the international boundaries of Egypt in UN Doc. S/10070, Add. 2, at 4. And see BLUM, supra note 36, at 63–70.

38 Mcnair, , Legal Effects of War 320 (3rd ed., 1958)Google Scholar where this doctrine is described as “the most important principle of law incident to belligerent occupation.” See also, Castren, , The Present Law of War and Neutrality 215–16 (1954)Google Scholar; Debbasch, , L’Occupation Militaire 10 (1962)Google Scholar.

39 See the first principle in the UN General Assembly Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28 (A/8028): Resolution 2625, Oct. 24, 1970. And see, e.g., Brownlie, , International Law and the Use of Force by States 410–23 (1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jennings, , The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (1963)Google Scholar; Garner, , Non-Recognition of Illegal Territorial Annexation and Claims to Sovereignty, 30 AJIL 679–88 (1936)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

For international documents establishing the principle, see 5 Whiteman, , Digest of International Law 847–965 (1965)Google Scholar.

40 For a discussion and refutation of other minor arguments such as alleged “acquisitive prescription” or “general recognition” see Wright, The Middle East, supra note 34, at 22–23. The argument that international practice knows precedents for annexation of territories for the purpose of guaranteeing the security of certain states, presented in particular by BLUM, supra note 36, at 24–45, simply ignores the development of international law under the UN system.

4 1 See e.g., Higgins, , The June War, the U.N. and Legal Background, 3 Journal of Contemporary History 271 (1968)Google Scholar; Stone, , No Peace—no War in the Middle East 39–40 (1969)Google Scholar; Lauterpacht, Elihu, Jerusalem and the Holy Places 46 (Anglo-Israeli Association, Pamphlet No. 19, 1968)Google Scholar; Schwebel, , What Weight to Conquest 64 AJIL 344–47 (1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shapira, , The Six Day War and the Right of Self Defence 6 Israel L. Rev. 65–80 (1971)Google Scholar; Martin, supra note 34, at 153–70.

42 Id., at 165; Dinstein, , The Legal Issues of Para-War and Peace in the Middle East, 44 St. John’s L. Rev. 466 (1969–70)Google Scholar.

43 Schwebel, supra note 41, at 346. For the refutation of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, see, 2 Oppenheim, , International Law 156 (Lauterpacht, H. ed., 7th ed., 1952)Google Scholar; Kelsen, , The Law of the United Nations 269, 787–89 (1950)Google Scholar; Jessup, , A Modern Law of Nations 165–68 (1948)Google Scholar; Brownlie, supra note 39, at 278; Brownlie, , The Use of Force in Self Defence, 28 Byil 232–47 (1961)Google Scholar. Compare Schwebel, , Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence in Modem International Law, Recueil des Cours 413, 478–83 (II, 1972)Google Scholar.

And see an early insistence, on another occasion, by Israel’s representative to the United Nations on the argument that self-defense presupposes an actual armed attack. In UN Security Council, Official Records, 6th Year, 551st Meeting, 10.

44 Dinstein, supra note 42, at 466, 468–70.

45 Schwebel, supra note 41, at 345–46.

46 E. Lauterpacht, supra note 41, at 52; MARTIN, supra note 34, at 263. And see Meyhowitz, , Le Principe de L’egalité des Belligerents devant le Droit de la Guerre 296 et seq. (1970)Google Scholar.

47 For these developments see Report of the Secretary-General presented pursuant to Security Council Resolution 331 (1973) dated 20 April 1973, in UN Doc. S/10929, May 10, 1973.

48 See Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Question of Defining Aggression, submitted to the General Assembly pursuant to its Resolution 599 (VI), Jan. 21, 1952, in GAOR, 7th Sess. Annex. Agenda Item 54 UN Doc. A/2211, at 17–86, Oct. 3, 1952. And see, 5 Whiteman, supra note 39, at 719–873; Wright, , The Concept of Aggression in International Law, 29 AJIL 873 (1953)Google Scholar.

49 Wright, Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, supra note 34, at 27.

50 Accord. Wright, id., at 24. See also, Falk, , Quincy Wright on Legal Tests of Aggressive War, 66 AJIL 560, 566 n. 22 (1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. And see, Jennings, supra note 39, at 52–67.

51 See, Security Council Res. No. 242, Nov. 22, 1967, UN Security Council Official Records, 22nd Year, Resolution and Decisions, at 8.

52 See, UN G.A. Res. 2628 (XXV), Nov. 4, 1970, GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28 (A/8028), at 5; Res. 2799 (XXVI), Dec. 13, 1971, id., 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29 (A/8429), at 82; Res. 2949 (XXVII), Dec. 8, 1972, id., 27th Sess. (A/4548) Part I, at 24. In the three above resolutions the illegality of occupation is properly considered a corollary of the illegality of annexation as “the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible and . . . consequently territories thus occupied must be restored.”

53 See, UN Security Council Res. 252, May 21, 1968, UN Security Council Official Records, 23rd Year, Resolutions and Decisions, 8–12; Res. 267, July 3, 1969, id., 24th Year, 4; Res. 271, Sept. 15, 1969, id., 5; Res. 298, Sept. 25, 1971, id., 26th year, 6.

54 UN G.A. Res. 2625(XXV), Oct. 24, 1970, GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28 at 122–24 (A/8028).

55 UN G.A. Res. 2734 (XXV), Dec. 16, 1970, id., at 22–24.

56 Referred to in note 53 supra.

57 See, The General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt, Feb. 24, 1949 (Art. IV (3)) , 42 UNTS 251; between Israel and Lebanon, March 23, 1949, id., 287; between Israel and Jordan, April 3, 1949 (Art. II (2)), id., 303; and between Israel and Syria, July 20, 1949 (Art. II (2)), id., 327.

58 Blum, supra note 36, at 23. See also Martin, supra note 34, at 280–81.

59 See, e.g., Statements of Israel’s Permanent Representative to United Nations before the Security Council during discussion of Israel’s complaint concerning passage through the Suez Canal, UN Security Council Official Records, 6th Year, 549th Meeting, at 2–7 (July 23, 1951). And see generally, Feinberg, , The Legality of a State of War after Cessation of Hostilities 36 (1951)Google Scholar.

60 Resolution 81(11), Nov. 29, 1947, GAOR, 2nd Sess., Resolutions, 31–50, UN Doc. A/519.

61 Wright, , The Middle East Problem, 64 AJIL 270, 277 (1970)Google Scholar.

62 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/AC. 24/SR. 45–48, 50–51, May 5–9, 1949. And see earlier and more explicit statements of Israeli representatives in UN, GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. 1, 1st Comm., 640–43, 644–45, 832, 840–42.

63 See, UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Ad hoc Political Committee, Annex, vol. II, at 5, 8–9, UN Doc. A/927, June 21, 1949.

64 Ibid.

65 Id., Supp. 18, at 3–4, 19–21, UN Doc. A/1367/Rev. 1 (1950).

66 Res. No. 242, Nov. 22, 1967, UN Doc. S/PV 1382, at 36; UN Security Council Official Records, 22nd Year, Resolutions and Decisions at 8.

67 E.g., Blum, supra note 36, at 63, Dinstein, supra note 42, at 477, Shapira, supra note 41, at 235, 236; Rosenne, , Directions for a Middle East Settlement—Some Underlying Legal Problems, 33 L. & Contem. Prob. 44, 57 (1968)Google Scholar; Lapidoth, , La résolution du Conseil de Sécurité en date 22 Novemhre 1967 au sujet du Moyen Orient, 74 Rev. Gén. Dr. Int. Public 289, 292–4 (1970)Google Scholar.

68 S/Res./338 adopted by the Council in its 1747th Session, October 21/22, 1973. In paragraph 2, the Security Council “calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts.”

68 E.g., Blum, supra note 36, at 72–79; Lapidoth, supra note 67, at 300–01; Rosenne, supra note 67, at 60. See also Stone, , The “November Resolution” and Middle East Peace: Pitfall or Guidepost?, University of Toledo L. Rev., Nos. 1 and 2, at 43 (1970)Google Scholar;

Rostow, E. V., Legal Aspects of the Search for Peace in the Middle East, Proc. Amer. Soc. INT. L., 64 AJIL, No. 4, 64, 69 (1970)Google Scholar.

70 See, e.g., the French text: “Retrait des forces armées israeliennes des territories occupés lors du recent conflit;” and the Spanish text “Retiro des las fuerzas armadas isralies de los territorios que ocuparon durente el reciento conflicto,” UN Doc. S/inf. 22/Rev. 2, at 4. Since the English text does not mean partial withdrawal there is no room for the argument that in case of conflict between the texts in different languages the one which was submitted to the vote prevails, or for the argument, advanced by Martin, supra note 34, at 256, that partial withdrawal is the common meaning in all texts.

71 See resolutions referred to in note 52, supra.

72 For a detailed account, see, Lall, , The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967, at 230–73 (1968)Google Scholar.

73 Text of Address of Mr. William Rogers, Dec. 9, 1969, U.S. Mission to the U.N., Press Release 371, Dec. 9, 1969; 62 Dept. State Bull. 7 (1970). Mr. Rogers indicated that only “insubstantial alterations” may be introduced to ensure mutual security. Such alterations would be based, however, on the acceptance of the parties, not merely on the language of the Security Council resolution. See also, Wright Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, supra note 34, at 24; Wright, The Middle East Problem, supra note 61, at 274–75; Falk, , The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AJIL 415, 435, n. 55 (1969)Google Scholar.

74 Wright, , The Middle Eastern Crisis, Proc. Amer. Soc. Int. L., 64 AJIL, No. 4, 71, 78 (1970)Google Scholar.

75 The history of Resolution 242 further confirms this truth. The phrase “secure and recognized boundaries” in the British draft was taken from the earlier U.S. draft submitted to the Security Council on November 7, 1967 (UN Doc, S/8229). Security in boundaries was envisaged by the sponsors of the latter draft as a condition in the arrangements to be adopted, not in the geographic location, as is evident in the draft resolution submitted by the United States on June 20, 1967 to the General Assembly (UN Doc, A/L 520). According to the last draft the proposed settlement was thus to include “recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction and war.” (Emphasis added).

76 See, e.g., Blum, supra note 36, at 84, Rosenne, supra note 67, at 59; Lapidoth, supra note 67, at 295–96.

77 See resolutions referred to in notes 52, 54, 55, supra.

78 Res. 2628(XXV), Res. 2799 (XXVI), and Res. 2949(XXVH) referred to in note 52, supra.

79 Compare Art. 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties opened for signature from May 23, 1969 until November 30, 1969 (UN Doc, A/conf. 39/27, May 23, 1969). And see, 1 Oppenheim, supra note 43, at 891–92; McNair, , The Law of Treaties 213–17 (1961)Google Scholar; Lauterpacht, H., Recognition in International Law 426, 429 (1947)Google Scholar.

80 Compare Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 79. And see, McNair, supra note 79, at 213–17; Brownlie, , Principles of Public International Law 417–18 (1966)Google Scholar; Verdross, , Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AJIL 55, 60 (1966)Google Scholar.

81 See in particular Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter and Principle I of the abovementioned Declaration, Res. No. 2625(XXV), Annex.

82 See, Aide-Memoire presented to Ambassador Jarring by the United Arab Republic (now the Arab Republic of Egypt) on IS February 1971, UN Doc. S/10929, Annex III, at 1–2.

83 See, Aide-Memoire presented to Israel and the United Arab Republic by Ambassador Jarring on 8 February 1971, id., Annex II, at 1–2.

84 See, Communication presented to Ambassador Jarring by Israel on 26 February 1971, id., Annex IV, at 1–2. In item 4 of that communication, it is bluntly stated that “Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines.”

85 See, e.g., Lillich, , Forcible Self-Help under International Law, 22 Naval War Coll. Rev. 56 (1970)Google Scholar, where he refers also to a lecture given by Professor McDougal in 1968 in which the latter came to the conclusion that “in the absence of collective machinery to protect people against attack and deprivation . . . the principle of major purposes requires an interpretation which would honor self-help against a prior unlawfulness.” Id., at 65.

86 That is, a reading which considers a continued forcible occupation following an armed intervention a prolonged “armed attack” under Article 51 of the Charter.

87 Using the above argument in what is submitted to be the wrong context, Elihu Lauterpacht adds: “For if force can never be used to effect lawful territorial change, then, if territory has once changed hands as a result of an unlawful use of force, the illegitimacy of the position thus established is sterilized by the prohibition upon the use of force to restore the lawful sovereign.” E. Lauterpacht, supra note 41, at 52.

88 All Arab states are members of the Joint Arab Defense Council, an organ of the Arab League. For an English translation of some relevant inter-Arab joint military pacts, see, 2 Khalil, , The Arab States and the Arab League. A Documentary Record. International Affairs 101–05, 242–15, 250–53 (1962)Google Scholar.

89 See, supra, note 27.

90 See, e.g., The United States Shipping Act of 1916, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §808, 835, 46 C.F.R. §221.5 et seq. (sale and transfer to foreign registry of vessels owned by US citizens); the Act of October 6, 1917, 12 U.S.C. §95a, 95b; 31 C.F.R. §54.1 et seq. and the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 31 U.S.C. §440 (export of gold); the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §717b; 18 C.F.R. §153.1 et seq. (export of natural gas) The Tobacco Seed and Plant Exportation Act of 1940; 7 U.S.C. §576 (export of tobacco seed and live tobacco plants); the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 7 U.S.C. §1691 et seq.; 68 Stat. 454 (export of subsidized U.S. agricultural commodities to the Sino-Soviet bloc); the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §2011 (export of atomic materials, faculties) etc.

91 See Act of July 2, 1940, 54 Stat. 712, 714 (1940), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §701 (expired). For a historical account see, Comment, Export Controls, 58 Yale L.J. 1325 (1951).

92 The Sthategic Trade Control System 1948–1956, Dept. of State, Ninth Report to Congress (1957) on Operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, at 4–5 (excerpt republished in Metzger, , Law of International Trade. Documents and Readings 1047, 1051 (1966)Google Scholar).

93 The Export Control Act of 1949, Section 2, 19 U.S.C. §2021 (1949) as extended and amended by Public Law 89–63, 89th Cong.

94 Id., Sec. 3 (a).

95 See, Silverstone, , The Export Control Act of 1949: Extraterritorial Enforcement, 108 U.P.L.R. 337–43 (1959)Google Scholar.

96 See, Surrey, and Shaw, (eds.), A Lawyer’s Guide to International Business Transactions 56–85 (1963)Google Scholar.

97 For these groups, see Export Control, 99th Rep., 1st Quarter 1972, by the Secretary of Commerce to the President, the Senate and the House of Representatives, 2–3. And see a description of an earlier classification in Metzger, , Federal Regulation and Prohibition of Trade with Iron-Curtain Countries, 29 Law & Contem. Prob. 1000, 1001 (1964)Google Scholar.

98 For a critical detailed account of these measures, see Adler-Karlsson, , Western Economic Warfare 1947–1967—A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy, particularly at 201, 210 (Stockholm Economic Studies, New Series IX, 1968)Google Scholar.

99 50 U.S.C. App. §§2401 et seq. as extended by Senate Joint Resolution 218, April 29, 1972, Public Law 92–284, 92nd Congress.

100 Statement of Senator Mondale of Minnesota as quoted in, Berman, , The Export Administration Act of 1969: Analysis and Appraisal, 3 Amer. Rev. of East-West Trade 19 (Jan., 1970)Google Scholar.

101 See Export Control, supra note 97, at 1.

102 222 U.S.C. S1611 et seq.; 65 Stat. 644 (1951), as amended by 75 Stat. 424, approved Sept. 4, 1961.

103 See, The Strategic Trade Control System 1948–1956, supra note 92, at 11–14.

104 Sec. 1304 of Public Law 843, effective Sept. 27, 1950.

105 Sec. 1302 of Public Law 45, effective June 2, 1951.

106 Sec. 103(b), 104 and 105, 202 and 203 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, supra note 102.

107 For the effect on the 61 countries then receiving military, economic, or financial assistance from the United States, see Metzger, supra note 92, at 1066.

108 See, id., at 1064.

109 For further details, id., at 1066–79.

110 See, Report on Export Controls in the U.K., France, Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, submitted by Senator Thomas J. Dodd and Senator Kenneth B. Keating to the Sub-Comm. to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 87th Cong. 2nd Sess., April 4, 1962 at 12.

111 Ibid. Reference in the Report is made in particular to Law of June 30, 1931, modified by Law of July 10, 1934, and Decree of January 17, 1955, in Belgium; Decree of November 30, 1944 in France; Foreign Trade Circular No. 89154 in Germany; and Tabella Esport dated July 22, 1957, amended on August 13, 1960, in Italy. No mention is made in the Report, however, of the U.K.’s Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939 or, quite obviously, of the Export of Goods (Control) order 1967 which was issued pursuant to the 1939 Act after the date of the Report. For text see S.I. 1967 No. 675 reprinted in Schmitthoff, , The Export Trade 429–33 (5th ed., 1969)Google Scholar. The Dutch Laws of 1935 and 1962, referred to infra, are also not mentioned in the Report.

112 See, Adler-Karlsson, supra note 98, at 68.

113 Staatsblad, No. 295.

114 See Adler-Karlsson, at 68.

115 Id., at 75–77.

116 See, e.g., Allen, , Soviet Economic Warfare (1960)Google Scholar.

117 [Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee], Economic Laws Series No. 1: Laws and Regulations Relating to Control of Import and Export Trade in Member Countries, December 1965.

118 Adler-Karlsson, supra note 98, at 3.

119 Art. 6 of Hague Convention XIII (1907) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. 36 Stat. 2415; TS 545; 1 Bevans 723. See also Art. 44 of the “Rules of Aerial Warfare, 1923,” drafted by a Commission of Jurists at The Hague, Dec. 1922-Feb. 1923, reproduced in Greenspan, , The Law of Land Warfare 650 (1959)Google Scholar. For the general character of the international custom codified in these provisions see, 2 Oppenheim, supra note 43, at 686; Greenspan, supra, at 548.

120 See Art. 2 of Hague Convention V(1907) concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land. 36 Stat. 2310; TS 540; 1 Bevans 654. And see 2 Oppenheim, supra note 43, at 690.

121 See the argument presented by the Netherlands in answer to Great Britain’s protest over the transit of metals from occupied Belgium to Germany and of sand and gravel from Germany to Belgium during World War I, as reported in 2, Oppenheim, supra note 43, at 690–91.

122 Accord, Greenspan, supra note 119, at 584.

123 For a clear distinction between the two terms, as used in the above context, see 2 Oppenheim, supra note 43, at 136.

124 See, e.g., id., at 651.

125 I Medlicott, , The Economic Blockade 474 (1952)Google Scholar.

126 Id., at 476, Furthermore, Medlicott reports that, with a minor exception, “the British and American oil policies were virtually identical” even before the U.S. entered the war. Id., at 481.

127 Id., at 477.

128 Id., at 478.

129 Id., at 479.

130 Ibid.

131 Id., at 480.

132 Id., at 485.

133 Testimony of Professor Richard N. Gardner to the Sub-committee on International Economics of the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, December 13, 1973, at 3. Professor Gardner admitted, however, that “the present state of international law in this area is most unsatisfactory” and that there was a clear need for “new rules.”

134 UN G.A. Res. 2625(XXV), Oct. 24, 1970, GAOR, 25th Sess., STOP. NO. 28 at 122–24 (A/8028).

135 See, e.g., Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, UN G.A. Res. 2131, Feb. 21, 1965, GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. NO. 14 at 12 (A/6220), described by the U.S. representative to the General Assembly as “a political Declaration with a vital political message, not as a declaration or elaboration of the law governing non-intervention.” Id., 1st Committee, 143rd Meeting, A/C.1/PV.1422, at 12.

138 Supra note 34.

137 Cf., Bowett, , Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 Va. J. Int’l L. 1, 7–9 (1972)Google Scholar. Mr. Bowett further maintains that “there has been no agreement within the United Nations that economic reprisals are illegal under the Charter. Indeed, given the rather low level of compliance accorded by States to the prohibition of armed reprisals (footnote omitted), it would seem excessively optimistic to argue that economic reprisals are illegal per se” (emphasis added).

138 McDougal, and Feliciano, , Law and Minimum Would Public Order 197 (1961)Google Scholar.

139 Accord, Bowett, supra note 137, at 5.

140 In the light of the above, one may differentiate between the U.S. practice under the Battle Act, where U.S. assistance is tied to the recipient’s adoption of economic sanctions against third states which are not necessarily guilty of a breach of international law, and the Arab oil measures, which practically made the unlimited supply of oil dependent on the expression of friendly attitudes towards the Arabs’ claim for the restoration of the status juris in the Middle East.

141 UN G.A. Res. 1515 (XV), GAOR, 15th Sess., Dec. 15, 1960.

142 See, UNCTAD: Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Oct. 19, 1972, UN Doc. TD/B/421 of Nov. 5, 1972 (335th meeting) where reference is made to all earlier UN General Assembly resolutions on this matter.

143 See, e.g., UN G.A. Res. 1803(XVII), GAOR, 17th Sess., Dec. 14, 1962 (emphasis added). For a study of this and earlier UN resolutions in their application to Arab Oil, see, Mughhaby, , Permanent Sovereignty Over Oil Resources (1966)Google Scholar.

144 UN G.A. Res. 3016 (XXVII), GAOR, 27th Sess., Dec. 18, 1972; Res. 3171 (XXVIII), GAOR, 28th Sess. Dec. 17, 1973. It is surprising therefore to see these two resolutions, which are obviously meant to strengthen the right of states over their natural resources against coercion from consuming countries, cited against Arab states, in Paust and Blaustein, supra note 11, at 420–21.

145 UN G.A. Res. 3175(XXVIII), GAOR, 28th Sess., Dec. 17, 1973.

146 Recent proposals in the United Nations on the definition of aggression seem content to leave out economic coercion at this stage at least. See, the USSR Draft in UN Doc. A/AC 134/L.12 (1969); Draft of the thirteen non-committed Powers in, id., A/AC 134/L.16 (1969); and Add. 1 & 2; Draft of the eight Western Powers in, id. A/AC 134/L.17 (1969); and draft definition adopted by the Special Committee and forwarded to the General Assembly A/AC. 134/L.46 (1974).

147 See, Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Question of defining Aggression, GAOR, 7th Sess., Agenda Item 54, UN Doc. A/2211, at 74.

148 Ibid. And see Schwebel, , Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence in Modern International Law, Recueil des Cours 413, 449–52 (II, 1972)Google Scholar.

149 See, S/Res/217 (1965), Nov. 20, 1965; S/Res/221 (1966), April 9, 1966; S/Res/232 (1966), Dec. 16, 1966; S/Res/253 (1968), May 29, 1968; S/Res/277 (1970), March 18, 1970; S/Res/314 (1972), Feb. 28, 1972; S/Res/318 (1972), July 28, 1972; S/Res/320 (1972), Sept. 29, 1972.

150 See , S/Res/181 (1963), Aug. 7, 1963; S/Res/182 (1963), Dec. 4, 1963; S/Res/191 (1964), June 18, 1964; S/Res/282 (1970), July 23, 1970; S/Res/311 (1972), Feb. 9, 1972.

151 UN G.A. Res. 500(V), May 18, 1951, GAOR, 5th Sess., SOTP., NO. 20A, A/1775/Add.l (1951), at 2.

152 See, e.g., UN G.A., Res. 2107(XX), Dec. 21, 1965; UN G.A., Res. 2311(XXII), Dec. 14, 1967; UN G.A. Res. 2426(XXIII), Jan. 8, 1969 (with respect to South Africa and Portugal).

153 UN G.A., Res. 2949(XXVIII), Dec. 8, 1972.

154 See a discussion of these measures and of the question of the competence of a regional organization such as the O.A.S. to authorize them in the absence of a prior authorization from the Security Council in Claude, , The OAS, The UN and the United States, 347 Int. Conciliation 1 (March 1964)Google Scholar; Halderman, , Regional Enforcement Measures and the United Nations, 52 Georgia L.J. 89 (1963)Google Scholar.

155 See, e.g., OAU Doc. CIAS/Plen.2/Rev.2, May 25, 1963 in Resolutions Adopted by the Conference of Heads of States and Governments of Independent African Countries 1963–1972 at 3, 5; AHG/Res. 5 (1) , 6(1), July 21, 1964, id., 20, 21; AHG/Res/34(11), Oct. 25, 1965, id., 49. Res. 6(1) of 1964 appealed to all oil producing countries to impose an embargo on shipment to South Africa of oil and oil products. See also the following resolutions of OAU Council of Ministers: CM/Res. 6(1), 11 August 1963, 1 Resolutions, Recommendations and Statements Adopted by the Ordinary and Extraordinary Sessions of the Council of Ministers 1963–1967 at 5 (May 1973); CM/Res. 31(111), July 17, 1964, id., 29; CM/Res. 48(IV), March 9, 1965, id., 50, CM/Res. 66(V), Oct. 21, 1965, id., 74; CM/Res. 68(VII), Nov. 4, 1966, id., 102; CM/Res. 102(IX), Sept. 10, 1967, id., 122; CM/Res/138(X), Feb. 24, 1968, 2 id., 1968–1973 at 7, CM/Res. 242/Rev. l(XVII), June 19, 1971, id., 141; CM/Res. 269 (XIX), June 12, 1972, id., 183.

156 See, e.g., OAU Doc. CIAS/Plen. 2/Rev. 2 supra note 155; AHG/Res. 9 (1) , July 24, 1964, id., 26; AHG/Res. 35(11), Oct. 25, 1965, id., 52. And see, CM/Res. 6(1), supra note 155; CM/Res. 83(VII), Nov. 4, 1966, id., 99; CM/Res. 137(X), Feb. 24, 1968, 2 id., 5; CM/Res. 268(XIX), June 12, 1972, id., 178; CM/Res. 272(XIX), June 12, 1972, id., 193.

157 See, OAU Doc. CM/Res. 62(V) , Oct. 21, 1965, id. 70, ECM/Res. 13(VI), Dec. 5, 1965, id. 86; CM/Res. 78 (VII), Nov. 4, 1966, id. 94; CM/Res. 102(IX), Sept. 10, 1967, id. 116; CM/Res/10(IX), Sept. 10, 1967, id. 133; CM/Res/207(XIV), March 6, 1970, 2 id. 86; CM/Res. 269 (XVIII), Feb. 19, 1972, id. 164; CM/Res. 267 (XIX), June 12, 1972, id. 175.

158 See, OAU Doc, ECM/Res. 21 (VIII), Nov. 21, 1973.

159 Ibid., para. 20.

160 Signed at Geneva on Oct. 30, 1947, TIAS 1700; 55–61 UNTS.

161 See, Treaties in Force. A list of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1974, at 330. (Dept. of State Pub. 8755).

162 See supra note 7.

163 See, Lauterpacht, H., Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BYIL 76 (1949)Google Scholar. And see for possible exceptions, not warranted in the above context, McNair, supra note 79, at 474–84.

164 See, Flory, T., Le G.A.T.T.—Droit International et Commerce Mondial 83 (1968)Google Scholar, where the security exceptions in GATTs Article 21 are also described as constituting matters within the “domestic jurisdiction” of each party.

165 See, a discussion of this point in relation to bilateral trade agreements, infra pp. 623–25.

166 Cf., Dam, , The Gatt, Law and International Economic Organization 221 (1970)Google Scholar.

167 See a description of U.S. practice in, James, III, Comment, The Mandatory Oil Import Program: A Review of Present Regulations and Proposals for Change in the 197ffs, 7 Tex. Int’l L.J. 373 (1972)Google Scholar.

168 See also the testimony of Prof. R. N. Gardner referred to in note 133 supra, where he emphatically states that all the GATT principles on discrimination are “effectively vitiated” by Article 21 thereof.

169 The above statement is based on information obtained from some of the Foreign Offices of the Arab states involved, supported by the results of a review of the League of Nations Treaty Series, the United Nations Treaty Series, and the U.S. Treaties in Force referred to in note 161, supra.

170 Provisional Agreement in regard to Diplomatic and Consular Representation, Judicial Protection, Commerce and Navigation, signed at London on Nov. 7, 1933, 48 Stat. 1826 (1933); 11 BEVANS 5456; 142 LNTS 329. The Agreement does not extend, pursuant to Article (4) thereof, to the treatment which the United States accords to the commerce of Cuba and the Panama Canal zone.

171 As is implied in the testimony of Professor R. N. Gardner referred to in note 133 supra, and in his statement quoted in “Saudi Oil Embargo Termed Breach of ‘33 Treaty with U.S.,” N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1973, at 12, col. 4.

172 Accord, Schwarzenberger, , The Most-Favoured-Nation Standard in British State Practice, 22 Byil 96, 110, 111 (1945)Google Scholar.

173 Id., at 111, 120.

174 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, signed at Baghdad, Dec. 3, 1938, 54 Stat. 1790 (1940); TS960; 9 Bevans 7; 203 LNTS 107. According to the treaty, extension of advantages given by the United States does not include advantages accorded to Cuba, the Panama Canal Zone, border traffic zones, and states in Customs Unions (Art. 1).

175 See, supra note 4.

176 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights (with Protocol) signed at Salalah on Dec. 20, 1958, 11 UST 1835; TIAS No. 4530; 380 UNTS 181. Each party reserved the right to accord special advantages to “adjacent countries” or by virtue of a customs union (Art VIII (4)). Application of the treaty does not extend to Cuba, the Philippines, trusteeship territories in the Pacific, and the Panama Canal Zone.

177 The President’s message to Congress of Jan. 6, 1941, cited in Greenspan, supra note 119, at 519.

178 Griffith, W. E., The Fourth Middle East War, the Energy Crisis and U.S. Policy, 17 Orbis 1161, 1185 n.23 (1974)Google Scholar.