1 Jenks, C. W., Common Law of Mankind 66–74 (1958)Google Scholar.

2 Hall, W. E., A Treatise on International Law 40 (7th ed., 1917)Google Scholar.

3 Jessup, P. C., The Use of International Law (The Thomas M. Cooley Lectures at the University of Michigan Law School) 20 (1959)Google Scholar.

4 P. C. Jessup, ibid. 21.

5 Jenks, op. cit. note 1, pp. 62–63.

6 Pathak, G. S., Welcome Address, 1 Indian Journal of Int. Law 4 (1960)Google Scholar; Jawaharlal Nehru, ibid. 6.

7 Verzijl, J. H. W., “Western European Influence on the Foundation of International Law,” 1 Int. Relations 41 (1955)Google Scholar.

8 Jorge, Castaneda, “The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of International Law,” 15 Int. Organization 38 (Winter, 1961)Google Scholar.

9 Luis Padilla Nervo, 1957 I.L.C. Yearbook (I) 155.

10 Ibid.

11 O’Connell, D. P., “International Law and Boundary Disputes,” 1960 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 81 Google Scholar.

12 Alexandrowicz-Alexander, C. H., “Grotius and India,” 3 Indian Year Book of Int. Affairs 363–367 (1954)Google Scholar; “The Discriminatory Clause in South East Asian Treaties in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” 6 ibid. 126 ff. (1957).

13 D. P. O’Connell, loc. cit. 81.

14 Ibid. 82.

15 Abi-Saab, George M., “The Newly Independent States and the Scope of Domestic Jurisdiction,” 1960 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 84–90, 99–101 Google Scholar.

16 Jenks, C. W., Common Law of Mankind 85 (London, 1958)Google Scholar.

17 Padilla Nervo, loc. cit. note 9, p. 155; El Erian, ibid. 161; Paris Bey El Khouri, ibid. 169.

18 1957 I.L.C. Yearbook (I) 158.

19 Raj, Krishna, “Crisis in International Law,” National Herald (Lucknow), April 29, 1957 Google Scholar, quoted by Quincy, Wright, “The Influence of the New Nations of Asia and Africa upon International Law,” 7 Foreign Affairs Reports 39, footnote (1958)Google Scholar.

20 Hafez, Ghaneim, “The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee—1958,” 14 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International 63 ff. (1958)Google Scholar.

21 P. C. Jessup, op. cit. note 3, p. 27. One may argue that once they commit themselves to these rules of international law by interpreting the rules in their own favor, the principle of estoppel applies. They cannot later claim not to be equally bound by these rules.

22 Krishna Menon, V. K., “Statement in Lok Sabha on Withdrawal of Kashmir Case from U. N . ,” 4 Foreign Affairs Record 100 (1960)Google Scholar.

23 At least it requires a lot of further research to prove that the basic principles underlying the legal systems of the Eastern countries are different from those of the Western countries. So far, the studies carried on in this field show that the fundamental principles underlying different legal systems are all in harmony with each other. Speaking about Hindu law, for example, Professor Harrop A. Freeman of Cornell University says: “Hindu jurisprudence is not ‘ideologically different’ from our own.” He further asserts: “ . . . there is no eastern or western philosophy and no eastern or western law.” 8 Indian Year Book of Int. Affairs 182, 213–214 (1959); see also Arthur Larson, “World Rule of Law: An Idea Whose Time Has Come,” Danforth Foundation Project Lectures, 1959–1960, Lecture No. 3, pp. 1–11; “Arms Control Through World Law,” Daedalus 10, 44–45 (1960); Jenks, op. cit. note 1, Ch. 2.

24 You Chan Yang (Korean Ambassador to the U. S. A.), “Possible Permanent Cleavages in Asia,” 318 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 97 ff. (1958); Mohammad Ali (Pakistan Ambassador to the U. S. A.), “Factors Looking to Eastern World Leadership,” ibid. 132 ff.

25 Panikkar, K. M., “The Afro-Asian States and Their Problems 12–14 (New York, 1959)Google Scholar.

26 Thus in a long-standing dispute between Great Britain and Guatemala over the territory of Belize, the former wants to take it before the International Court so that the controversy might be resolved according to international law. Guatemala rejects the offer but is prepared to submit the dispute to the Court to be decided ex aequo et bono, which Britain is not in a mood to accept. J. Castañeda, loc, cit, note 8, pp. 41–43.

27 I n 1948 Iceland put into effect a system of straight base lines around the island, from which the breadth of its territorial waters was to be measured. In 1958 it extended its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction out to a distance of twelve miles from the above-mentioned base lines. Great Britain, not recognizing Iceland’s right to take these measures, proposed that the matter be taken before the International Court of Justice. Iceland did not agree to take the dispute to the Court and resolve it in accordance with the international law in force, and was trying, in its turn, to achieve in international conferences the recognition of a new general rule that would vindicate its stand in the dispute. See Castañeda, ibid. 42. Recently the dispute has been settled through an agreement whereby the United Kingdom, recognizing the dependence of Iceland’s economy on fish and fish products, has agreed not to object to the twelve-mile fishing zone around Iceland, to be measured from new base lines redrawn in Iceland’s favor, running from headland to headland instead of following the indentions of the coast. In return, Iceland, for a transitional period of three years, has agreed to admit British vessels in certain parts of a six- to- twelve-mile zone at certain times of the year. I t is interesting to note that Iceland is resolved to extend her fisheries jurisdiction still further, but has agreed to give six months’ notice before claiming any such extension and has also agreed, in case of a dispute in relation to such extension, to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. New York Times, Feb. 28, 1961, p. 10; see also D. H. N. Johnson, “The Anglo-Icelandic Agreement of March 11, 1961,” 10 Int. and Comp. Law Q. 592–594 (1961).

28 George M. Abi-Saab, loc. cit. note 15, p. 90.

29 Julius, Stone, “The Rule of Law in the Relations of States,” Unpublished John Field Simms Memorial Lecture delivered at the University of New Mexico, April, 1959 Google Scholar.

30 Jessup, , The Use of International Law 15, 28, 133–134 (1959)Google Scholar.

31 Quincy Wright, loc. cit. note 19, pp. 33–39.

32 Jennings, R. Y., The Progress of International Law 44–45 (Cambridge, 1960)Google Scholar.

33 Jessup, op. cit. note 30, pp. 153–154.

34 Jennings, op. cit. note 32, pp. 47–48,

35 Eastern Carelia Case, 1 Hudson, World Court Reports 204,

36 See Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/1, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 382–384 (San Francisco, 194S); Hudson, M. O., “The New World Court,” 24 Foreign Affairs 83 (1945)Google Scholar.

37 Hudson, M. O., International Tribunals, Past and Future 76 (1944)Google Scholar.

38 Waldock, C. H. M., “Decline of the Optional Clause,” 32 Brit. Yr. Bk. of Int. Law 244 ff. (1955–1956)Google Scholar; Briggs, H. W., “Reservations to the Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,” 93 Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 229 ff. (1958, I)Google Scholar.

39 1960–1961 I.C.J. Yearbook 43–81.

40 Jessup, The Use of International Law 120 (1959). According to William Samore, “ . . . sweeping allegations or ‘historical’ statements to the contrary, the scales of justice at the international level have generally been balanced with as pleasing a degree of impartiality as ever graced an American courthouse.” “National Origins vs. Impartial Decisions: A Study of World Court Holdings,” 34 Chicago-Kent Law Rev. 194 (1956).

41 See Compulsory Jurisdiction, International Court of Justice. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U, S, Senate, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. on S. Res. 94, Jan. 27 and Feb. 17, 1960.

42 Briggs, H. W., “Confidence, Apprehension and the International Court of Justice,” 1960 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 26–27 Google Scholar.

43 Jessup, op. cit. note 40, p. 124.

44 Max, Sørensen, “The International Court of Justice: Its Bole in Contemporary International Relations,” 14 Int. Organization 272 (Spring, 1960)Google Scholar.

45 Thus, out of 24 Asian and 28 African states Members of the U.N., 9 Asian (including Israel) and 4 African (including South Africa) states have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under the Optional Clause of its Statute. 1960–1961 I.C.J. Yearbook 195 ft 46 Out of the 33 contentious cases submitted to the Court they have been parties in five cases. In four cases (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., “Electricité de Beyrouth” Co., Bight of Passage over Indian Territory, and Compagnie du Port, des Quais et des Entrepôts de Beyrouth and Sociéité Badio-orient) they have appeared as defendant states against European countries; in one case (Temple of Preah Vihear) both the parties (Cambodia and Thailand) are Asian states.

47 Northrop, F.S.C., Taming of the Nations 80–81 (New York, 1952)Google Scholar; see also his Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics 160–168 (1960).

48 Northrop, , Taming of the Nations 63–64 (New York, 1952)Google Scholar.

49 Ibid. 124–125.

50 Ibid. 126.

51 Ibid. 61–62.

52 Ibid. 71.

53 Ibid. 81.

54 Quincy, Wright, “The Influence of the New Nations of Asia and Africa upon International Law,” 7 Foreign Affairs Reports 38 (1958)Google Scholar.

55 Wright, , “Asian Experience and International Law,” 1 Int. Studies 84–86 (1959–1960)Google Scholar; see also his Diplomatic Machinery in the Pacific Area 11, 13, 14 (New York, 1936).

56 Quoted by Northrop, Taming of the Nations, Ch. 7 (1952).

57 Quincy Wright, “Asian Experience and International Law,” loc. cit. note 55, p. 71,

58 Radhakrishnan, S., The Hindu View of Life 67–68 (London, 1949)Google Scholar.

59 Ibid. 79.

60 Ibid.73–74.

61 Vivekananda, , “The Vedanta,” Selections from Swami Vivekananda 277 (Calcutta, 1957)Google Scholar.

62 S, Radhakrishnan, op, cit. note 58, p . 66.

63 Ibid, 69,

64 Sarkar, U. C., Epochs in Hindu Legal History 14 (Hoshiarpur, 1958)Google Scholar.

65 The general view, therefore, that rules relating to procedure and forms of action were the most prominent in early law, and the rules of substantive law were evolved only through the expansion of adjective law, does not hold good in the history of the development of Hindu Law. Sir Varadachariar, S., The Hindu Judicial System 84 (Lucknow University, 1946)Google Scholar.

66 Jayaswal, K. P., Hindu Polity 323 (Bangalore, 1943)Google Scholar.

67 Only once in the history of Indian thought did a writer venture to exalt the royal edict above the customary law. Kautilya, Chancellor of Chandragupta Maurya, laid it down in his Arthasastra (written about 300 B. C.) that the royal edict, by its very nature, was of an overriding validity and prevailed, in cases of conflict, over Dharme (traditional code), Vyavahara (contract) and Charitra (local custom); and maybe this rule was followed in the Mauryan Empire. But Kautilya’s rule was not accepted by his successors, with the single exception of Narada (100—400 AJD.); and the general rule was that the king’s edict was valid only insofar as it conformed to the other time-honored sources of law. See K. A. Nilakantha Sastri, “International Law and Relations in Ancient India,” 1 Indian Year Book of Int. Affairs 98 (1952).

68 Jayaswal, op. cit. note 66, pp. 330–331.

69 Priyanath, Sen, The General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence 361 (Tagore Law Lectures, 1909) (Calcutta, 1918)Google Scholar.

70 S. Varadachariar, op. cit. note 65, p. 64; Jayaswal, op. cit. note 66, p. 326.

71 U. C. Sarkar, op. cit. note 64, p. 35.

72 Ibid. 100; Jayaswal, op. cit. note 66, p. 337.

73 S. Varadachariar, op. cit. note 65, p. 123.

74 Ibid. 122.

75 Ibid. 155.

76 Priyanath Sen, op. cit. note 69, p. 364.

77 S. Varadachariar, op. cit. note 65, p. 174.

78 The courts of pugas, srenis, and kulas, referred to above, were analogous to the village panchayats in their jurisdiction and function, and it seems that the modern panchayats are successors of these tribunals. V. C. Sarkar, op. cit. note 64, p. 241.

79 Sarkar, ibid. 239–242. The Indian Constitution made it a directive principle of state policy for the government “to take steps to organize village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government.” (Art. 40.)

80 Sarkar, ibid. 257–259.

81 Contesting the views of Professor Northrop, Professor Freeman says: “In my work in India with lawyers, law schools and courts, I found law as litigious as in America. The ratio of litigation to settlement was greater than in my own practice; the proportionate cost of litigation was higher; the minuteness of legal detail at issue was greater; the insistence on vindication of legal ‘rights’ was comparable. In fact, I felt completely at home with the bench and bar of India and South Asia generally.” Loc. cit. note 23, p. 197.

82 S. Varadaehariar, op. cit. note 65, p. 258.

83 Thus, the well-known Hindu jurist, Dr. Priyanath Sen, says: “Whatever else you may say, no one can claim that our lawgivers were lacking in logical consistency. The Hindu mind has ever been eminently logical; subtlety of discrimination, analytical skill, and logical accuracy in defining legal conceptions have always been its delight; and it has never enunciated a principle without perceiving what it really involves and the deduction which logically follows from it. “ Op. cit. note 69, p. 375. Cf. Quincy Wright as cited above, note 55.

84 During the course of history many Asian states, such as Burma, Siam, Malaya, Cambodia, Sumatra, Java, Bali and Borneo, were influenced by the Indian culture, traditions and law, and Hindu states were established in them. Indian cultural influence is also to be found in China, Tibet, Korea, Japan, and even the Philippine Islands. See Majumdar, R. C. (editor), The History and Culture of the Indian People, Vol. III, pp. xlvii-xlviii (Bombay, 1954)Google Scholar.

85 Julius, Stone, “A Common Law for Mankind?” 1 Int. Studies 430–431 (1959–1960)Google Scholar; “The Rule of Law in the Relations of States,” unpublished John Field Simms Memorial Lecture delivered at the University of New Mexico, April, 1959. Emphasis added.

86 The Institute, in its resolution in 1959, recommended that economic and financial agreements concerning development schemes, whether concluded between states or concluded with states by international organizations or international public corporations, should contain a clause conferring on the International Court of Justice or any other tribunal compulsory jurisdiction in any dispute relating to their interpretation or application. Resolutions adopted by the Institut de Droit International at its Neuchâtel Session, Sept. 3–12, 1959, 48 Annuaire de 1’Institut 383 (1959, II) ; 54 A.J.I.L. 137 (1960). Mr. C. W. Jenks, Rapporteur of the Commission, in his preliminary report said that the best prospect of securing general acceptance of a larger measure of compulsory jurisdiction is to make such acceptance an integral feature of plans which will commend themselves by their political or economic advantages. An important opportunity of this type, he suggested, may arise in connection with the plans for large-scale international economic development schemes. By linking compulsory jurisdiction and economic development in this manner, he felt, we may be able to achieve more in respect of both than would be achieved separately in respect of either. “The Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Courts and Tribunals,” Preliminary Report presented by C. Wilfred Jenks, pp. 135–136 (Geneva, 1957).

87 Julius Stone, “The Rule of Law in the Relations of States,” op. cit. note 85.

88 Ibid.

89 Julius Stone, ibid. That is also the view of Professor E. Giraud, who feels that the prohibition of resort to force and the fear of the new states that the Court will apply traditional law, are the main causes of the neglect of the International Court. Quoted in Working Papers on the Rule of Law Among Nations, American Bar Association, Special Committee on World Peace through Law, p. 29. See also Jenks’ Preliminary Report, op. cit. note 86, pp. 124–126; Jessup, The Use of International Law 133–135 (Ann Arbor, 1959).

90 Lauterpaeht, , Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice, Pt. 111 (London, 1958)Google Scholar.

91 Kunz, J. L., “Compulsory International Adjudication and Maintenance of Peace,” 38 A.J.I.L. 676 (1944)Google Scholar; Habicht, , The Power of the International Judge to Give a Decision ex Aequo et Bono 80 (London, 1935)Google Scholar.

92 Max Sørensen, loc. cit. note 44, p. 274.

93 See above. Mr. Jenks also holds the same view. Op. cit. note 86, pp. 135–136.

94 Ibid.

95 Sohn, Louis B., “Proposals for the Establishment of a System of International Tribunals,” in Domke (ed.), International Trade Arbitration 64 (1958)Google Scholar.

96 Quoted by Jessup, op. cit. note 40, pp. 106–107.

97 Jessup, ibid. 107.

98 Sohn, loc. oit. note 95, p. 64.

99 Ibid. 65.

100 Working Papers on the Rule of Law Among Nations, American Bar Association, Special Committee on World Peace Through Law 34 (1959).

101 At present there are only three judges from the Asian-African countries, viz., China, Japan, and Egypt.

102 Professor Jessup has rightly pointed out that the contest for places on the Bench of the Court is inspired by the desire for prestige (national or individual) rather than by any governmental conviction that the presence of one of its nationals is necessary to secure a well-balanced and impartial judiciary. Op. cit. note 40, p. 126.

103 C. W. Jenks, Preliminary Report, op. cit. note 40, p. 124.

104 “The United Kingdom representative, speaking on behalf of the three co-sponsoring Powers, said: ‘ . . . these legal issues are no doubt debatable, but I do not consider that it is necessary for the Security Council to go into them. . . . The view which the Council takes on this question should depend, in our opinion, on the actual situation as it exists rather than on any legal technicalities.’ The objections to this brushing aside of the legal issues came from Egypt, as a party in interest, and from China and India.” Arthur, Larson, “Peace Through Law; The R61e and Limits of Adjudication—Some Contemporary Applications,” 1960 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 12 Google Scholar.

105 Ibid.

106 Certain Norwegian Loans Case, [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9.

107 Interhandel Case, [1959] ibid. 6.

108 Jessup, op. cit. note 40, p. 136.

109 See Aerial Incident eases brought by the U. S. A. and other non-Communist states against the Soviet Union and other members of the Soviet group. 1959–1960 I.C.J. Yearbook 37–38; Jessup, Philip C., “International Litigation as a Friendly Act,” 60 Columbia Law Rev. 29 (1960)Google Scholar.

110 As we have seen, in the Interhandel case the United States tried every means to avoid international litigation. A similar attitude was shown by Norway (Certain Norwegian Loans Case), India (Case of Right of Passage over Indian Territory), and Iran (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case), when they were arraigned before the Court. See also Jessup, “International Litigation as a Friendly Act,” loc. cit. 30, 31.

111 Jessup, ibid. 24 ff.; Richard N. Gardner, “International Economic Litigation as a Friendly Act,” ibid. 35 ff.

112 See Jessup, , The Use of International Law 154 (1959)Google Scholar.