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Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2000

Jeffrey S. Banks
Jeffrey S. Banks*
Affiliation:
California Institute of Technology
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Abstract

I analyze the finite-voter version of the Groseclose and Snyder vote-buying model. I identify how the optimal coalition size varies with the underlying preference parameters; derive necessary and sufficient conditions for minimal majority and universal coalitions to form; and show that the necessary condition for minimal majorities found in Groseclose and Snyder is incorrect.

Type
Forum
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 94 , Issue 3 , September 2000 , pp. 677 - 681
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2000

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References

REFERENCES

Baron, David, and Ferejohn, John. 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 83 (December): 1181–206.10.2307/1961664CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Browne, Eric. 1993. Coalition Theories: A Logical and Empirical Critique. London: Sage.Google Scholar
Groseclose, Tim, and Snyder, James M. Jr. 1996. “Buying Supermajorities.” American Political Science Review 90 (June): 303–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, William. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar