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Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Gary W. Cox
Gary W. Cox
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
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Abstract

Previous investigations of strategic voting equilibria in mass electorates have looked only at single-member districts. I shall investigate such equilibria in multimember districts operating under the single nontransferable vote system. What appear to be the most natural equilibria conform to the M + 1 rule, according to which strategic voting in M-seat districts produces exactly M + 1 vote-getting candidates in equilibrium, any others having their support totally undercut. This result provides the beginnings of a formal underpinning for Reed's recent extension of Duverger's Law to the Japanese case. The model also generates specific and empirically testable hypotheses concerning the exceptions to the M + 1 rule that one ought to expect in equilibrium. I test these hypotheses with Japanese data. Finally, the model also reveals a type of strategic voting that is specific to multimember districts. I use Japanese data again to explore the empirical importance of this kind of strategic voting.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 88 , Issue 3 , September 1994 , pp. 608 - 621
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1994

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