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Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

Peter D. Taylor*
Affiliation:
Queen's University
*
Postal address: Department of Mathematics, Jeffery Hall, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6.

Abstract

A definition of ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) is suggested for games in which there are two types of player, each with its own set of strategies, and the fitness of any strategy depends upon the strategy mix, of both types, in the population as a whole. We check that the standard ESS results hold for this definition and discuss a mate-desertion model which has appeared in the literature in which the two types are male and female.

Type
Research Papers
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 1979 

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