The Impact of Environmental Administrative Penalties on the Disclosure of Environmental Information
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development
2.1. Legitimacy Management and EID
2.2. Impression Management and EID
2.3. Environmental Administrative Penalty and the Voluntary EID
2.4. Environmental Administrative Penalty and the Mandatory EID
2.5. Impression Management and the Quality of EID in the Context of Environmental Administrative Penalty
3. Research Methods and Data Sources
3.1. Samples and Data Sources
3.2. Selection and Measurement of Variables
3.2.1. Measurement of EID Level
3.2.2. Measurement of Environmental Information Quality
3.2.3. Measurement of Explanatory Variables and Control Variables
3.3. Metrological Model
4. Empirical Results and Analyses
4.1. Descriptive Results and Variable Correlations
4.2. Regression Results between the Environmental Administrative Penalty and EID
4.3. Further Test
4.3.1. One-Way ANOVA: A Post-Hoc Test for Comparing These Effects
4.3.2. Independent Sample T-Test for Distinguishing the Change of Information Quality Feature
4.4. Robustness Test
4.4.1. Environmental Information Disclosure and the Environmental Penalty: Based on the Propensity Score Matching Method
4.4.2. Different Types of Environmental Administrative Penalty and Environmental Information Disclosure
5. Discussion and Conclusion
5.1. Discussion
5.2. Implications
5.3. Contributions, Limitations, and Future Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Sample | Number |
---|---|
The number of listed companies that disclosed environmental information in 2014 | 706 |
The number of manufacturing companies that disclosed environmental information uninterrupted from 2014 to 2016 (losing 372 companies) | 334 |
The number of samples of missing explanatory variables (losing 18 companies) | 18 |
Final sample number | 316 |
Category | Items |
---|---|
Environmental values, policies, and organization | 1. The values of operator’s environment 2. Environmental protection policies and objectives 3. Environmental protection organization structure and personnel responsibility |
Environmental management system and initiative | 1. International Organization for Standardization Certification and other environmental certification 2. Voluntary cleaner production 3. Environmental education and training 4. Plant greening and working environment improvement 5. Environmental information exchange with stakeholders 6. The implementation of environmental accounting 7. Participate in government environmental protection projects 8. Environmental honor 9. Third-party environmental audit |
Environmental technology, environmental investment, and expenditure | 1. Research and development of environmental technology 2. Waste treatment and technology development 3. Construction and operation of environmental protection facilities 4. Environmental loans or investments 5. Environmental-related government grants and subsidies, etc. 6. Environmental recurrent expenditure |
Resource consumption and Environmental performance | 1. Total resource consumption 2. Total pollution discharge 3. Resource consumption per unit of raw materials, water resources consumption, energy consumption, etc. 4. Wastewater per unit of raw materials, emissions of major pollutants, greenhouse gas emissions, etc. 5. Environmental benefits such as revenue from the wastes, etc. 6. Social benefits of reducing emissions |
Environmental protection public welfare activities | 1. Environmental-related social activities 2. Potential environmental impacts such as global warming 3. Other environmental activities |
Pollution control and environmental compliance | 1. Discharge of pollution up to standard 2. Completion of total emission reduction tasks 3. Implementation of the “three simultaneous” systems 4. Status of sewage charges 5. General industrial solid waste and hazardous waste disposal according to law 6. Applications for discharge permit 7. Noise condition 8. Environmental impact assessment |
Significant environmental impacts, events, and risk management | 1. Environmental violation and environmental contamination in accident 2. The establishment and operation of the environmental risk management system 3. Construction projects with significant environmental impact 4. Whether or not to be included in the list of serious pollution enterprises 5. Major risk sources of company 6. Resident complaint 7. The impact of environmental laws and regulations on the operation of the company 8. The complete situation of an emergency plan for environmental emergencies |
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy | 0.749 | |
---|---|---|
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity | Approx. chi-square | 509.933 |
df | 66 | |
Sig. | 0.000 |
Characteristics | % | Evaluation Items |
---|---|---|
Relevance | 8.6 | I1: Item reflects the past performance of the enterprise in the field of environmental protection. (No disclosure: assigned 0; simple text: assigned 1; detailed text description: assigned 2; data quantification: assigned 3) |
7.5 | I2: Item contains information about the company’s plans for environmental protection. (No disclosure: assigned 0; simple text: assigned 1; detailed text description: assigned 2; data quantification: assigned 3) | |
Reliability | 8.9 | I3: Whether the report has been examined by a third-party professional body. (If no disclosure: assigned 0; it is examined by an expert in a certain field of social responsibility: assigned 1; it is a well-known domestic audit institution: assigned 2; the audit body is a major international accounting firm or an internationally renowned social responsibility reporting organization: assigned 3.) |
8.7 | I4: Authenticity and accuracy of environmental information disclosed. (In the social responsibility report, if there is no proof of the degree of inspection and no commitment: assigned 0; an audit by the principal: assigned 1; the company promises that the information disclosed in the report is true and accurate: assigned 2; the “The degree of examination specified in the inspection statement” is a total or deep audit: assigned 3.) | |
Comprehensibility | 7.5 | I5: Information disclosure is presented in a quantitative form and is clear and easy to read. (No quantitative information: assigned 0; a small amount of quantitative information: assigned 1; a large quantity of quantitative information: assigned 2; quantitative information displayed in tables or histograms: assigned 3.) |
7.8 | I6: Qualitative environmental information is intuitive, visual, and easy to understand. (There are no pictures, cases, and news reports in real time, no term interpretation: assigned 0; only a small number of pictures, cases, or factual news reports, terms interpretation: assigned 1; some information has pictures, cases, or news reports, the term interpretation: assigned 2; a large number of pictures, cases, or factual news reports; the term interpretation: assigned 3.) | |
Comparability | 7.7 | I7: Compliance with uniform reporting criteria. (If the uniform reporting specification is not followed: assigned 0; the reporting standard is “Company Act” or “Measures on the publicity of Environmental Information in Enterprises and Institutions”: assigned 1; if it refers to one of the criteria from the “Guidelines on social responsibility of listed companies”, “Guidelines on environmental information disclosure of listed companies”, “Guidelines on the compilation of enterprise environmental reports” and “Guidelines on environmental information disclosure of listed companies”: assigned 2; the company’s environment report that cites two or more criteria: assigned 3.) |
Balance | 9.6 | I8: Description, reasons, and countermeasures for the occurrence of substantive negative information on environmental protection during the reporting period. (In detail, it refers to the disclosure of information about adverse environmental events, as well as measures to rectify existing loopholes in environmental protection. If no disclosure: assigned 0; simple text disclosure: assigned 1; detailed text description: assigned 2; data quantification: assigned 3.) |
7.3 | I9: There is no bias toward a stakeholder: This part of the environmental information refers to substantive environmental issues where companies actively responded to the concerns of investors, creditors, the public, the employee government, etc. (If reference is made in the report to a substantive environmental issue of concern to a particular stakeholder: assigned 1; a simple textual description of a substantive topic of concern to multiple stakeholders: assigned 2; it uses data, pictures, or tabular details to describe substantive issues of concern to multiple stakeholders: assigned 3.) | |
Integrality | 8.5 | I10: No information reflecting significant environmental impacts is omitted. (In the environmental report, if the board of directors and all directors of the company guarantee that there is no material omission in the report: assigned 3; if no disclosure: assigned 0.) |
9.3 | I11: Covers all major environmental events during the reporting period and their impact on future projections. (In detail, it refers to the disclosure of the impact of energy conservation, emission reduction, and major environmental impact projects on enterprise development. If no disclosure: assigned 0; simple text: assigned 1; detailed text description: assigned 2; data quantification: assigned 3.) | |
8.6 | I12: Information on the environment is included for all entities controlled or affected by the company during the reporting period. (In detail, it refers to whether the environmental report includes the environmental information of the headquarters of the group and its subordinate units. If no disclosure: assigned 0; simple text: assigned 1; detailed text description: assigned 2; data quantification: assigned 3.) |
Variable | Min | Max | Mean | S.D. | Penalty | ∆VEIDL | ∆MEIDL | ∆EIDQ | Growth | Lev | Roe | Size | Soe | Pollu | Audit | Safty | Media | Herfi5 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Penalty | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.068 | 0.252 | 1 | |||||||||||||
∆VEIDL | −7.910 | 11.01 | 0.099 | 1.829 | 0.240 ** | 1 | ||||||||||||
∆MEIDL | −6.020 | 14.01 | 0.012 | 1.112 | −0.016 * | 0.236 ** | 1 | |||||||||||
∆EIDQ | −0.742 | 0.466 | −0.001 | 0.170 | −0.302 ** | 0.005 | 0.035 | 1 | ||||||||||
Growth | −1.725 | 5.970 | 0.124 | 0.615 | 0.101 * | 0.283 ** | 0.078 * | 0.041 | 1 | |||||||||
Lev | 0.031 | 1.345 | 0.450 | 0.204 | −0.084 * | −0.086 * | −0.018 | −0.075 | 0.016 | 1 | ||||||||
Roe | −2.141 | 3.499 | 0.068 | 0.241 | 0.244 ** | 0.098 * | 0.041 | 0.087 * | 0.049 | −0.167 ** | 1 | |||||||
Size | 0.777 | 8.684 | 4.529 | 1.361 | 0.199 ** | 0.224 ** | 0.068 | −0.054 | 0.012 | 0.386 ** | 0.114 ** | 1 | ||||||
Soe | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.212 | 0.409 | −0.017 | 0.071 | −0.006 | 0.012 | 0.073 | 0.044 | −0.04 | 0.017 | 1 | |||||
Pollu | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.467 | 0.499 | 0.226 ** | −0.038 | −0.043 | −0.124 ** | −0.074 | 0.019 | −0.029 | 0.024 | −0.051 | 1 | ||||
Audit | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.149 | 0.356 | −0.042 | −0.030 | 0.050 | 0.067 | −0.037 | 0.06 | 0.057 | 0.252 ** | −0.065 | −0.017 | 1 | |||
Safty | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.820 | 0.385 | −0.037 | −0.008 | −0.052 | −0.028 | −0.113 ** | 0.039 | −0.05 | 0.054 | 0.082 * | 0.043 | 0.080 * | 1 | ||
Media | 0.000 | 13.00 | 3.502 | 2.143 | 0.213 ** | 0.373 ** | 0.195 ** | 0.003 * | 0.187 ** | 0.062 | 0.096 * | 0.191 ** | 0.041 | −0.025 | 0.058 | −0.003 | 1 | |
Herfi5 | 0.000 | 0.681 | 0.139 | 0.126 | 0.029 | −0.018 | 0.018 | −0.033 | −0.064 | 0.139 ** | 0.008 | 0.222 ** | 0.135 ** | 0.047 | 0.093 * | 0.072 | 0.005 | 1 |
Regression | Regression | Regression | |
---|---|---|---|
(1) ∆VEIDL | (2) ∆MEIDL | (3) ∆EIDQ | |
Penalty | 0.559 ***(3.75) | −1.680 **(−1.99) | −0.810 ***(−6.37) |
Growth | 0.438 ***(5.64) | 0.02(0.21) | 0.002 **(1.97) |
Lev | −0.127(−0.80) | −0.259(−0.93) | −0.039(−1.10) |
Roe | 0.021(0.01) | 0.104(0.56) | 0. 140(1.55) |
Size | 0.110 ***(2.74) | 0.015(0.32) | −0.01(−1.06) |
Soe | 0.153(1.34) | −0.066(−0.46) | −0.01(−0.03) |
Pollu | −0.094(−0.98) | −0.022 *(−1.75) | |
Audit | −0.087 *(−1.65) | 0.06 **(1.97) | 0.028 ***(4.48) |
Media | 0.586 ***(25.83) | 0.10 ***(3.37) | 0.040 *(1.66) |
Herfi 5 | −0.545 *(−1.73) | −0.079(−0.17) | −0.055(−1.05) |
Cons | −2.043 ***(−10.71) | −0.263 ***(−3.20) | −0.032(−1.23) |
Year | YES | YES | YES |
N | 632 | 294 | 632 |
Adj-R2 | 0.602 | 0.191 | 0.214 |
F-stat | 68.06 *** | 15.70 *** | 18.37 *** |
Variable: ∆VEIDL | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(I) Types | (J) Types | Mean Difference (I-J) | Std. Error | Sig. |
EE | EPI | −0.302 | 0.279 | 0.287 |
CPAEL | 0.066 | 0.247 | 0.792 | |
EPI | EE | 0.302 | 0.279 | 0.287 |
CPAEL | 0.368 | 0.304 | 0.234 | |
CPAEL | EE | −0.066 | 0.248 | 0.792 |
EPI | −0.368 | 0.304 | 0.234 |
Variable: ∆EIDQ | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(I) Types | (J) Types | Mean Difference (I-J) | Std. Error | Sig. |
EE | EPI | −0.039 | 0.092 | 0.672 |
CPAEL | −0.054 | 0.082 | 0.509 | |
EPI | EE | 0.039 | 0.092 | 0.672 |
CPAEL | −0.015 | 0.100 | 0.881 | |
CPAEL | EE | 0.054 | 0.082 | 0.509 |
EPI | 0.015 | 0.100 | 0.881 |
Sample 1 (Year: 2015) | Sample 2 (Year: 2016) | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Characteristics | Type | N | Mean | N | Mean |
Relevance | Penalized company | 16 | −0.019 | 27 | −0.017 |
Non-penalized company | 300 | 0.002 | 289 | 0.018 | |
Reliability | Penalized company | 16 | 0.000 | 27 | 0.001 |
Non-penalized company | 300 | −0.001 | 289 | 0.002 | |
Comprehensibility | Penalized company | 16 | −0.052 | 27 | −0.003 |
Non-penalized company | 300 | 0.012 | 289 | 0.001 | |
Comparability | Penalized company | 16 | 0.024 | 27 | 0.000 |
Non-penalized company | 300 | 0.016 | 289 | 0.000 | |
Balance | Penalized company | 16 | −0.127 | 27 | −0.045 |
Non-penalized company | 300 | 0.032 | 289 | −0.065 | |
Integrality | Penalized company | 16 | −0.258 | 27 | −0.052 |
Non-penalized company | 300 | −0.001 | 289 | 0.019 |
Sample 1 | Sample 2 | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Levene’s Test | T-Test | Levene’s Test | T-Test | ||||||
F | Sig. | t | Sig. | F | Sig. | t | Sig. | ||
Relevance | Equal variances assumed | 1.279 | 0.259 | −1.991 | 0.047 | 0.050 | 0.823 | −2.589 | 0.010 |
Equal variances not assumed | −2.413 | 0.027 | −2.809 | 0.008 | |||||
Reliability | Equal variances assumed | 2.319 | 0.129 | 0.168 | 0.867 | 1.357 | 0.245 | −0.430 | 0.667 |
Equal variances not assumed | 0.111 | 0.913 | −1.409 | 0.160 | |||||
Comprehensibility | Equal variances assumed | 94.31 | 0.000 | 4.558 | 0.000 | 1.042 | 0.308 | 3.531 | 0.006 |
Equal variances not assumed | 1.964 | 0.064 | 2.502 | 0.020 | |||||
Comparability | Equal variances assumed | 0.984 | 0.322 | 0.700 | 0.485 | 0.375 | 0.541 | −0.305 | 0.760 |
Equal variances not assumed | 0.645 | 0.528 | −1.000 | 0.318 | |||||
Balance | Equal variances assumed | 0.464 | 0.496 | −4.472 | 0.000 | 0.279 | 0.598 | 0.744 | 0.457 |
Equal variances not assumed | −5.917 | 0.000 | 0.756 | 0.456 | |||||
Integrality | Equal variances assumed | 491.4 | 0.000 | −19.59 | 0.000 | 0.003 | 0.953 | −3.315 | 0.001 |
Equal variances not assumed | −4.700 | 0.000 | −4.075 | 0.000 |
Probit Model | Nearest Neighbor | Nearest Neighbor (caliper = 0.01) | Probit Model | Nearest Neighbor | Nearest Neighbor (caliper = 0.01) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
PENALTY | ∆VEIDL | ∆VEIDL | PENALTY | ∆MEIDL | ∆MEIDL | |
Penalty | 1.427 *** | 1.452 *** | −0.435 ** | −0.325 ** | ||
(5.02) | (4.67) | (−2.17) | (−2.25) | |||
Lev | −4.121 *** | −1.148 *** | −0.714 | −3.148 *** | −0.403 | −0.407 |
(−4.26) | (−2.74) | (−1.54) | (−3.26) | (−1.31) | (−1.38) | |
Size | 1.015 *** | 0.323 *** | 0.479 *** | 0.895 *** | 0.064 | 0.114 * |
(6.13) | (3.80) | (5.08) | (5.14) | (0.99) | (1.76) | |
Soe | 0.042 | 0.021 | 0.017 | 0.338 | −0.702 *** | −0.650 *** |
(0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.71) | (−4.54) | (−4.65) | |
Audit | −1.096 * | −0.522 * | −0.732 ** | −0.588 | 0.216 | 0.002 |
(−1.78) | (−1.89) | (−2.48) | (−0.94) | (1.26) | (0.01) | |
Safty | −0.766 * | −0.863 * | ||||
(−1.76) | (−1.84) | |||||
Pollu | 2.422 *** | −0.423 | −0.018 | |||
(4.75) | (−1.46) | (−0.06) | ||||
Growth | 0.005 | 0.021 | 0.023 | 0.011 | ||
(0.07) | (0.21) | (0.49) | (0.34) | |||
Roe | 0.632 | 0.714 | −3.112 *** | −2.506 *** | ||
(1.14) | (1.18) | (−7.19) | (−6.27) | |||
Media | 0.403 *** | 0.420 *** | 0.240 *** | 0.212 *** | ||
(8.37) | (8.19) | (7.00) | (6.05) | |||
Herfi 5 | −1.952 ** | −2.135 ** | −0.944 | −0.452 | ||
(−2.44) | (−2.54) | (−1.64) | (−0.85) | |||
Cons | −6.889 *** | −2.605 *** | −3.675 *** | −4.271 *** | 0.443 | 0.509 |
(−7.15) | (−4.16) | (−5.47) | (−4.98) | (1.09) | (1.34) | |
YEAR | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
N | 632 | 152 | 138 | 294 | 120 | 104 |
F-stat | 21.08 *** | 21.20 *** | 9.317 *** | 8.421 *** | ||
Adj-R2 | 0.594 | 0.649 | 0.461 | 0.475 | ||
Pseudo R2 | 0.284 | 0.161 |
Probit Model | Nearest Neighbor | Nearest Neighbor (caliper = 0.01) | |
---|---|---|---|
(1) | (7) | (8) | |
PENALTY | ∆EIDQ | ∆EIDQ | |
Penalty | −0.279 ***(−5.04) | −0.311 ***(−5.17) | |
Lev | −4.121 ***(−4.26) | −0.004(−0.04) | −0.029(−0.33) |
Size | 1.015 ***(6.13) | −0.058 ***(−3.53) | −0.058 ***(−3.22) |
Soe | 0.042(0.09) | −0.022(−0.53) | −0.040(−0.98) |
Audit | −1.096 *(−1.78) | 0.036(0.67) | 0.025(0.44) |
Safty | −0.766 *(−1.76) | ||
Pollu | 2.422 ***(4.75) | −0.109*(−1.93) | −0.068(−1.11) |
Growth | 0.014(0.94) | 0.012(0.59) | |
Roe | 0.114(1.06) | 0.049(0.43) | |
Media | 0.057 ***(6.06) | 0.061 ***(6.02) | |
Herfi 5 | −0.462 ***(−2.97) | −0.387 **(−2.37) | |
Cons | −6.889 ***(−7.15) | 0.239*(1.96) | 0.208(1.60) |
YEAR | YES | YES | YES |
N | 632 | 152 | 138 |
F-stat | 9.523 *** | 9.030 *** | |
Adj- R2 | 0.428 | 0.440 | |
Pseudo R2 | 0.284 |
Regression | Regression | Regression | |
---|---|---|---|
(1) ∆VEIDL | (2) ∆MEIDL | (3) ∆EIDQ | |
EE | 0.572 **(2.08) | −0.200 *(−1.73) | −0.206 ***(−4.39) |
EPI | 0.364 *(1.81) | −0.071 **(−1.97) | −0.172 ***(−3.08) |
CPAEL | 0.666 **(1.98) | −0.245(−1.57) | −0.147 ***(−3.17) |
Growth | 0.438 ***(5.63) | 0.024(0.24) | 0.001(1.13) |
Lev | −0.115(−0.75) | −0.244(−0.87) | −0.036(−1.03) |
Roe | 0.010(0.01) | 0.102(0.56) | 0.151(0.55) |
Size | 0.113 ***(2.76) | 0.012(0.25) | −0.095(−0.64) |
Soe | 0.154(1.34) | −0.074(−0.51) | −0.001 (−0.95) |
Pollu | −0.096(−1.00) | −0.022*(−1.73) | |
Audit | −0.088 *(−1.65) | 0.060 *(1.73) | 0.027 *(1.86) |
Media | 0.586 ***(25.79) | 0.100 ***(3.36) | 0.004 ***(4.33) |
Herfi 5 | −0.539 *(−1.72) | −0.053(−0.12) | −0.052(−0.99) |
Year | YES | YES | YES |
Cons | −2.046 ***(−10.69) | −0.990 ***(−2.61) | −0.621(−1.15) |
N | 632 | 294 | 632 |
Adj-R2 | 0.602 | 0.172 | 0.197 |
F-stat | 64.35 *** | 13.79 *** | 15.11 *** |
© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Ding, X.; Qu, Y.; Shahzad, M. The Impact of Environmental Administrative Penalties on the Disclosure of Environmental Information. Sustainability 2019, 11, 5820. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11205820
Ding X, Qu Y, Shahzad M. The Impact of Environmental Administrative Penalties on the Disclosure of Environmental Information. Sustainability. 2019; 11(20):5820. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11205820
Chicago/Turabian StyleDing, Xiangan, Ying Qu, and Mohsin Shahzad. 2019. "The Impact of Environmental Administrative Penalties on the Disclosure of Environmental Information" Sustainability 11, no. 20: 5820. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11205820