ABSTRACT
Testimonial injustice is a disposition to fail to see speakers as credible when they are credible, due to the hearer's identity prejudice. Though it is possible for a hearer to inflict a single instance of testimonial injustice on a speaker as a 'one-off', this chapter focuses on testimonial injustice as a disposition of hearers. The chapter then argues that testimonial injustice is an epistemic vice. First and foremost, it is an epistemic vice because it consistently produces bad epistemic effects - e.g., it impedes the transmission of knowledge. It is epistemically vicious insofar as it expresses those bad epistemic values and motives - e.g., it expresses the racist values and motives of Tom Robinson's jurors. The chapter also argues that testimonial injustice can take the form of an effects-viceor a personalist-vice, even if it sometimes - perhaps often - falls short of a responsibilist-vice.
