The War Ledger
by A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler
University of Chicago Press, 1980
Cloth: 978-0-226-63279-7 | Paper: 978-0-226-63280-3 | Electronic: 978-0-226-35184-1
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226351841.001.0001
ABOUT THIS BOOKAUTHOR BIOGRAPHYTABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THIS BOOK

The War Ledger provides fresh, sophisticated answers to fundamental questions about major modern wars: Why do major wars begin? What accounts for victory or defeat in war? How do victory and defeat influence the recovery of the combatants? Are the rules governing conflict behavior between nations the same since the advent of the nuclear era?

The authors find such well-known theories as the balance of power and collective security systems inadequate to explain how conflict erupts in the international system. Their rigorous empirical analysis proves that the power-transition theory, hinging on economic, social, and political growth, is more accurate; it is the differential rate of growth of the two most powerful nations in the system—the dominant nation and the challenger—that destabilizes all members and precipitates world wars.

Predictions of who will win or lose a war, the authors find, depend not only on the power potential of a nation but on the capability of its political systems to mobilize its resources—the "political capacity indicator." After examining the aftermath of major conflicts, the authors identify national growth as the determining factor in a nation's recovery. With victory, national capabilities may increase or decrease; with defeat, losses can be enormous. Unexpectedly, however, in less than two decades, losers make up for their losses and all combatants find themselves where they would have been had no war occurred.

Finally, the authors address the question of nuclear arsenals. They find that these arsenals do not make the difference that is usually assumed. Nuclear weapons have not changed the structure of power on which international politics rests. Nor does the behavior of participants in nuclear confrontation meet the expectations set out in deterrence theory.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

A. F. K. Organski is professor of political science at the University of Michigan. Jacek Kugler is professor of political science at Vanderbilt University. They are the coauthors, with J. Timothy Johnson and Youssef Cohen, of Births, Deaths, and Taxes: The Demographic and Political Transitions, also published by the University of Chicago Press.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Of Power

Of Size and Growth

Of Nuclear Weapons

Plan of the Book

One Causes, Beginnings and Predictions: The Power Transition

Three Models

Comparison of the Three Models

Preparation for the Testing of a Model

Empirical Tests of the Power-Distribution Models

Conclusion

Two Davids and Goliaths: Predicting the Outcomes of International Wars

Power Indicators: Existing Measures

The Missing Measure of Political Development

Construction of a Measure of Political Development

An Index of Governmental Extraction

A New Measure of National Capabilities

Tests, Hypotheses, and Findings

Conclusion

Three The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor

Theoretical Propositions

Indexing National Capabilities or Power Resources

Estimating Consequences of War

Choice of Test Cases

Actors

Empirical Propositions

Findings

The Phoenix Factor

Conclusion

Four Nuclear Arms Races and Deterrence

Deterrents and Deterrence

Testing Deterrence: Outcomes of Crises

Testing Mutual Deterrence: The Nuclear Arms Race

Conclusion

A Note on Architecture

Major Wars: Beginnings

Predictions of War Outcomes

The Phoenix Factor

Deterrence and Arms Races

Beyond the Data

Appendix 1: Index of Political Development

Appendix 2: Postwar American Aid

Appendix 3: Analysis of Models

Notes

Bibliography

Index