Castles, Battles, and Bombs

Castles, Battles, and Bombs How Economics Explains Military History

by Jurgen Brauer and Hubert van Tuyll

University of Chicago Press, 2008
Cloth: 978-0-226-07163-3 | Paper: 978-0-226-07164-0 | Electronic: 978-0-226-07165-7
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226071657.001.0001

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ABOUT THIS BOOKAUTHOR BIOGRAPHYREVIEWSTABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THIS BOOK

Castles, Battles, and Bombs reconsiders key episodes of military history from the point of view of economics—with dramatically insightful results. For example, when looked at as a question of sheer cost, the building of castles in the High Middle Ages seems almost inevitable: though stunningly expensive, a strong castle was far cheaper to maintain than a standing army. The authors also reexamine the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II and provide new insights into France’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. Drawing on these examples and more, Brauer and Van Tuyll suggest lessons for today’s military, from counterterrorist strategy and military manpower planning to the use of private military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

"In bringing economics into assessments of military history, [the authors] also bring illumination. . . . [The authors] turn their interdisciplinary lens on the mercenary arrangements of Renaissance Italy; the wars of Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon; Grant's campaigns in the Civil War; and the strategic bombings of World War II. The results are invariably stimulating."—Martin Walker, Wilson Quarterly

"This study is serious, creative, important. As an economist I am happy to see economics so professionally applied to illuminate major decisions in the history of warfare."—Thomas C. Schelling, Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Jurgen Brauer is professor of economics in the James M. Hull College of Business at Augusta State University and the author of Arms Trade and Economic Development. Hubert P. van Tuyll is professor of history and chair of the Department of History, Anthropology, and Philosophy at Augusta State University. He is the author of The Netherlands and World War I.

REVIEWS

"My skepticism was relieved by the preface, my expectations enhanced by the first chapter, my confidence assured by the second. This study is serious, creative, important. As an economist I am happy to see economics so professionally applied to illuminate major decisions in the history of warfare."

— Thomas C. Schelling, University of Maryland, winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics

“Rarely does reading a book offer such rewards. Unarguably scholarly, cast in Jared Diamond’s mold, Brauer and van Tuyll’s work transported this economic historian across centuries and into realms that opened my eyes and engaged my imagination, both as an historian and an economist. My understanding of a past I thought I knew has been broadened and deepened and my teaching of that past forever altered. I enjoyed the journey. I am in the authors’ debt.”

— John J. McCusker, Trinity University

— Martin Walker, Wilson Quarterly

"The authors have cogently synthesized an extensive literature to effectively demonstrate to nonspecialists how basic economic concepts can provide insights into the nature of war."

— Choice

“[Brauer and van Tuyll’s] analysis and discussion of military history is fascinating and mirrors the substantial recent interest on the economic dimensions of conflicts and the fiscal important of strategic choices. . . . The strengths of this book include the clarity of the material and the writing style, the accessibility of both the economic theory and historical cases used, and the various illustrations and additional materials. . . . I can heartily recommend this for everyone interested in military history and on how economics theory can help us understand historical outcomes better.”

— Jari Eloranta, Journal of Economic History

"[The authors] are to be congratulated for adding an imaginative, logical, and hitherto mostly ignored explanation for the apparent irrationality of wars and warmaking. When they apply their theories to the present, [they] take much of the emotion and partisanship out of contemporary discussions, showing how many controversial choices are in fact guided by economic necessities rather than supposedly shallow and bad men."

— Victo Davis Hanson, Claremont Review of Books

"There is a need for a closer study of the historical relationship between economics and war....This is not that book. Its title suggests that it might be something else, at once more narrow and yet possibly more instructive: an attempt to explain decisions taken in war as a product of economic considerations."

— The International History Review

List of Figures and Tables

Preface

One: Economics

Economics

Principle I: Opportunity Cost

Principle II: Expected Marginal Costs and Benefits

Principle III: Substitution

Principle IV: Diminishing Marginal Returns

Principle V: Asymmetric Information and Hidden Characteristics

Principle VI: Hidden Actions and Incentive Alignments

Conclusion: Economics—and Military History

Two: The High Middle Ages, 1000–1300: The Case of the Medieval Castle and the Opportunity Cost of Warfare

Opportunity Cost and Warfare

The Ubiquity of Castles

The Cost of Castling

The Advantages of Castles

The Cost of Armies

Castle Building and the Other Principles of Economics

Conclusion

Three: The Renaissance, 1300–1600: The Case of the Condottieri and the Military Labor Market

The Principal-Agent Problem

Demand, Supply, and Recruitment

Contracts and Pay

Control and Contract Evolution

The Development of Permanent Armies

Condottieri and the Other Principles of Economics

Conclusion

Four: The Age of Battle, 1618–1815: The Case of Costs, Benefits, and the Decision to Offer Battle

Expected Marginal Costs and Benefits of Battle

The 1600s: Gustavus Adolphus and Raimondo de Montecuccoli

The 1700s: Marlborough, de Saxe, and Frederick the Great

Napoleonic Warfare

The Age of Battle and the Other Principles of Economics

Conclusion

Five: The Age of Revolution, 1789–1914: The Case of the American Civil War and the Economics of Information Asymmetry

Information and Warfare

North, South, and the Search for Information

Major Eastern Campaigns through Gettysburg

Grant in Virginia

The American Civil War and the Other Principles of Economics

Conclusion

Six: The Age of the World Wars, 1914–1945: The Case of Diminishing Marginal Returns to the Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II

A Strategic Bombing Production Function

Bombing German War Production

Bombing the Supply Chain and the Civilian Economy

Bombing German Morale

Assessing the Effect of Strategic Bombing

Strategic Bombing and the Other Principles of Economics

Conclusion

Seven: The Age of the Cold War, 1945–1991: The Case of Capital-Labor Substitution and France’s Force de Frappe

History of the Force de Frappe

The Force Post–De Gaulle

Justifying the Force

The Force’s Effect on France’s Conventional Arms

Substituting Nuclear for Conventional Forces

The Force de Frappe and the Other Principles of Economics

Conclusion

Eight: Economics and Military History in the Twenty-first Century

Economics of Terrorism

Economics of Military Manpower

Economics of Private Military Companies

Economics, Historiography, and Military History

Conclusion

Notes

References

Index