Rule Breaking and Political Imagination
by Kenneth A. Shepsle
University of Chicago Press, 2017
Cloth: 978-0-226-47318-5 | Paper: 978-0-226-47321-5 | Electronic: 978-0-226-47335-2
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.001.0001
ABOUT THIS BOOKAUTHOR BIOGRAPHYREVIEWSTABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THIS BOOK

“Imagination may be thought of as a ‘work-around.’ It is a resourceful tactic to ‘undo’ a rule by creating a path around it without necessarily defying it. . . . Transgression, on the other hand, is rule breaking. There is no pretense of reinterpretation; it is defiance pure and simple. Whether imagination or disobedience is the source, constraints need not constrain, ties need not bind.”
           
So writes Kenneth A. Shepsle in his introduction to Rule Breaking and Political Imagination. Institutions are thought to channel the choices of individual actors. But what about when they do not? Throughout history, leaders and politicians have used imagination and transgression to break with constraints upon their agency. Shepsle ranges from ancient Rome to the United States Senate, and from Lyndon B. Johnson to the British House of Commons. He also explores rule breaking in less formal contexts, such as vigilantism in the Old West and the CIA’s actions in the wake of 9/11. Entertaining and thought-provoking, Rule Breaking and Political Imagination will prompt a reassessment of the nature of institutions and remind us of the critical role of political mavericks.
 

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Kenneth A. Shepsle is the George D. Markham Professor of Government and a founding member of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University.
 

REVIEWS

“Shepsle highlights that politicians learn the rules to better break them. At a time when political leaders in the US and elsewhere are seeking to rewrite the rules to their own advantage, this timely book reminds us that institutions exist as long as stakeholders are willing to protect them and that small, apparently benign, transgressions can have long-term consequences.”
— Stephane Wolton, London School of Economics and Political Science

“A home run for those interested in institutional change. Shepsle uses captivating stories to illustrate that devising, revising, and breaking the rules are more than an expected pay-off calculation. At times, breaking rules requires imagination to see downstream further than others or a willingness to take a leap into uncharted waters.”
— Lee J. Alston, Indiana University

“What happens when the rules don’t hem in the most forceful actors? That is the question Shepsle asks in Rule Breaking and Political Imagination. No one interested in the news can fail to be intrigued by the central proposition in his new book."
— David Warsh, Economic Principles

TABLE OF CONTENTS


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0001
[institutions;rules;rule-breaking;imagination;politician]
This book departs from conventional understandings of institutions in the field of political economy. While it is appropriate to think of an institution either as a context organized by "humanly devised constraints" (North) or as an equilibrium set of practices in a primal environment (Calvert), the claim of the book is that institutional rules may be broken and practices violated. Constraints constrain and ties bind only when the consequences of violation are sufficiently deleterious and the likelihood of such sanctions being imposed is sufficiently high. A second theme of the book is that, whether in breaking rules or operating within their strictures, exercises of imagination are possible. Rule-breakingcutsthe Gordian knot; imagination allow it to be untied in a novel way. These themes are developed in the context of a series of stories that illustrate historically significant or conceptually interesting circumstances in which politicians boldly break the rules of the game or engage in imaginative maneuvers.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0002
[institution;rules;rule-breaking]
While it is appropriate to think of an institution either as a context organized by "humanly devised constraints" (North) or as an equilibrium set of practices in a primal environment (Calvert), the claim of the book is that institutional rules may be broken and practices violated. Constraints constrain and ties bind only when the consequences of violation are sufficiently deleterious and the likelihood of such sanctions being imposed is sufficiently high.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0003
[imagination;politician;institution]
A second theme of the book is that, whether in breaking rules or operating within their strictures, exercises of imagination are possible. Rule-breaking cuts the Gordian knot; imagination allow it to be untied in a novel way. This theme is developed in the context of a series of stories that illustrate historically significant or conceptually interesting circumstances in which politicians boldly engage in imaginative maneuvers.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0004
[institution;rule-breaking;imagination]
This story portrays historically eminent rule breakers in institutionally rich circumstances. Sulla and Caesar violate aspects of the constitution of the Roman Republic by disregarding its separation-of-powers requirements. Nearly two millennia later, Speaker Thomas Brackett Reed violates House rules in the late 19th century and Minority Leader Lyndon Johnson violates age-old Senate practices in the mid- twentieth century.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0005
[institutions;rules;filibuster]
This chapter tells the story of revising the filibuster rule in the Senate in 1975. An imaginative attempt to alter Senate rules clearly violates the requirement that a super-majority is necessary to revise those rules. Nevertheless, the rules violation was allowed to stand.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0006
[filibuster;post-cloture;imagination]
This story displays political imagination as Senator James Allen of Alabama devises a way around the restriction on filibusters. He invents the post-cloture filibuster.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0007
[imagination;interpretation;filibuster;remote majoritarianism]
This third take on the filibuster suggests how imaginative interpretation of Senate rules permits majorities to work their will.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0008
[obstruction;rule-breaking;imagination]
This story combines both rule-breaking and imagination. The latter is illustrated in the brilliant obstructionism of Irish MPs in the 19th century UK House of Commons. The former is found in the brave effort by the Speaker of the House to quash obstructionism by resorting to authority beyond the rules.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0009
[conference procedure;rule-breaking;imagination]
The US Congress uses the conference procedure, among others, to bring two versions of a bill into concordance. However, the procedure as described in the rules is often violated by ambitious politicians.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0010
[imagination;elections;stealing votes]
This story describes a number of experiences in US history in which electoral rules are short-circuited by imaginative politicians.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0011
[King David;Bible;rule-breaking]
King David is an exemplar of rule breaking. In this story Biblical detail is presented to suggest how David maneuvered to secure his empire.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0012
[contract;Supreme Court;contractual relief]
Contracts were protected by the US Supreme Court throughout the 19th century. Efforts by state legislatures to revise or reverse contractual conditions were repulsed during this period. The Great Depression, however, provided the extreme conditions in which the Court reversed itself.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0013
[rule-breaking;gimmickry;creative accounting]
Rules are occasionally complied with, but only the letter not the spirit of the requirement is honored. This story provides examples of how gimmickry is used to violate the intention of rules.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0014
[manipulation;rule-breaking;principal-agent relationships]
Government agents are subject to higher authority. But in contexts of secrecy principals are not always able to exercise sufficient authority. This story tells how the US Central Intelligence Agency managed to manipulate its principals.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0015
[vigilante;rule-breaking;criminal activity]
Vigilante activity is one form of rule breaking in which individuals take the law into their own hands.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473352.003.0016
[conclusions;lessons;rule breaking;imagination]
In this concluding chapter, the lessons of the stories in earlier parts are pulled together.