The Concept of Mind

by Gilbert Ryle, introduction by Daniel C. Dennett

University of Chicago Press, 2003
Paper: 978-0-226-73296-1 | Electronic: 978-0-226-92265-2
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226922652.001.0001

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University of Chicago Press (paper)

ABOUT THIS BOOKAUTHOR BIOGRAPHYTABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THIS BOOK

This now-classic work challenges what Ryle calls philosophy's "official theory," the Cartesians "myth" of the separation of mind and matter. Ryle's linguistic analysis remaps the conceptual geography of mind, not so much solving traditional philosophical problems as dissolving them into the mere consequences of misguided language. His plain language and esstentially simple purpose place him in the traditioin of Locke, Berkeley, Mill, and Russell.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) was the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford University from 1947-1971.

Introduction: Re-Introducing the Concept of Mind

Introduction

(1) The Official Doctrine

(2) The Absurdity of the Official Doctrine

(3) The Origin of the Category Mistake

(4) Historical Note

(2) Intelligence and Intellect

(3) Knowing How and Knowing That

(4) The Motives of the Intellectualist Legend

(5) 'In My Head'

(6) The Positive Account of Knowing How

(7) Intelligent Capacities versus Habits

(8) The Exercise of Intelligence

(9) Understanding and Misunderstanding

(10) Solipsism

(2) The Myth of Volitions

(3) The Distinction Between Voluntary and Involuntary

(4) Freedom of the Will

(5) The Bogy of Mechanism

(2) Feelings versus Inclinations

(3) Inclinations versus Agitations

(4) Moods

(5) Agitations and Feelings

(6) Enjoying and Wanting

(7) The Criteria of Motives

(8) The Reasons and the Causes of Actions

(9) Conclusion

(1) Foreword

(2) The Logic of Dispositional Statements

(3) Mental Capacities and Tendencies

(4) Mental Occurrences

(5) Achievements

(1) Foreword

(2) Consciousness

(3) Introspection

(4) Self-Knowledge Without Privileged Access

(5) Disclosure by Unstudied Talk

(6) The Self

(7) The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'

(1) Foreword

(2) Sensations

(3) The Sense Datum Theory

(4) Sensation and Observation

(5) Phenomenalism

(6) Afterthoughts

(1) Foreword

(2) Picturing and Seeing

(3) The Theory of Special Status Pictures

(4) Imagining

(5) Pretending

(6) Pretending, Fancying and Imagining

(7) Memory

(2) The Demarcation of the Intellect

(3) The Construction, Possession and Utilisation of Theories

(4) The Application and Misapplication of Epistemological Terms

(5) Saying and Teaching

(6) The Primacy of the Intellect

(7) Epistemology

(1) The Programme of Psychology

(2) Behaviourism

Index