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Erschienen in: Public Choice 1-2/2018

01.03.2018

Logrolling under fragmented authoritarianism: theory and evidence from China

verfasst von: Mario Gilli, Yuan Li, Jiwei Qian

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 1-2/2018

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Abstract

This paper provides a rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of logrolling between interest groups on social welfare in a non-democratic political system. In particular, we focus on China, where bureaucratic interest groups are separate vertical organizations reaching down from Beijing to the provinces and cities. The key question in this paper is: what are the effects of the logrolling of parochial interest groups on state policies and social welfare in autocracies? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. The theory predicts a specific distortion in resource allocation because of logrolling, while the empirical results confirm the theoretical prediction. We find policy outcomes under logrolling are characterized by excessive spending on all the interest groups’ preferred goods and insufficient spending on public goods. We test the existence of logrolling between the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Health in China. Our result shows logrolling between the two ministries lead to inefficiencies in social security and health care policies.

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Fußnoten
1
Interview with Susan Shirk in 2012.
 
2
See also Mueller (2003) for a complete review.
 
3
In the 2013 reforms, the MOH was dissolved and its functions integrated into a new agency called the National Health and Family Planning Commission.
 
4
For example, an 2016 action plan can be accessed at http://​www.​gov.​cn/​zhengce/​content/​2016-03/​29/​content_​5059540.​htm; last accessed October 4, 2016.
 
5
Statistical Communique of the People’s Republic of China on the 2013 development of social services.
 
6
Another incentive for the MOH to increase the coverage of rural health insurance is because the government provides financial subsidies for each enrollee and the size of the budget increases with the number of enrollees. For example, in 2015, a 420 RMB government subsidy per enrollee was provided by the central and local governments combined.
 
8
See Huang (2013).
 
9
The free treatments that the Dibao recipients can receive include a basic package of services and drugs according to the decision of MOH.
 
10
Note that these poor households are defined as poor households who have difficulties to afford medical fees and these poor households are not necessary to be Dibao recipients.
 
11
For rural health insurance, eleven ministries including MOH and MCA have been involved. Representatives from MCA and MOH are appointed as deputy coordinators of this joint conference.
For medical assistance program, MOH, MCA and other ministries hold regular working meetings to coordinate their policies for the recipients of medical assistance program. For mental health care, the joint conferences have regularly been held since 2006, where both MCA and MOH sit in the conference.
 
12
According to this guideline, households under Dibao must be covered by the medical assistance programs and appointed health care institutions will provide both inpatient and outpatient services to these families. Additionally, Rural Health Insurance premiums for rural low-income households should be covered by the medical assistance fund. See http://​www.​mca.​gov.​cn/​article/​zwgk/​fvfg/​zdshbz/​200906/​20090610031974.​shtml accessed on June 24, 2016.
 
13
Bernholz (2012).
 
14
Using β would be immaterial because of symmetry.
 
15
In the jargon of the legislative bargaining literature, we are thus considering a closed rule.
 
16
Using β would again be immaterial because of symmetry.
 
17
Both Dibao and rural health insurance require that a household rather than an individual as a basic unit.
 
18
The threshold of 20% is chosen because the mean of economic losses as a share of fiscal revenue is 20%.
 
19
The direct Dibao benefit, which is in the form of cash transfer, is allocated to urban households whose incomes fall below a threshold value. The annual cash transfer was RMB 4,000 per recipient in 2012.
 
20
The annual benefit for unemployment insurance was about RMB 8,800 per recipient in 2012.
 
21
For example, between 1997 and 2011, the ratio of unemployment insurance benefit to Dibao benefit varied between 1.5 and 2.3 (China Civil Affairs Statistical Yearbook; China Human Resources and Social Security Yearbook, various years).
 
23
The three major social health insurance plans refer to Basic Health Insurance, Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance, and Rural New Cooperative Medical Scheme.
 
24
Qian (2012) reviews this in detail.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Logrolling under fragmented authoritarianism: theory and evidence from China
verfasst von
Mario Gilli
Yuan Li
Jiwei Qian
Publikationsdatum
01.03.2018
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Public Choice / Ausgabe 1-2/2018
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0526-4

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