nach oben

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Erschienen in:

12.03.2018 | Original Research

Management’s personal ideology and financial reporting quality

verfasst von: Matthew Notbohm, Katherine Campbell, Adam R. Smedema, Tianming Zhang

Erschienen in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting | Ausgabe 2/2019

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

We investigate the relation between managers’ personal ideologies and financial reporting quality. We use Federal Elections Commission data to develop three proxies for managers’ personal ideologies and test their relations with two financial reporting quality metrics: discretionary accruals and financial statement restatements. We find that both the absolute value of discretionary accruals and the probability of restatement decrease in the degree to which firms’ managers have conservative ideologies. These results are robust in the post-SOX period, to controls for potential self-selection bias, to alternative measures of both ideology and financial reporting quality, and to controls for firm political sensitivity, lobbying activity, governance, operational complexity and auditor strength. Our findings contribute to a growing literature demonstrating that business outcomes are partially explained by manager-specific factors including managers’ personal views and priorities.

Vorheriger Artikel Do forward-looking narratives affect investors’ valuation of UK FTSE all-shares firms?

Nächster Artikel Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

We use the term ideology to refer to “an interrelated set of moral and political attitudes that possesses cognitive, affective, and motivational components (Jost 2006).” This definition makes clear that the concept of ideology is much broader than an individual’s political views. However, consistent with prior work in finance (Hutton et al. 2014; Jiang et al. 2012; and Hutton et al. 2015), social psychology (Jost 2006), and political science (Gerring 1997) we simplify this multidimensional concept by assuming that individual ideologies all lie somewhere on a single ideological continuum running between conservative and liberal. Therefore, our use of the terms “conservative” and “liberal” refers to the direction or position of an individual’s personal ideology on this continuum.

We use the term “earnings quality” to refer to the subset of “financial reporting quality” that is related to amounts included in the financial statements and specifically in the determination of net income. We use the term “financial reporting quality” to refer to the overall quality of the financial statements and the related disclosures.

Although Bamber et al. (2010) cite research in psychology, they motivate their investigation, at least in part, by the finding that humans develop long-lived, individual communication styles (e.g., Pennebaker and King 1999). Results of Bamber et al. (2010) are consistent with persistent differences in manager-specific disclosure styles. This finding is consistent with the theory of behavioral consistency.

It is possible that some managers’ social views dominate their fiscal views, allowing fiscally liberal (conservative) managers who vote and contribute as social conservatives (liberals) to appear in our dataset differently than their fiscal views would dictate. However, this should only bias against finding results consistent with our hypotheses.

To aggregate contribution data by individual donor, we construct an individual identifier based on first name, last name and employer name. We use these three variables because they are the only common variables across the FEC contributions files and the EXECUCOMP database used to link the contributions data to COMPUSTAT financial data. Because of the size of the databases, we use a matching algorithm created in SAS. Due to the particulars of SAS, we have to thoroughly clean the data for non-letter characters, titles, etc. For firm name, we choose the longest name of the employer after removing several common terms (e.g., CORP, CO., etc.).

Since it is not straightforward to identify and classify the conservatism level of minor or third parties, we exclude all contributions that are not to candidates identified as Republican and Democrat.

If George Smith had made contributions to both Republican and Democrat candidates in the same election cycle (1999–2000 in this case), the conservatism score would have been coded zero since not all contributions were to Republican candidates.

It is essential to code managers in EXECUCOMP but not matched to FEC contributions data as zero rather than missing when constructing the CONSRV_TOP5 proxy since this metric is an average of the top managers’ individual scores. If missing values were not coded to zero an extreme constraint would be placed on sample size (i.e., only cases where all listed managers were matched with FEC contributions data would be included).

Following Hutton et al. (2014), the weight assigned to the ith (of 5) highest paid manager’s political conservatism w_i, is: \(w_{i} = \frac{{i^{ - 1} }}{{\sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^{5} {i^{ - 1} } }}\)

We also estimated our discretionary accruals models using discretionary accruals from (a) a cross-sectional modified Jones model, as recommended by Keung and Shih (2014) and (b) a cross-sectional performance adjusted modified Jones model, as recommended by Kothari et al. (2005). Our results were qualitatively unaffected by the use of these alternative discretionary accruals models.

We also considered the relation between financial reporting quality and conditional conservatism. However, upon further investigation we discovered that other researchers question the connection between financial reporting quality and conditional conservatism. Ruch and Taylor (2015) said, “In general, it is unlikely that conditional conservatism would have a significant relationship with earnings management.” Therefore, we do not investigate the relation between management’s ideology and conditional conservatism.

As a specification check, we also performed analyses using an alternative restatement sample that excludes restatements related to “Accounting Rule Application Failures”. This is a slightly more conservative definition of restatement than that used in our main analyses, and is consistent with that used by Hennes et al. (2008) and in the dataset available on Andrew Leone’s website at https://sbaleone.bus.miami.edu/. We find significantly negative coefficients on the CONSRV measures for the CFO and the top five managers. Results for the CEO CONSRV variable are insignificant, but this may be explained by the restricted sample size that this definition of restatement imposes.

Altman’s (1983) Z score is equal to 0.717 * working capital/total assets + 0.847 * retained earnings/total assets + 3.107 * EBIT/total assets + 0.42*Book Value of Equity/total liabilities + 0.998 * Sales/total assets. A lower Z-score indicates a higher risk of bankruptcy.

McGuire et al. (2012) use responses to a Gallup survey about religiosity. We use the American Religion Data Archive Churches and Church Membership surveys following Hilary and Hui (2009). This allows us to also analyze the robustness of the results of McGuire et al. (2012) using an alternative measure of geographical religiosity.

We thank the American Religion Data Archive (www.theARDA.com) for making this data available for download. We use the Churches and Church Membership in the United States, 1990 (principal investigators are the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies and the Lily Foundation), Churches and Church Membership in the United States, 2000 (principal investigators are the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies), and the U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations and Membership Study, 2010 (County file) (principal investigators are Clifford Grammich, Kirk Hadaway, Richard Houseal, Dale E. Jones, Alexei Krindatch, Richie Stanley, Richard H. Taylor).

We considered using CEO equity pay in the CONSRV_CEO regressions, CFO equity pay in the CONSRV_CFO regressions and the proportion of equity pay for the top 5 executives in the CONSRV_TOP5 regressions. However, data losses due to missing compensation data for CFO and others led us to use only CEO equity pay in all specifications. We believe that the CEO equity pay ratio sufficiently measures the relevant construct, which is the firm’s philosophy on managerial pay.

We could not perform firm-level fixed effects analysis for our restatement sample because there is no firm level variation in the value of RESTATE. Due to sample selection criteria all firms are either RESTATE = 1 or RESTATE = 0. Therefore, controlling for firm level effects removes all variation in RESTATE.

Lennox et al. (2012) caution researchers about using an Instrumental Variables approach when controlling for self-selection bias. These researchers suggest that selection models frequently suffer from multicolinearity and generally fail to base 2nd stage regression exclusions on theory. These issues can result in spurious findings.

We do not remove utility firms or financial service firms from the restatements and control samples to be consistent with prior studies utilizing restatement methodologies (Paterson and Valencia 2011; Kinney et al. 2004; Raghunandan et al. 2003; Aier et al. 2005).

We follow Paterson and Valencia (2011) elimination of restatements not categorized within Audit Analytics as either “Financial Fraud, Irregularities, or Misrepresentations” or “Accounting Rule-Application Failures”. This data screen is designed to remove less severe restatements.

The one exception is our measure of the market to book ratio, MB, computed as the natural log of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Our sample mean (median) was 0.83 (0.82), but the sample mean (median) for Francis and Yu (2009) was 1.367 (0.943). We believe this difference can be explained by the difference in economic conditions during Francis and Yu’s sample period (2003–2005) and ours (1992–2010).

We tested for multicolinearity using VIFs. All were below 2, suggesting that multicolinearity is not a problem.

Chen et al. (2015) suggest that firm level fixed effects may be insufficient controls when estimating the effect of political contributions variables since political contributions rise and fall with election cycles.

We do not use a changes specification for the restatement model, since there is no firm-level variation in the dependent variable.

Coefficients on control variables are generally consistent with predictions or insignificant. The only exceptions are SIZE, DEBT, VOL_Ret and CFO, where some specifications include significant coefficient estimates with signs inconsistent with predictions for these variables.

We thank an anonymous referee for making this point.

We sincerely thank anonymous referees for identifying these issues and suggesting the related analyses.

We acquire this data from the Lobbying Disclosure database that is maintained by the U.S. Senate’s Office of Public Records. This database covers all federal lobbyists, not just those that lobby the U.S. Senate. This database is available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/Public_Disclosure/database_download.htm.

For pre-2009 fiscal years, these inputs are all reported in EXECUCOMP. For fiscal years 2009 and after, EXECUCOMP changed some of the option-related variables it reported. From data available in CRSP, we obtained or computed stock price, dividend yield, and stock return volatility following the method EXECUCOMP used for the pre-2009 fiscal years.

Aier J, Comprix J, Gunlock J, Lee D (2005) The financial expertise of CFOs and accounting restatements. Acc Horiz 119:123–135CrossRef

Alker H (1972) Is personality situationally specific or intrapsychically consistent? J Pers 40:1–16CrossRef

Altman E (1983) Corporate financial distress: a complete guide to predicting, avoiding, and dealing with bankruptcy. Wiley, New York

Ashbaugh-Skaife H, Collins D, Kinney W (2007) The discovery and reporting of internal control deficiencies prior to sox-mandated audits. J Acc Econ 44:166–192CrossRef

Atieh J, Brief A, Vollrath D (1987) The protestant work ethic conservatism paradox: beliefs and values about work and life. Pers Indiv Differ 8:577–580CrossRef

Bamber L, Jiang J, Wang I (2010) What’s my style? The influence of top managers on voluntary corporate financial disclosure. Acc Rev 85:1131–1162CrossRef

Bannister J, Newman H (1996) Accrual usage to manage earnings toward financial analysts’ forecasts. Rev Quant Finan and Acc 7:259–278CrossRef

Batta G, Heredia R, Weidenmier M (2014) Political connections and accounting quality under high expropriation risk. Eur Acc Rev 23:485–517CrossRef

Beasley M (1996) An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Acc Rev 71:443–465

Bebchuck LA, Cremers KJM, Peyer UC (2011) The CEO pay slice. J Financ Econ 102:199–221CrossRef

Becker C, Defond M, Jiambalvo J, Subramanyam KR (1998) The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemp Acc Res 5:1–24CrossRef

Bedard J, Chtourou SM, Courteau L (2004) The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing 23:15–37CrossRef

Bergstresser B, Philippon T (2006) CEO incentives and earnings management. J Financ Econ 180:511–529CrossRef

Bertrand M, Schoar A (2003) Managing with style: the effects of managers on firm policies. Q J Econ 118:1169–1208CrossRef

Boone JP, Khurana I, Raman KK (2010) Do the big 4 and the second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality? J Acc Public Pol 29:330–352CrossRef

Brochet F, Welch K (2011) Top executive background and financial reporting choice: The case of goodwill impairment. Working paper, Harvard Business School

Burgstahler D, Dichev I (1997) Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. J Acc Econ 24:99–126CrossRef

Burns N, Kedia S (2006) The Impact of Performance-Based Compensation on Misreporting. J Fin Econ 79:35–67CrossRef

Burton R (1963) Generality of honesty reconsidered. Psychol Rev 70:481–499CrossRef

Cahan S (1992) The effect of antitrust investigations on discretionary accruals: a refined test of the political cost hypothesis. Acc Rev 67:77–95

Chaney P, Faccio M, Parsley D (2011) The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms. J Acc Econ 51:58–76CrossRef

Chao C-L, Horng S-M (2013) Asset write-offs discretion and accruals management in Taiwan: the role of corporate governance. Rev Quant Finan Acc 40:41–74CrossRef

Chen H, Parsley D, Yang Y (2015) Corporate lobbying and firm performance. J Bus Financ Acc 42:444–481CrossRef

Cheng Q, Warfield T (2005) Equity incentives and earnings management. Acc Rev 80:441–476CrossRef

Chin A, Parawada J (2010) Red-blooded Republican or true-blue Democrat? The influences of political preferences on money managers’ decisions. Working paper, University of New South Wales

Christensen DM, Dhaliwal DS, Boivie S, Graffin SD (2015) Top management conservatism and corporate risk strategies: evidence from managers’ personal political orientation and corporate tax avoidance. Strateg Manag J 36:1918–1938CrossRef

Cohen DA, Dey A, Lys TZ (2008) Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre- and post-Sarbanes–Oxley periods. Acc Rev 83:757–787CrossRef

Core J, Guay W (2002) Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility. J Acc Res 40:613–630CrossRef

Cronqvist H, Makhija A, Yonker S (2010) Behavioral consistency in corporate finance: CEO personal and corporate leverage. Working paper, The Ohio State University

Dechow P, Dichev I (2002) The quality of accruals and earnings. Acc Rev 77:35–59CrossRef

Dechow P, Sloan R, Sweeney A (1995) Detecting earnings management. Acc Rev 70:193–225

Dechow P, Sloan R, Sweeney A (1996) Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemp Acc Res 13:1–36CrossRef

DeFond R, Jiambalvo J (1994) Debt covenant violations and manipulation of accruals. J Acc Econ 17:145–176CrossRef

Desai H, Hogan C, Wilkins M (2006) The reputational penalty for aggressive accounting: earnings restatements and management turnover. Acc Rev 81:83–112CrossRef

Dhaliwal DS, Naiker V, Navissi F (2010) The association between accruals quality and the characteristics of accounting experts and mix of expertise on audit committees. Contemp Acc Res 27:787–827CrossRef

Doyle J, Ge W, McVay S (2007) Accruals quality and internal control over financial reporting. Acc Rev 82:1141–1170CrossRef

DuCharme L, Malatesta P, Sefcik S (2004) Earnings management, stock issues, and shareholder lawsuits. J Financ Econ 17:27–49CrossRef

Epstein S (1979) The stability of behavior: I. On predicting most of the people much of the time. J Pers Soc Psychol 37:1097–1126CrossRef

Feather N (1979) Value correlates of conservatism. J Pers Soc Psychol 37:1617–1630CrossRef

Francis J, Yu D (2009) Big 4 office size and audit quality. Acc Rev 84:1521–1552CrossRef

Francis J, LaFond R, Olsson P, Schipper K (2005) The market pricing of accruals quality. J Acc Econ 39:295–327CrossRef

Ge W, McVay S (2005) The disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control after the Sarbanes–Oxley act. Acc Horiz 19:137–158CrossRef

Gerring J (1997) Ideology: a definitional analysis. Polit Res Q 50:957–994CrossRef

Ghosh A, Marra A, Moon D (2010) Corporate boards, audit committees, and earnings management: pre- and post-Sox evidence. J Bus Financ Acc 37:1146–1176

Gong G, Louis H, Sun X (2008) Earnings management and firm performance following open-market repurchases. J Financ 63:947–986CrossRef

Green D, Palmquist B, Schickler E (2002) Partisan hearts and minds: political parties and the social identities of voters. Yale University Press, New Haven

Gul F, Wu D, Yang Z (2013) Do individual auditors affect audit quality? Evidence from archival data. Acc Rev 88:1993–2023CrossRef

Healy P (1985) The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. J Acc Econ 7:85–107CrossRef

Hennes KM, Leone AJ, Miller BP (2008) The importance of distinguishing errors from irregularities in restatement research: the case of restatements and CEO/CFO turnover. Acc Rev 83:1487–1519CrossRef

Hilary G, Hui KW (2009) Does religion matter in corporate decision making in America? J Financ Econ 93:455–473CrossRef

Holthausen R, Larcker D, Sloan R (1995) Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings. J Acc Econ 19:29–74CrossRef

Hong H, Kostovetsky L (2012) Red and blue investing: values and finance. J Financ Econ 103:1–19CrossRef

Hribar P, Nichols D (2007) The use of unsigned earnings quality measures in tests of earnings management. J Acc Res 45:1017–1053CrossRef

Hutton I, Jiang D, Kumar A (2014) Republican managers and corporate policies. J Financ Quant Analysis 49:1279–1310CrossRef

Hutton I, Jiang D, Kumar A (2015) Political values, culture, and corporate litigation. Manag Sci 61:2905–2925CrossRef

Iliev P (2010) The effect of SOX section 404: costs, earnings quality, and stock prices. J Financ 65:1163–1196CrossRef

Jiang J, Petroni K, Wang I (2010) CFOs and CEOs: who have the most influence on earnings management? J Financ Econ 96:513–526CrossRef

Jiang D, Kumar A, Law K (2012) Republican equity analysts. Working Paper, University of Texas

Joe VC (1974) Personality correlates of conservatism. J Soc Psychol 93:309–310CrossRef

Joe VC, Jones RN, Ryder S (1977) Conservatism, openness to experience, and sample bias. J Pers As 41:527–531CrossRef

Jones JJ (1991) Earnings management during import relief investigations. J Acc Res 29:193–228CrossRef

Jones KL, Krishnan GV, Melendrez KD (2008) Do models of discretionary accruals detect actual cases of fraudulent and restated earnings? An empirical analysis. Contemp Acc Res 25:499–531CrossRef

Jost JT (2006) The end of the end of ideology. Am Psychol 61:651–670CrossRef

Kam CD, Simas EN (2010) Risk orientations and policy frames. J Polit 72:381–396CrossRef

Keung E, Shih M (2014) Measuring discretionary accruals: are ROA-matched models better than the original Jones-type models? Rev Acc Stud 19:736–768CrossRef

Kinney WR, Palmrose Z-V, Scholz S (2004) Auditor independence, non-audit services, and restatements: was the US government right? J Acc Res 42:561–588CrossRef

Klien A (2002) Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. J Acc Econ 33:375–400CrossRef

Kothari SP, Leone AJ, Wasley CE (2005) Performance matched discretionary accruals. J Acc Econ 39:163–197CrossRef

Krishnan J, Wen Y, Zhao W (2011) Legal expertise on corporate audit committees and financial reporting quality. Acc Rev 86:2099–2130CrossRef

Lee J, Lee KJ, Nagarajan NJ (2014) Does political alignment between top management and directors impair board independence? J Financ Econ 112:232–250CrossRef

Lennox P, Pittman J (2010) Big five audits and accounting fraud. Contemp Acc Res 27:209–247CrossRef

Lennox C, Francis J, Wang Z (2012) Selection models in accounting research. Acc Rev 87:589–616CrossRef

Li S, Nwaeze E, Yin J (2016) Earnings management in the electric utility industry: profit incentives. Rev Quant Finan Acc 46:633–660CrossRef

Liu Y, Wei Z, Xie F (2016) CFO gender and earnings management: evidence from China. Rev Quant Finan Acc 46:881–905CrossRef

Lobo G, Zhou J (2006) Did conservatism in financial reporting increase after the Sarbanes–Oxley act? Initial evidence. Acc Horiz 20:57–73CrossRef

McClosky H (1958) Conservatism and personality. Am Polit Sci Rev 52:27–45CrossRef

McGuire S, Omer T, Sharp N (2012) The impact of religion on financial reporting irregularities. Acc Rev 87:645–673CrossRef

McNichols M (2000) Research design issues in earnings management studies. J Acc Public Pol 19:313–345CrossRef

McNichols M (2002) Discussion of the quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual estimation errors. Acc Rev 77:61–69CrossRef

Menon K, Williams D (2004) Former audit partners and abnormal accruals. Acc Rev 79:1095–1118CrossRef

Mills L, Nutter S, Schwab C (2013) The effect of political sensitivity and bargaining power on taxes: evidence from federal contractors. Acc Rev 88:977–1005CrossRef

Nagy A (2010) Section 404 compliance and financial reporting quality. Acc Horiz 24:441–454CrossRef

Palmrose Z-V, Scholz S (2004) The circumstances and legal consequences of non-GAAP reporting: evidence from restatements. Contemp Acc Res 21:139–180CrossRef

Palmrose Z-V, Richardson VJ, Scholz S (2004) Determinants of market reactions to restatement announcements. J Acc Econ 37:59–89CrossRef

Paterson J, Valencia A (2011) The effects of recurring and nonrecurring tax, audit-related, and other nonaudit services on auditor independence. Contemp Acc Res 28:1510–1536CrossRef

Pennebaker J, King L (1999) Linguistic styles: language use as an individual difference. Pers Soc Psychol 77:1296–1312CrossRef

Perry S, Williams T (1994) Earnings management preceding managerial buyout offers. J Acc Econ 18:157–179CrossRef

Peterson BE, Lane MD (2001) Implications of authoritarianism for young adulthood: longitudinal analysis of college experiences and future goals. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 27:678–690CrossRef

Petroni KR (1992) Optimistic reporting in the property-casualty insurance industry. J Acc Econ 15:485–508CrossRef

Raghunandan K, Read WJ, Whisenant J (2003) Initial evidence on the association between nonaudit fees and restated financial statements. Acc Horiz 17:223–234CrossRef

Ruch G, Taylor G (2015) Accounting conservatism: a review of the literature. J Acc Lit 34:17–38

Schrand C, Zechman S (2012) Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial misreporting. J Acc Econ 53:311–329CrossRef

Sherman RA, Nave CS, Funder DC (2010) Situational similarity and personality predict behavioral consistency. J Pers Soc Psychol 99:330–343CrossRef

Skaife H, Veenman D, Werner T (2013) Corporate lobbying and CEO pay. Working Paper, University of Wisconsin—Madison

Sue S, Chin C, Chan L (2013) Exploring the causes of restatements by family firms. J Bus Financ Acc 40:1068–1094CrossRef

Teoh S, Welch I, Wong T (1998a) Earnings management and the post-issue performance of seasoned equity offerings. J Financ Econ 50:63–99CrossRef

Teoh S, Welch I, Wong T (1998b) Earnings management and the long-term market performance of initial public offerings. J Financ 53:1935–1974CrossRef

Young C, Tsai L, Hsu H (2008) The effect of controlling shareholders excess board seats control on financial restatements: evidence from Taiwan. Rev Quant Financ Acc 30:297–314CrossRef

Titel: Management’s personal ideology and financial reporting quality
verfasst von: Matthew Notbohm
Katherine Campbell
Adam R. Smedema
Tianming Zhang
Publikationsdatum: 12.03.2018
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting / Ausgabe 2/2019
Print ISSN: 0924-865X
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7179
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-0718-5

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 2/2019

Fee competition among Big 4 auditors and audit quality

Testing for the underlying dynamics of bank capital buffer and performance nexus

CEO power, board oversight, and earnings announcement tone

Idiosyncratic volatility puzzle: influence of macro-finance factors

Do forward-looking narratives affect investors’ valuation of UK FTSE all-shares firms?

Semi-parametric real exchange rates dynamics