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2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. Managing, Inducing, and Preventing Regime Shifts: A Review of the Literature

verfasst von : Ngo Van Long

Erschienen in: Dynamic Economic Problems with Regime Switches

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

How do economic agents manage anticipated shifts in regimes? How do they try to influence or prevent the arrival of such shifts? This paper provides a selective survey of the analysis of regime shifts from an economic viewpoint, with particular emphasis on the use of the techniques of optimal control theory and differential games. We examine the concepts of regime shifts, thresholds, and tipping points in both deterministic and stochastic settings, with or without ambiguity aversion. Applications to the analysis of political regime shifts are reviewed, with a focus on the role of policy instruments such as repression, redistribution, and gradual democratization. Other dynamic games involving regime shifts that we survey include games of resource exploitation and games in industrial organization theory (R&D races, sabotage against rivals to prevent entry). We compare regime shifts under a Big Push and gradual regime changes.

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Nächstes Kapitel Institutional Change, Education, and Population Growth: Lessons from Dynamic Modelling

From an historical perspective, what is termed “sudden” can correspond to hundred of years. For example, in England, the change in property right regime brought about by the “enclosure” movement took more than 300 years. Between 1605 and 1914, over 5000 “inclosure acts” were passed by Parliament, which transferred to private owners’ land that was previously common properties. The general question as to whether most changes occur as discrete jumps or in a continuous fashion is a matter of debate, which to some extent hinges on what one means when words such as continuity and suddenness are used. For example, the theory of punctuated equilibrium, put forward by Eldredge and Gould [38] as a “better description” of the evolutionary process than Darwin’s gradualism, has been opposed by Dawkins [32] on the ground that it was wrong to interpret gradualism as “constant speedism”.

The Arab Spring, which undoubtedly has many facets, is not unrelated to the contests for rents between the elite and the citizens.

To be fair, humans are also one of nature’s most cooperative species. See, for example, Seabright [105], Grafton et al. [42], and Roemer’s book, “How We Cooperate: A Theory of Kantian Optimization”, (2019, Yale University Press).

Dictionnaire LE ROBERT, Société du Nouveau Littré, Paris: 1979.

Polasky et al. [97, p. 233] assume that \(h^{\prime }(X)=0\) at \(X=K_{1}\).

Note that in writing the above HJB equation, it is assumed that \(V_{1}^{\prime }(X)\) is defined for all \(X>0\).

In their formulation, they also add a random variable \(\varepsilon _{t}\) that represents stochastic shocks with a known distribution (these shocks are not ambiguous). For simplicity of exposition, I have omitted this variable.

In the standard DICE model of Nordhaus [95] without tipping points, there is a parameter called “climate sensitivity,”defined as the equilibrium warming from doubling the stock of GHGs. Lemoine and Traeger [73] introduce Knightian uncertainty about a climate-feedback tipping point that increases this parameter from its pre-tipping value of 3 \(^\circ \)C to, say, 5 \(^\circ \)C.

The authors assume that when the unknown tipping point is crossed, there is a sudden decrease in the rate of transfer of \(CO_{2}\) out of the atmosphere.

The non-strategic approach is also taken in a recent interesting paper by Michaeli and Spiro [92], where they show a number of interesting results, including a demonstration of how the implementation of popular policies, such as Perestroika, can trigger a revolution.

In the model of Boucekkline et al. [16], these are parameters that the elite chooses at the beginning of the program; they are not control variables in the standard sense of being piece-wise continuous functions of time.

The fraction of national income that is distributed to the citizens is \(1-u_{E}\).

With \(\delta =1/2\) and \(C=0\), one obtains \(h(s;0,1/2)=-(s/2)(s^{2}-2s+1)\). Then \(h=0\) at \(s_{L}=0\) and \(s_{M}=s_{H}=1.\)

This property is crucially dependent on the special structure of the model, and on the assumed functional forms, e.g., logarithmic utility.

For details, see Kossioris et al. [62].

However, eventually when \(k_{1}\) is large enough, \(I_{1}\) begins to fall.

This method yields polynomial approximations of value functions. One shortcoming is that such polynomial approximation gives continuous and smooth value functions, which may be incorrect. To deal with this issue, Dawid et al. [30] combine the homotopy method with another method that yields local value functions (each around a stable steady state).

On Nashian behavior versus Kantian behavior, see, e.g., Grafton et al. [42].

In a recent interesting paper, using evolutionary game theory, Wood et al. [128] outline a model that explains well a regime shift in the world oil market: the “Seven Sisters” were replaced by OPEC in the battle for oil market dominance.

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Titel: Managing, Inducing, and Preventing Regime Shifts: A Review of the Literature
verfasst von: Ngo Van Long
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Dynamic Economic Problems with Regime Switches
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-54575-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-54576-5

Copyright-Jahr: 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54576-5_1

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