Maritime Issues and Regional Order in the Indo-Pacific

This chapter argues that the South China Sea disputes have entered an important new phase defined by several mutually reinforcing trends. First, China’s completion of most major infrastructure at its artificial island bases in the Spratly Islands has since the end of 2017 allowed it to project power short of military force in a continuous manner throughout the entirety of the South China Sea. For its neighbors, this mostly means a persistent and overwhelming presence by the China Coast Guard and maritime militia which have engaged in increasingly brazen acts of intimidation. Second, Beijing has managed to defang any threat of multilateral diplomatic pressure. And third, those parties still interested in pushing back on Chinese assertiveness—primarily Vietnam and external actors like Australia, Japan, the United States, and some European countries—have been unable to regain the initiative they held briefly in 2015–2016 when international opinion swung decidedly against Beijing due to its island-building campaign and the Philippines’ arbitration case. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the United States and partners could alter these dynamics through a coalition-based campaign to impose diplomatic and economic costs on Beijing.

China’s navy (PLA-N) has a large potential to become a real “blue-water” navy and could become a strong competitor for the US navy supported by Japan’s navy (JMSDF). In order for the JMSDF and the US navy to cope with China’s challenges, new strategic initiatives will be required such as a Fleet Ballistic Missile Defense posture to protect US reinforcement crossing the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Without this capability, the two nations’ efforts to protect capital naval assets by intercepting PLA’s anti-ship ballistic missiles known as “carrier killer” will end in vain and accelerate China’s aggressive maneuvers under its anti-access and area defense strategy known as A2AD. However, chokepoints are China’s Achilles Heel, and they can be blocked by adversary forces preventing PLA-N fleets from operating outside of the semi-closed South and East China Seas. Japan and the United States could realize chokepoint control through regional cooperation among like-minded nations. China would then face serious problems in building the PLA-N as a real blue-water navy. Japan and the United States will need to counter China’s strategy by precise coordination and focusing, which is the chokepoints.

China’s strategy in the South China Sea relies on military trained fishermen, large law enforcement vessels, and coast guard vessels called “white hulls” to be distinguished from the “gray hulls” of the navy. White hulls are China’s maritime militia which harasses the ASEAN claimants, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. In this way China is manipulating weakness as the ASEAN claimants cannot match its white hull strength. China’s pursuit of supremacy and marine resources in the South China Sea has made it more aggressive, as it operates in a dubious conceptual space between peace and war, called gray zone operations. These tactics involve coercive actions below a threshold avoiding a conventional military response. Gray zone operations are cost-effective and easy to deploy for China to enforce its dubious claims in the South China Sea. These operations mask their true nature since they are directed by military commanders under the Central Military Commission, They show a civilian front but they have military backing. Law enforcement vessels in gray zone operations are being used as instruments of foreign policy. There should be a collective and global effort to meet China’s gray zone operations in the South China Sea.

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was elected to office in June 2016 and quickly revealed his own pivot to China. Despite the Arbitral Tribunal of the Law of the Sea’s ruling of July 12, 2016 in favor of the Philippines, Duterte downplayed it as he curried favor with China seeking Chinese economic support and investment that did not come up to expectations. In this way, Duterte threatened Philippine sovereign rights over the West Philippine Sea (WPS). By disregarding this ruling, and not seeking the support of the international community to get China to uphold the ruling, Duterte has weakened the Philippines, the position of the other ASEAN claimants, and ASEAN as well. As a result, Chinese pressure in the West Philippine Sea has escalated, and the number of Chinese incursions by maritime militia vessels, Coast Guard, and naval vessels has increased. However, the Philippines has not repudiated the alliance with the United States which is its security anchor and there is hope that the presidential elections of May 2022 will bring changes. This election will be crucial for Philippine foreign policy.

This chapter examines the impact of multilateral forums on the behavior of claimant states involved in South China Sea maritime disputes. It explores the research question: Do multilateral settings help restrain state behavior by providing a conductive environment and mechanisms to foster the management and resolution of existing disputes? Five case studies are examined to determine whether these multilateral forums have contributed to moderating state behavior in the South China Sea—45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (July 2012), Third ADMM-Plus Meeting (November 2015), Special China–ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (June 2016), Mid-Term Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (April 2018), and 32nd ASEAN Summit (April 2018). These multilateral forums operate on the basis of consensus. This results in watering down contentious issues between member states. In addition, multilateral forums issue non-binding statements that do not contain any enforcement mechanism or penalty for non-compliance. These case studies provide compelling evidence that multilateral forums did not moderate China’s behavior with respect to the maritime disputes in the South China Sea nor did multilateral forums mitigate major power rivalry within multilateral forums. The case studies also revealed that internal divisions within ASEAN, exacerbated by Chinese interference, undermined the ability of these multilateral forums to moderate state behavior.

The South China Sea faces numerous and increasingly complex environmental and marine resource problems caused by human activities and behavior such as destructive and illegal fishing practices in overlapping waters. The overexploitation of marine resources has resulted in the loss of marine biodiversity, the degradation of coastal and marine ecosystems, and serious damage has been done to offshore coral reef systems. Blue solutions are required based on regional cooperation on marine biodiversity conservation and fisheries management between the ASEAN claimants and China. Blue solutions can protect the environment and the health of the ecosystems. They are also peaceful solutions to ensure trust between the parties in managing complex sovereignty disputes. Sovereignty, marine resources and environmental protection in the South China Sea are intertwined and blue solutions can contribute to a reduction of tension between the parties to the dispute. This is the only feasible way to gain trust and to reverse the current deteriorating trend in the marine environment and ecosystems of the South China Sea.

Europe has a strategic interest in a peaceful environment in and around the South China Sea. A large part of Europe’s global trade passes through the Sea’s international waters. China’s militarization of the South China Sea has been a wakeup call for the EU and its member states which have stepped up their involvement in the area. The European Union has made itself available to find a solution to the ongoing tensions, in line with its normative approach to security issues. At the same time, some European states, in particular France and the UK, have sailed naval vessels in the Sea’s international waters to send the message that European powers care about stability and the rules-based order in the area. This chapter examines Europe’s perspectives on the South China Sea arguing that Europe is gradually shedding its traditional neutrality stance vis-à-vis territorial and maritime disputes toward a general hardening of positions vis-à-vis Beijing. There is, in fact a growing willingness within the EU and among member states not only to issue diplomatic protests but also to take actions to defend the rules-based order in the region.

This chapter discusses the security situation in the East and South China Seas from a Japanese perspective. In contrast to the comprehensive developments in Japan–China diplomatic relations, the situation in the East China Sea is far from stable and has been deteriorated. China’s assertiveness in the East China Sea in 2019 was much more apparent than in previous years. Therefore, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) incessantly reinforces its operations in the East China Sea. The Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) is also continuously making efforts to enhance its defense capabilities in the southwestern region. Within the context of increasing tensions in the East China Sea, the Japanese government is addressing the South China Sea in tandem with the East China Sea. Japan’s perception of the South China Sea is that the dispute over the sea is of great concern to the entire international community due to its direct implications for peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. In this regard, Japan is pursuing cooperation with ASEAN in multilateral dialogues as well as fostering bilateral cooperation with ASEAN claimants, like Vietnam and the Philippines, aiming to jointly address China’s assertiveness. Based on the Vientiane Vision, capacity-building assistance is one of the main items for bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Japan and ASEAN.

Though a common legal framework governing the establishment or enforcement of ADIZs does not exist, scholars should work together to help policymakers develop an international-law-based comprehensive understanding about the theory and practice of ADIZs. Unfortunately, some scholars, without sufficient evidence and thorough analysis, have misinterpreted certain legal facts of China’s East China Sea (ECS) ADIZ, which is usually described by them as being unlike other ADIZs—a lack of knowledge of China’s ADIZ policies and other countries’ ADIZ practices (especially the evolution of US ADIZ rules since 1950) has fueled misperceptions in the international community. Notable misperceptions include: first, China’s ECS ADIZ includes the disputed Diaoyu Dao Islands; second, China’s ADIZ rules do not distinguish between civil and state aircraft; third, the Chinese rules apply to all aircraft flying in the ADIZ, and make no exception for aircraft not intending to enter Chinese national airspace. The above misperceptions, which were possibly caused by technical flaws in analyzing, to some extent, have led to strategic misunderstanding and worsened the distrust between governments in the region. After carefully studying the US ADIZ rules and other countries’ ADIZ practices, the author found it necessary to clarify that China’s ADIZ rules are not unlike those of other countries: first, China’s ESC ADIZ does not cover the territorial airspace of the Diaoyu Dao Islands, which is included in Japan’s ADIZ; second, there is no evidence proving the Chinese rules apply to state aircraft (including military aircraft); third, there are a number of precedents for governments establishing ADIZ rules that are applicable to aircraft merely passing through an ADIZ; so China’s ADIZ rules are not unique, and the US ADIZ rules are actually unlike those of other countries in this regard.

Maritime disputes are extremely common in the world’s oceans and seas. Worldwide, over 400 maritime disputes have occurred, with less than half of them have been resolved. In East Asia, the maritime boundaries in the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, East China Sea (ECS), and South China Sea overlap and remain unsettled. Under international law, all countries have the duty to cooperate in good faith and resolve maritime disputes by a variety of peaceful means, including negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, regional arrangements, or other peaceful means chosen by the parties to the dispute. The People’s Republic of China and Japan, as State Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), bear the obligation to settle their boundary disputes by peaceful means over the boundary of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelf in the ECS. This chapter discusses the maritime disputes in the ECS by focusing on the two disputants’ duty to cooperate and their obligation to settle disputes peacefully in accordance with the provisions contained in the UN Charter and UNCLOS.

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is a reaction against China’s increasing political and economic influence under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It represents Japan’s emerging geopolitical interests in the Indo-Pacific and is a product of Japanese nationalism which envisages competition between the two regional great powers as “Japan versus China.” Though it was officially announced in 2016 under Prime Minster Shinzo Abe, it is a continuation of Japan’s past security and economic cooperation with the region. However, the use of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) beyond territorial defense is still cautiously restrained by the Japanese government except for naval exercises, port visits, and defense exchanges in the region. Japan’s defense and ODA budget has not significantly increased to cover the huge geographical area to compete with China. The gap between its grandiose geopolitical vision and limited capability suggests that the FOIP will remain Japan’s political tool to put psychological pressure on China by non-military means such as the power of norms.

This chapter attempts to clarify Washington’s ongoing conceptualization of the Indo-Pacific as a region, and to provide some thoughts on the state of the strategy. It finds that President Donald Trump was likely heavily influenced by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s approach of maintaining a “free and open” Indo-Pacific in the face of growing Chinese economic and military challenges. It further argues that America’s Indo-Pacific strategy is essentially enshrined in four key documents, including the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, and A Free and Open Indo-Pacific. A distinct challenge for Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy has been the apparent divergence between the letter and spirit of the strategy, on the one hand, and President Trump’s statements and actions on the other hand. But even in these cases, allies and partners to date have been quite forgiving because they seem to be willing to distinguish between the two and generally support the US vision. This chapter concludes with a discussion of ways in which Washington might strengthen the Indo-Pacific strategy going forward.

India has emerged as a significant actor in the Indo-Pacific. India has geostrategic and geo-economic interests in the larger region, and a focused interest in the Indian Ocean region. This chapter examines the emergence of Indo-Pacific as a mental map, and how the concept came to be accepted in India. It reviews the role of Act East policy and “Neighbourhood First” policy as pillars of its larger Indo-Pacific policy. In particular, it looks at India’s relationship with ASEAN, and two of its important strategic partners—Indonesia and Vietnam. In its central analysis, this paper looks at the strategic and economic components of India’s Indo-Pacific policy and how they are being developed to meet emerging strategic challenges in concert with other stakeholders. The upgradation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) signals an advance in the strategic domain whereas the focus on blue economy, Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), signifies the economic trajectory of India’s Indo-Pacific policy. The chapter concludes on an aspirational note that India and other stakeholders coordinate their efforts to address the new challenges in the Indo-Pacific and frame an effective response.

This chapter explains the development of Indonesia’s own concept of the Indo-Pacific cooperation and what it entails. It explains the three key features of Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific cooperation that include its emphasis on the centrality of ASEAN as the driver of cooperation, the inclusion of all major powers in the region in the cooperation venture, and its focus on non-traditional maritime security concerns. This chapter argues that Indonesia’s move to advance the Indo-Pacific cooperation has been derived from the country’s Global Maritime Fulcrum vision to improve maritime connectivity; to deal with problems posed by illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; and to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.

The chapter discusses ASEAN’s interests and motivations behind the adoption of the Indo-Pacific Outlook in July 2019. It is argued that ASEAN as a grouping has found its self-perceived centrality increasingly challenged by China’s maritime push and the emerging Indo Pacific visions of the United States and its allies. In fear of being forced to taking sides by these dynamisms, under Indonesia’s proactive role, ASEAN searched for a new way to rearticulate its principles and rules while adding strength to its existing mechanisms. The emergence of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is a result of the collective desire to maintain ASEAN’s centrality in the evolving political-economic landscape. As a result, the Outlook says nothing about geopolitical realignments, but restated the existing norms and principles and the promotion of inclusive cooperation with the priority given to the maritime domain.