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Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare 2/2023

27.01.2023 | Original Paper

Mechanism design with model specification

verfasst von: Pathikrit Basu

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 2/2023

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Abstract

We consider a setting in which additional parameters that determine preference characteristics are unknown. The mechanism designer specifies a model for possible type distributions and utility functions. We consider mechanisms that are uniformly incentive compatible with respect to a domain of possible utility functions. We identify conditions on the utility domain in which mechanisms always prescribe the same distribution over outcomes. These conditions have implications for optimal mechanism design with max-min objectives, and may be interpreted as capturing different forms of preference heterogeneity.

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Metadaten
Titel
Mechanism design with model specification
verfasst von
Pathikrit Basu
Publikationsdatum
27.01.2023
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 2/2023
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01449-3

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