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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

4. Ministerial Selection: Twitter as a Signal?

verfasst von : Andrea Ceron

Erschienen in: Social Media and Political Accountability

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Chapter 4 deals with the role of social media in the process of government formation. It analyzes the comments released on Twitter by politicians belonging to the PD, in order to record their distance from the party line. The results show that such distance has an effect on the politician’s career and emphasize the role of Twitter as a signal, suggesting that it can be used by politicians both for position-taking purposes and for boosting their own career. Furthermore, the impact of the ideological distance seems conditional on the context and the nature of the ruling coalition.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Endorsements in Primary Elections

Nächstes Kapitel Parliamentary Behavior: Rebels and Switchers

See: http://www.corriere.it/politica/12_dicembre_25/monti-napolitano-natale-berlusconi_2dcbfdec-4e9e-11e2-be01-3194f599ff4a.shtml or http://www.lastampa.it/2012/12/26/italia/politica/l-appello-di-monti-su-twitter-basta-lamentarsi-rinnoviamo-la-politica-YP7levPgkFPFBaMIPYXPVK/pagina.html

Each politician’s Twitter account, on average, is 1,057 words long.

Each politician’s Twitter account, on average, is 1,032 words long.

See: http://video.ilmessaggero.it/primopiano/bersani_arrivati_primi_ma_non_abbiamo_vinto-118557.html

Given that a politician’s decision to be active on Twitter could be subjected to self-selection, I also estimated a probit selection equation and included the inverse Mills ratio drawn from such model in a new probit regression built as in Models 3 and 4. By doing this, I can control for the hypothetical bias in Twitter usage (but see the discussion at the end of this chapter). Once again, the results remain the same.

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Titel: Ministerial Selection: Twitter as a Signal?
verfasst von: Andrea Ceron
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Social Media and Political Accountability
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-52626-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-52627-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52627-0_4