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Public Choice

Erschienen in:

01.12.2016

Minor candidates as kingmakers

verfasst von: Akifumi Ishihara, Shintaro Miura

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 3-4/2017

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Abstract

We consider a sequential entry model with three candidates who cannot commit to any policy announcement during the campaign. The study focuses on how a minor candidate, who wins only when unopposed, influences the electoral outcome. We show that unless the Condorcet winner (i.e., the winner in every pairwise vote) coincides with the grand winner (i.e., the winner of the three-candidate competition), the minor candidate is a kingmaker in the sense that his preferred rival wins regardless of the order of the entry decisions. To influence the outcome, the minor candidate could either (i) enter strategically without any chance to win, or (ii) enter if and only if the Condorcet winner already has entered.

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Bush and Gore obtained 47.87 and 48.38% of the total votes, respectively.

Instead, Chile declared its candidacy for the 2013 election.

If the minor prefers CW to win, then he simply exits to assure the winning of CW.

Osborne and Slivinski (1996) restrict attention to one-dimensional spatial competitions with a continuum of citizens who vote sincerely. As an alternative, Besley and Coate (1997) consider environments wherein finite sets of citizens vote strategically across potentially multidimensional political issues.

Iwanami (2016) analyzes elections in UNSC, using a model in which a Tullock (1980) contest occurs following the sequential decision making of candidacy.

Palfrey (1984) obtains a positive answer to this question under the essential assumption that the followers necessarily enter. Callander (2005) relaxes this demanding assumption by considering multidistrict competition, and successfully demonstrates policy divergence. While the order of decision making is exogenously fixed in these studies, Osborne (1993) considers a model where the order is determined endogenously. In his framework, the entrant is likely to choose the position of the median voter.

Another body of work exists with a slightly different interest in that it investigates whether a voting procedure is immune to the threat of strategic candidacy. See Dutta et al. (2001, 2002), Ehlers and Weymark (2003), Eraslan and McLennan (2004), and Samejima (2007).

For example, a fresh weak challenger is opposed to an established dominant incumbent. See Jewell and Breaux (1988, 1991) and Brady et al. (2007) for details.

These earlier studies of sequential entry exclude the possibility of strategic candidacy mainly because of their assumptions on preferences. In Osborne (1993), each potential candidate prefers to exit than to lose at the post-entry voting stage and thus never chooses to run with no chance of winning in equilibrium. Callander (2005) and Iwanami (2016) assume that each potential candidate is office motivated, which guarantees that each candidate stays out unless there is a positive probability of winning.

In the Supplementary Appendix, we consider a model for which the order of decision making is endogenous.

The status quo policy never emerges in equilibrium under the assumptions made below. The analysis can be extended to the case in which a tie is allowed. See the Supplementary Appendix.

This approach obviously covers the cases of sincere voters. Even if the voters are strategic, the voting outcome can be summarized by the voting function as long as the voter’s strategy depends only on the set of the candidates.

The formal definition of the strategy is found in Appendix 1.

This result relies on the assumption that the winner cannot credibly choose a policy different from his ideal point. When the winner can credibly implement a policy other than his ideal point, strategic candidacy may arise in a two-candidate equilibrium because entry may change the policy implemented by the rival (Asako 2015; Ishihara 2016).

The formal definition of threatening is found in the Supplementary Appendix.

Strictly, the history must satisfy \(h_1 = \emptyset\), \(h_2 \in \{\emptyset , \{1\} \}\), and \(h_3 \in \{\emptyset , \{1\}, \{2\}, \{1, 2\} \}\).

The lemmas here are implied by other lemmas displayed in the Supplementary Appendix.

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Bloomberg, M. R. (2016). The risk i will not take. http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-03-07/the-2016-election-risk-that-michael-bloomberg-won-t-take. Accessed May 23, 2016.

Brady, D. W., Han, H., & Pope, J. C. (2007). Primary elections and candidate ideology: Out of step with the primary electorate? Legislative Studies Quarterly, 32(1), 79–105.CrossRef

Burden, B. C. (2003). Minor parties in the 2000 presidential election. In H. F. Weisberg & C. Wilcox (Eds.), Models of Voting in Presidential Election (pp. 206–227). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Callander, S. (2005). Electoral competition in heterogeneous districts. Journal of Political Economy, 113(5), 1116–1145.CrossRef

Dutta, B., Jackson, M. O., & Le Breton, M. (2001). Strategic candidacy and voting procedures. Econometrica, 69(4), 1013–1037.CrossRef

Dutta, B., Jackson, M. O., & Le Breton, M. (2002). Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy. Journal of Economic Theory, 103(1), 190–218.CrossRef

Ehlers, L., & Weymark, J. A. (2003). Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice. Economic Theory, 22(2), 233–243.CrossRef

Eraslan, H., & McLennan, A. (2004). Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures. Journal of Economic Theory, 117(1), 29–54.CrossRef

Ishihara, A. (2016). Strategic candidacy for political compromise. mimeo, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.

Iwanami, Y. (2016). Strategic entry into the un security council election. mimeo, Osaka City University.

Jewell, M. E., & Breaux, D. (1988). The effect of incumbency on state legislative elections. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13(4), 495–514.CrossRef

Jewell, M. E., & Breaux, D. (1991). Southern primary and electoral competition and incumbent success. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16(1), 129–143.CrossRef

Nir, D. (2013). Dairy kos elections gubernatorial race ratings: Initial ratings for 2013–2014. http://www.dailykos.com//tory/2013/10/06/1243548/-Daily-Kos-Elections-gubernatorial-race-ratings-Initial-ratings-for-2013-14. Accessed May 23, 2016.

Osborne, M. J. (1993). Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition. Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 133–151.CrossRef

Osborne, M. J., & Slivinski, A. (1996). An model of political competition with citizen candidates. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1), 65–96.CrossRef

Palfrey, T. R. (1984). Spatial equilibrium with entry. Review of Economic Studies, 51(1), 139–156.CrossRef

Samejima, Y. (2007). Strategic candidacy and single-peakedness. Japanese Economic Review, 58(4), 423–442.CrossRef

Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent-seeking. In J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison, & G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a Theory of Rent-Seeking Society (pp. 97–112). College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.

Titel: Minor candidates as kingmakers
verfasst von: Akifumi Ishihara
Shintaro Miura
Publikationsdatum: 01.12.2016
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Public Choice / Ausgabe 3-4/2017
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0393-9

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