New Nationalisms and China's Belt and Road Initiative

Taking for granted new perspectives of nationalism in China’s twenty-first-century global politics, this book introduces the everyday micro and macro-social levels of political, cultural, and economic behaviours and practices of individuals and States in society. It analyses the transformations surrounding the public domain of States and their national boundaries. Indeed, examples ranging from the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) to the global social contexts of the COVID-19 pandemic, including China’s politics of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have shown evidence of growing “global nationalism”. By putting the case of China’s BRI, the book advances the multi-scale dimensions of nationalism. It inserts the double face of foreign public policy and global Chinese activities. Based on a sociological-political perspective, the book reveals interactions emerging from “inside” and “outside” domains of States and their public actions. It also shows evidence of the role of culture in the global political economy. In addition, China’s BRI puts forward distinct roles of culture, interests, and economy. These interactions run as the key features of the reception of the Chinese foreign policy. Specifically, technologies, development projects, trade, agro-industry, cyber-technologies, expertise, labour, military, and individuals and States’ normative ambitions disclose new perspectives on nationalism and political economy. Contributors in this book explore these transactions between nationalism and economic politics by drawing on different cases from Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Latin America.

This chapter examines the role of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) for a normative construct as a benign leader in a multipolar world. China has attempted to strengthen its multilateral diplomacy through the construction of the BRI. Western powers have criticized that China has notoriously stood on bilateralism or unilaterally bullied the weaker neighbours through military or economic sanctions. Yet, China has continuously swung its foreign policy approaches to managing the capitalist and socialist states in correspondence with its shifting ideological and material positions. More than ever before, China as a world superpower has turned to multilateralism in its foreign policy and has come much closer to the multilateral mentality in viewing the world’s political and economic affairs. Through the BRI project, China attempts to transfer a norm that China has been a legitimate and benign regional leader in constructing a new world order. This chapter assesses the extent to which the BRI project has successfully achieved this attempt. If not, the chapter also analyses what factors have caused these incomplete results?

The historical conjuncture forming in the early 2000s offered Angolan authorities a unique opportunity to mostly bypass the waning influence of the imposed structural adjustment programmes and dilute the loan conditions imposed by Western donor countries and institutions. At the same time that analysts were debating the different phases of democratic transitions in Africa, China arrived with resources that offered Angola an entirely different path. As a result, an authoritarian hybrid regime consolidated, ultimately ceding little control over the mechanisms of its state-building agenda. An illiberal, neo-modernist model was effectively deployed with few tools put in place to ensure efficiency, feasibility, or proper maintenance. Based on months of fieldwork in 2017, semi-direct interviews, discussions, and an extensive reading of grey literature pertaining to Angola’s political economy, this paper explores the myriad external forces and influences that weighed on Angola’s government as it emerged from its long civil war and sought its own vision of reconstruction.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project has increasingly enjoyed prominence in Chinese policymaking and economic planning as the BRI involves several state and business actors from countries in different regions. The vast majority of African countries have signed up and thus form part of projects aimed at building transport and energy infrastructure in the relevant countries, especially ports, roads, railways, and power plants.

This chapter explains that China is not following any particular or singular BRI approach to countries on the African continent. A variety of approaches are followed in African countries and the priorities of Chinese BRI investments on the continent thus differ from country to country. The BRI experiences of three countries in three different regions of the African continent are specifically analysed in this chapter, namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, and Djibouti. The chapter also intends to reflect on the main political-economic strategic considerations underlying the BRI.

The Middle East has vital and strategic importance for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a key hub connecting the land and sea routes of Asia, Africa, and Europe. The strengthening of relations with the Middle East countries was facilitated by factors such as the absence of China’s colonial past, the skilful application of “soft power” policy, and the principle of “non-intervention” (or minimal intervention), the attractiveness and efficiency of the Chinese development model. Beijing’s influence in the Middle East can be enlarged, especially through the implementation of the geopolitical and geo-economic strategy of the BRI. This chapter discusses the transformations of regional order through a specific focus on the new challenges of state failure and its spillover impacts, the changing geopolitical landscape, and consolidated divergences in the Arab revolution.

“The New Silk Roads” (NSR) are the new economic weapon of the Chinese government for increasing its security. As China’s President Xi Jinping claims that his country has reached the status of “great power”, it seems only logical according to defensive realism (Waltz Kenneth N., Theory of international politics. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979) that the country wants to reform relations with the United States due to the new balance of power. However, how can we explain the Chinese strategic orientations and its NSR project by only taking into consideration the security variable? This chapter argues that Chinese security policy can only be correctly understood by taking a materialist constructivism (Lindemann Thomas, Sociologie constructiviste des crises internationales. L'Harmattan, Paris, 2010) point of view, which highlights the role of images, emotions, and identities. In order to show that these factors are important for analysing the NSR we will use Alexander George’s “operational code” (George Alexander L., International Studies Quarterly 13:190-222, 1969). It will help us trace Xi Jinping’s instrumental beliefs, and in particular the place of the NSR project in Chinese foreign policy. It will enable us to trace Xi’s philosophical beliefs about the opposition between internal and external relations, his self-images, and his vision of the future international order.

The goal of the present text is to collect evidence of the rising Chinese interests and activities in Central Europe (CE) and to analyse the political, security, societal, and economic effects of Chinese engagement in Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The study concludes that after one decade of optimism about mutual relations, Czechia, Poland, and Slovakia are disillusioned by the Chinese engagement, and are sobering up from the ‘Chinese dream’. Among CE countries, only Hungary has still maintained rhetoric about special relations between Budapest and Beijing and about positives resulting from China’s investments. Today, CE countries rather than developing a working partnership with China use the ‘China Card’ within the EU and towards EU authorities to get what they want.

The idea of reactivating the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013, aroused interest and even enthusiasm in Poland. Over time, however, this initial enthusiasm began to give way to skepticism and pessimism. The project’s supporters emphasize that Poland, as the largest state in the region, should use its geostrategic position as well as its economic potential to become an international logistic hub for the BRI. From this perspective, the Sino-Polish partnership appears as an opportunity for development in several crucial areas: trade and investment, transport (especially the expansion of air and rail connections), financial cooperation, and people-to-people exchange.

On the other hand, optimistic visions and plans do not go hand in hand with their implementation. Despite many efforts made in recent years to strengthen Sino-Polish bonds, the effects of cooperation remain unsatisfactory. The reasons for this result from various conditions: political, economic, cultural, and other. Currently, Poland’s attitude toward China can be described as cautious and restrained.

The aim of this chapter is to consider the reasons (especially political) for such restraint in the light of growing concerns about the excessive strengthening of China’s position in the world.

The rising presence of China in Laos is a very visible and potent force of change throughout the country. Until recently, this was consolidated largely in areas along the Lao-China border but is now visible throughout the country and particularly in Lao cities. This is particularly so since China embarked on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has brought China closer to Laos, metaphorically and literally.

This chapter argues that the rising presence of China in Laos has also entrenched a sense of Lao-ness. Laos is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, which has existed in its current form only since 1975 and has a weak sense of national consciousness. This chapter contends that the issue of China in Laos is a significant and rare driver of national unity across the Lao population. This is something on which many Lao people have opinions and/or concerns and produces a sense of we-ness or togetherness as citizens of Laos amongst an otherwise disparate population.

Although Chinese and Indian civilizations have been living side by side for centuries, it is only recently that they have to deal with a common border that is still problematic and contested. The latest lethal confrontation of 2020 indicated that the two respective governments prefer to maintain a low-intensity conflict. Beyond the respectively claimed territories, the Sino-Indian border tension transcends the growing rivalry between India and China. Whether it is geostrategic positioning, the exploitation of water resources or territorial sacralization by a warlike supranationalism, this border seems to be becoming more and more watertight and less and less fluid. This article argues that tensions on the Sino-Indian border will last because they serve reciprocal domestic interests.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the ongoing project in a long, steady progression of China’s foreign relations, and a new paradigm for global governance among countries around the world. Previous studies confirm that China’s internet is full of nationalism, but relatively few studies examine the case of the BRI. Therefore, this chapter analyses the online nationalism discourse on BRI. This study uses in-depth case-study analyses of the Budapest-Belgrade Railway Saga and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on Weibo to illustrate popular nationalism. This study finds out that geopolitical rivalry, self-interest in globalism, pride, and satisfaction with the government are the four major themes and important elements of popular nationalism discourse. The Chinese popular nationalism uses the BRI as a tool to express their hostile attitude towards foreign countries and demonstrate their willingness to become the leader of the world. However, their willingness of becoming the leader of the world shows a feature of the self-interest in globalism that is influenced by Chinese Confucian culture. Overall, the study argues that Chinese popular nationalism is a social construct that is embodied in people’s personal experience and understanding.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) also offers an extended vision of cities’ development and diplomacy. The initiative enables cities to advance national priorities in line with local peculiarities due to geography, fate, affinity, context, and opportunity. It encompasses cities which are nodes of BRI as well as non-node cities. The paper aims to demonstrate how BRI involves Chinese cities that are not on the BRI routes, enabling them as protagonists of international integration. The main argument is that city diplomacy is an outstanding tool to advance the BRI goals. To achieve the aims, a case study focuses on Jingdezhen, an inner city which supports China’s strategy based on the magnificence of its porcelain. The conclusion highlights the main components used by Chinese cities to advance the BRI goals, as well as indicates paths for future research.

Hundreds of billions spent on China’s BRI targeted a corridor of regions and countries including large parts of Africa. On 2 December 2015, South Africa and China signed twenty-six agreements valued at R90 billion (¥39 bn), which announced the elevation of relations established in 1995 after the collapse of apartheid in South Africa. Whereas this came a year after the two countries adopted the 5–10-Year Strategic Programme, China’s BRI. It had six priorities in South Africa including accelerating South Africa’s industrialisation process, enhancing economic cooperation through special economic zones, growing maritime economic cooperation, infrastructure development, human resource capacity development, and financial cooperation. The 2025 agreement was based on the discourse that sufficient ground had been laid in 2014 to upscale the strategic Programme into a series of agreements including the Memorandum of Understanding on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the twenty-first Century Silk Road. This paper examines 6 years later the meaning of this joint building of the Belt and Silk Road in South Africa, how this contributes to new trends in transnational public solidarity, and how it relates to post-apartheid South African nationalism pursuing fierce independence and cooperation.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the main foreign policy of China under Xi Jinping. BRI has changed from an international investment plan to a broader vision for China’s role in the international system in the twenty-first century. In Latin America, energy is the biggest sector for the destination of Chinese foreign direct investments (FDI), accounting for 51% of Chinese FDI between 2007 and 2018.

The present article will focus on two study cases of FDI conducted by State Grid Corporation in Brazil: (1) the acquisition of CPFL Energy in 2017, a provider of energy operating in the most important economic region of Brazil; (2) the construction of two transmission lines connecting the Belo Monte Hydropower plant in Northern Brazil to the Southeastern states of Minas Gerais, Rio De Janeiro, and São Paulo.

The main goal of this article is to view these cases within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative in order to analyze China’s economic diplomacy and foreign policy in Brazil.

Australia and Papua New Guinea provide a story of striking contrasts in their response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Australian attitude has been one of wariness and concern, particularly in instances where agreements have been reached by state governments with Chinese institutions and arms of government. Ever aligned with the security interests of the United States, Australian policy in the field has been increasingly coloured by regional anxiety and keenness for more extensive US engagement. Its own status as a regional donor state and political actor is also being challenged. Papua New Guinea’s contrasting reaction has been one of enthusiastic endorsement and participation, tinged by qualification and guile. Its relationship with the Belt and Road Initiative defies traditional stereotypes about indebtedness associated with the programme, showing a potential third way for Pacific countries in approaching Beijing.

Far from being the prerogative of the interconnection of railways, land, and sea linking Europe, Asia, and Africa, the new Silk Roads appear as one of the strategic levers through which China secures its African interests in raw materials and other natural resources. Its historical proximity to the global South in general and Africa, in particular, has led to the institutionalization of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, introduced in 2000. This chapter examines the transnational agricultural policies of China based on its quest for arable land in sub-Saharan Africa and its consequent strategic investments in the Cameroonian agricultural sector. It looks at Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDCs) as transnational public policy tools which involve both workers and Chinese norms and representations. Specifically, the chapter examines the reactions of the Cameroonian workers in the Cameroon Agricultural Technology Application Center (CATAC) which is located in Nanga-Eboko, a small peri-urban city in the central region of Cameroon. Through confronting workers’ practices and Chinese norms and representations, the chapter puts forward the new forms of nationalism arising from the Chinese African agro-industrial sectors. The chapter implements a qualitative methodology based on in-depth focused group interviews and direct discussions with the local managers of the CATAC in Nanga-Eboko, Cameroon.

Kazakhstan, being in the centre of the Eurasian continent, is a landlocked country that shares a border both with China and Russia. Since its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has attempted to take advantage of its geographical location, by becoming a bridge between Europe and China. To achieve this goal, Kazakhstan has actively participated in the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as one of the founding countries. These activities have brought Kazakhstan not only the opportunity to become a transport and logistics hub but also to reduce its dependence on Russian infrastructure. In the light of the current war in Ukraine, the transportation of goods through the territory of Kazakhstan becomes more crucial to China as it can bypass Russia. Though the SREB has enabled Kazakhstan to export more resources and become more independent from Russian infrastructure, same time, China might become a threat to Kazakhstan’s economic independence, as it will be more connected to the Chinese infrastructure. This chapter also shows that during the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s economic policy in Kazakhstan is evolving. China now spends less on large infrastructure projects and focuses more on Kazakhstan’s raw materials. This study aims to take a comprehensive look at Kazakhstan’s relationship with China, as well as the implications of the SREB for Kazakhstan and its transport capacity.

The enormous growth of China’s investments in Israel has become one of the major changes in the Middle East’s geopolitics during the last decade. This paper examines the nationalist motivation behind China’s investment in Israeli technologies and Israel’s strategic role in China’s intended transition from the “world factory” to a global innovation champion. China’s engagement with Israel in the Belt and Road Initiative reflects Chinese techno-nationalism, and the Chinese government has used nationalist discourse to mobilize private enterprises to invest in Israeli technology, promoting the growth of Chinese private investments alongside Chinese state-affiliated investments in Israel since 2014. This chapter also analyses how the surge in Chinese investment activities has shaped larger debates and tensions in Israel’s policymaking and national identity.

Southeast Asia is a strategically important region for China’s Maritime Silk Road and the broader Belt and Road Initiative. As a signature foreign policy doctrine in the development domain, BRI has served China’s national economic and geopolitical interests of the “Chinese dream” and “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, while using economic statecraft and development diplomacy to promote a Chinese vision of “community with common destiny.” Nonetheless, this nationalist strategy has intensified great power and regional rivalries, as illustrated by competing initiatives from global and regional powers such as the United States, Japan, and Australia. Instead of fully engaging with BRI or siding with China’s rivalries, regional countries have favored hedging as a dominant strategy with some variations and shifts over time. This chapter examines BRI footprints and responses in the region of maritime Southeast Asia. Through case studies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, I demonstrate how foreign policy and domestic political considerations have shaped these countries’ responses to BRI. Changing ruling elite preferences, nationalist sentiments, and opposition politics have contributed to inconsistencies, reversals, and even renegotiations in BRI implementation across these countries.

China’s government promotes a historical and cultural experience of development policies through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) despite its provocative nature. China’s government, its political leadership, global diasporas, and Chinese citizens reinvent new types of economic globalization. Such globalization manifests in various manners ranging from financial and normative ambitions to global socio-cultural behaviours. In particular, agricultural workers, farmers, engineers, entrepreneurs, Chinese traders and citizens, policymakers, experts, municipalities, and cities support state councils and governments, both the bottom-up and top-down transnational activities, and from home and host societies. China’s global BRI policies are provided with many technical projects, including modernizing local-scale economic activities and engineering. However, the offered cultural knowledge in these development policies, including the tasks to put in the creation of Special Economic Zones in countries such as Laos, show evidence of the Chinese constructed intention to colonize the world strategically.