Weitere Artikel dieser Ausgabe durch Wischen aufrufen
We develop a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on economic, institutional, managerial power and social comparison literatures to explain the role of the external compensation consultant in the top management pay setting institutional field. Taking advantage of recent disclosure requirements in the UK, we collect data on compensation consultant use in 232 large companies. We show that consultants are a prevalent part of the CEO pay setting scene, and document evidence of all advisor use. Our econometric results show that consultant use is associated with firm size and the equity pay mix. We also show that CEO pay is positively associated with peer firms that share consultants, with higher board and consultant interlocks, and some evidence that where firms supply other business services to the firm, CEO pay is greater.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
3i Group Plc. (2004). Annual report and accounts.
Abrahamson, E., & Rosenkopf, L. (1993). Institutional and competitive bandwagons: Using mathematical modeling as a tool to explore innovation diffusion. Academy of Management Review, 18, 487–517. CrossRef
Baker, G. P., Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and incentives—practice vs theory. Journal of Finance, 43(3), 593–616. CrossRef
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. (2003). Executive compensation as an agency problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, 71–92. CrossRef
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. (2004). Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bizjak, J. M., Lemmon, M. L., Naveen, L. (2000). Has the use of peer groups contributed to higher levels of executive compensation? Accessed November 15, 2000 from http://ssrn.com/abstract=252544.
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of Political Economy, 81, 637–654. CrossRef
Boyd, B. K. (1994). Board control and CEO compensation. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 335–344. CrossRef
Conyon, M. J., & Murphy, K. (2000). The prince and the pauper: Executive compensation in the US and UK. Economic Journal, 110, 640–671. CrossRef
Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. (1998). Board control, remuneration committees and top management compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 146–157. CrossRef
Core, J., Holthausen, R., & Larcker, D. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 371–406. CrossRef
Crystal, G. (1991). Why is CEO compensation so high? California Management Review, 34, 9–29.
Dacin, M. T. (1997). Isomorphism in context: The power and prescription of institutional norms. Academy of Management Journal, 40, 46–81. CrossRef
Dacin, M. T., Goodstein, J., & Scott, R. W. (2002). Institutional theory and institutional change: Introduction to the special research forum. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 45–57. CrossRef
Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., Ellstrand, A. E., & Dalton, D. R. (1998). Compensation committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 209–220. CrossRef
Davis, G. F., & Greve, H. R. (1997). Corporate elite networks and governance changes in the 1980s. American Journal of Sociology, 103, 1–37. CrossRef
Davis, G. F., & Stout, S. K. (1992). Organization theory and the market for corporate control: A dynamic analysis of the characteristics of large takeover target, 1980–1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, 605–633. CrossRef
Deutsch, Y. (2005). The impact of board composition on firms’ critical decisions: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Management, 31, 424–444.
Devers, C. E., Cannella, A. A., Reilly, G. P., & Yoder, M. E. (2007). Executive compensation: A multi-disciplinary review of recent developments. Journal of Management, 33(6), 1016–1072. CrossRef
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147–160. CrossRef
Dixons Group. (2004). Annual report and accounts.
Dobbin, F. R., Edelman, L., Meyer, J. W., Scott, R. W., & Swindler, A. (1988). The expansion of due process in organizations. In L. G. Zucker (Ed.), Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and environment. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Dobbin, F. R., & Sutton, J. R. (1998). The strength of a weak state: The rights revolution and the rise of human resource management divisions. American Journal of Sociology, 97, 1531–1576.
Eriksson, T. (2000). What determines managers pay? Long Range Planning, 33, 544–559. CrossRef
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 114–140.
Finkelstein, S., & Boyd, B. (1998). How much does the CEO matter? The role of managerial discretion in the setting of CEO pay. Academy Management Journal, 41, 179–199. CrossRef
Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1996). Strategic leadership: Top executives and their effects on organizations. St Paul: West.
Fligstein, N. (1990). The transformation of corporate control. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1994). Executive compensation: A review and integration of the literature. In G. R. Ferris (Ed.), Research in personnel and human resource management (Vol. 12, pp. 161–222). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Greenbury, R. (1995). Directors remuneration: Report of a study group chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury. London: Gee.
Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C. R. (1996). Understanding radical organizational change: Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism. Academy of Management Review, 21, 1022–1054. CrossRef
Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R., & Hinings, C. R. (2002). Theorizing change: The role of professional associations in the transformation of institutionalized fields. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 58–80. CrossRef
Hambrick, D., & Finkelstein, S. (1987). Managerial discretion: A bridge between polar views of organizations. In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 9, pp. 369–406). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Haunschild, P. R., & Beckman, C. M. (1998). When do interlocks matter?: Alternate sources of information and interlock influence. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, 815–844. CrossRef
Haunschild, P. R., & Miner, A. S. (1997). Modes of inter-organizational imitation: The effects of outcome salience and uncertainty. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, 815–844. CrossRef
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225–264. CrossRef
Kraatz, M. S. (1998). Learning by association? Interorganizational networks and adaptation to environmental change. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 621–643. CrossRef
Kraatz, M. S., & Zajac, E. J. (1996). Exploring the limits of new institutionalism: The causes and consequences of illegitimate organizational change. American Sociological Review, 61, 812–836. CrossRef
Marris, R. L. (1964). The economic theory of managerial capitalism. London: Macmillan.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340–363. CrossRef
Miner, A. S., & Haunschild, P. R. (1995). Population level learning. In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Shaw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 17, pp. 115–166). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of labor economics (Vol. 3). Amsterdam: North Holland.
Newman, M. E. (2003). The structure and function of complex networks. SIAM Review, 45, 167–256. CrossRef
North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ocasio, W. (1994). Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession in US industrial corporations 1960–1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 31, 586–611.
Oliver, C. (1997). The influence of institutional and task environment relationships on organizational performance: The Canadian construction industry. Journal of Management Studies, 34, 99–124. CrossRef
O’Reilly, C. A., Main, B., & Crystal, G. S. (1988). CEO compensation as tournament and social comparison: A tale of two theories. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, 257–274. CrossRef
Ornstein, M. D. (1984). Interlocking directorates in Canada: Intercorporate alliance or class alliance? Administrative Science Quarterly, 29, 210–231. CrossRef
Palmer, D. A., Jennings, P. D., & Zhou, X. (1993). Late adoption of the multi-divisional form by large US corporations: Institutional, political and economic accounts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 100–131. CrossRef
Pfeffer, J. (1992). Managing with power: Politics and influence in organizations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper and Row.
Rao, H., Davis, G. F., & Ward, A. (2000). Embeddedness, social identity, and mobility: Why firms leave the NASDAQ and join the New York stock exchange. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45, 268–292. CrossRef
Ruef, M., & Scott, W. R. (1998). A multi-divisional model of organizational legitimacy: Hospital survival in changing institutional environments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, 877–904. CrossRef
Scott, R. W. (1994). Institutions and organizations: Toward a theoretical synthesis. In R. W. Scott & J. W. Meyer (Eds.), Institutional environments and organizations: Structural complexity and individualism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Scott, R. W. (2001). Institutions and organizations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Selznick, P. (1992). The moral commonwealth. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Sherer, P. D., & Lee, K. (2002). Institutional change in large law firms: A resource dependency perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 102–142. CrossRef
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20, 571–610. CrossRef
Thomsen, S., & Pedersen, T. (2000). Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest European companies. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 689–705. CrossRef
Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. (1983). Institutional sources of change in the formal structure of organizations: Diffusion of civil service reform 1880–1935. Administrative Science Quarterly, 28, 22–39. CrossRef
Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. (1996). Institutionalization of institutional theory. In S. Clegg, C. Hardy, & W. Nord (Eds.), The handbook of organization studies (pp. 175–190). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Tosi, H., & Gomez-Mejia, L. (1989). The decoupling of CEO pay and performance: An agency theory perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34, 169–189. CrossRef
Tosi, H., & Greckhamer, T. (2004). Culture and CEO compensation. Organization Science, 15, 657–670. CrossRef
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment and uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124–1131. CrossRef
Useem, M. (1984). Inner circle: Large corporations and the rise of business political activity in the US and UK. New York: Oxford University Press.
Uzzi, B. D. (1996). The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic performance of organizations: The network effect. American Sociological Review, 61, 674–698. CrossRef
Vance, S. C. (1983). Corporate leadership: Boards, directors and strategy. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Wade, J. B., O’Reilly, C. A., & Pollock, T. G. (2006). Overpaid CEOs and underpaid managers: Fairness and executive compensation. Organizational Science, 17(5), 527–544. CrossRef
Wade, J. B., Porac, J. F., & Pollock, T. G. (1997). Worth, words and the justification of executive pay. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 18, 641–664. CrossRef
Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). Social network analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Watts, D. J. (2004). The “new” science of networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 30, 243–270. CrossRef
Werder, A., Talaulicar, T., & Kolat, G. (2005). Compliance with the German corporate governance code: An empirical analysis of the compliance statements by German listed companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13, 178–187. CrossRef
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1994). Substance and symbolism in CEO’s long-term incentive plans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, 389–402. CrossRef
Zajac, E. J. (1988). Interlocking directorates as an interorganizational strategy: A test of critical assumptions. Academy of Management Journal, 31, 428–438. CrossRef
Zajac, E. J. (1990). CEO selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 11, 217–230. CrossRef
Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1995). Accounting for explanations of CEO compensation: Substance and symbolism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 283–308. CrossRef
Zucker, L. G. (1977). The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. American Sociological Review, 42, 726–743. CrossRef
- New perspectives on the governance of executive compensation: an examination of the role and effect of compensation consultants
Martin J. Conyon
Simon I. Peck
Graham V. Sadler
- Springer US
Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© BBL, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta, Neuer Inhalt/© hww, digitale Transformation/© Maksym Yemelyanov | Fotolia