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Über dieses Buch

Planning in a general sense is concerned with the design of communication and decision making mechanisms in organizations where information and choice are decentralized. Non-cooperative planning theory as it is developed in this book treats the incentive aspects hereof. It stresses how strategic behavior and opportunism may impede planning, and how this can be coped with via the organization of communication and decision making, the design of information and control systems, and the development of incentive schemes. In particular, the book contains a thorough investigation of incentive provision in information production.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Introduction

Chapter 1. Basic Concepts and Approaches

Abstract
Most organizations involve several agents with conflicting interests, private information, and private possibilities to act. From the point of view of specialization, one can even argue that the decentralization of information and choice among the members of an organization is what gives it potential to operate more efficiently than a single individual. This requires, however, that some information be shared and some actions be coordinated which is what planning in a general sense is all about. There are two obvious aspects of this. One is to define operating rules (communication and decision making procedures) and the other is to define enforcement rules (incentive schemes).
Peter Bogetoft

Information and Communication

Chapter 2. Bayesian Games and Implementation

Abstract
In this Part, chapters 2–3, we emphasize the decentralization of information in planning, and we investigate how the organization of communication affects the possibility to implement social choice correspondences.
Peter Bogetoft

Chapter 3. Organization of Communication

Abstract
In this chapter, we consider the Bayesian social choice problem, and we investigate how the organization of communication and choice affect the possibility to implement social choice functions.
Peter Bogetoft

Delegated Decision Making

Chapter 4. Choice-Implementation Models

Abstract
In this Part, chapter 4–7, we consider the decentralization of decision making in planning, and we investigate how the efficiency of incentive schemes depends on the monitoring systems.
Peter Bogetoft

Chapter 5. Sufficient and Robust Information

Abstract
In this and the following chapters, we examine the use and value of information systems in delegated decision making. We concentrate initially on verifiable information, i.e. a maintained assumption here is X = ∅. We return to the case where X ≠ ∅ in chapter 7.
Peter Bogetoft

Chapter 6. Finer, Complete and Ancillary Information

Abstract
In this chapter, we continue the inquiry into the use and value of verifiable information in delegated decision making. The set-up, basic assumptions and notational conventions follow that of the last chapter. We seek new insights, however, by introducing three additional concepts from the statistical theory and by investigating their economic relevance.
Peter Bogetoft

Chapter 7. Non-Verifiable Information

Abstract
The structure of optimal information systems and incentive schemes has been studied at some length in the preceding chapters. So far the stress has been exclusively on information that is public and verifiable, i.e. which can be documented conclusively to a third party like a court. In most contexts, however, there exist large amounts of private, non-verifiable information. In this chapter, we investigate the use and value of such information. We emphasize that we shall be concerned with private information acquired after contracting.
Peter Bogetoft

Delegated Information Production

Chapter 8. Information Production Models

Abstract
In this Part, chapters 8 to 10, we consider the moral hazard problem in delegated information production. We examine how to ensure the generation of accurate information, and how the organization of information production affects the provision of incentives.
Peter Bogetoft

Chapter 9. Incentives in Information Production

Abstract
In this chapter, we analyze the incentive problem in information production as delineated in chapter 8. We stress the importance of the statistical properties of the private and public information, and we discuss how the informativeness condition from Part 3 must be modified.
Peter Bogetoft

Chapter 10. Organization of Information Production

Abstract
In this chapter, we analyze how alternative organizations of information production interact with incentive provision. Some related questions were addressed in chapter 3. The main difference is that we now impose more structure on the choice sets and the player’s motivations, such that we are able to push the analysis quite a bit further.
Peter Bogetoft

Evaluation of Specific Schemes

Chapter 11. Incentives and Productivity Measures

Abstract
In this chapter, we suggest that it may contribute to the theoretical foundations of specific Operations Research (OR) techniques to consider their viability and performance in a context with explicit non-cooperative elements. We illustrate the idea by analyzing a class of productivity analysis methods that have recently gained momentum in the literature, namely the socalled Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methods. We examine to which extent such methods may support incentives in delegated decision making.
Peter Bogetoft

Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 12. Summary and Conclusions

Abstract
The aim of this book has been to report on some contributions to non-cooperative planning theory. Planning, in our terminology, is concerned with the design of communication and decision making mechanisms to cope with the decentralization of information and choice in organizations. Non-cooperative planning theory treats the incentive aspects hereof. Agents in an organization may be opportunistic. Hence, it is relevant to consider how communication and decision making procedures will work in strategic environments, and it is important to design enforcement mechanisms such that desired outcomes are sustained by non-cooperative behavior.
Peter Bogetoft

Backmatter

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