Skip to main content
Fachgebiete
Automobil + Motoren Bauwesen + Immobilien Business IT + Informatik Elektrotechnik + Elektronik Energie + Nachhaltigkeit Finance + Banking Management + Führung Marketing + Vertrieb Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe Versicherung + Risiko
DE
EN
Bücher
Zeitschriften
Themenseiten
Organisationspsychologie Projektmanagement Marketing Smart Manufacturing
Weitere Formate
Podcasts Webinare Technik Webinare Wirtschaft Kongresse Veranstaltungskalender Awards
Jetzt Einzelzugang starten
Zugang für Unternehmen
Referenzkunden
SLX-Digitalkonferenz: Zukunftswerkstatt 2024

Mehr Umsatz mit Top-Kontakten

Am 7. Mai erfahren Sie, wie Vertriebsteams Leadgenerierung, Leadnurturing und Leadstrategien effizient steuern können.
Erweiterte Suche
Anmelden
nach oben
Erschienen in:
Agreement Technologies: A Computing Perspective Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2013 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

12. Norms in Game Theory

verfasst von : Davide Grossi, Luca Tummolini, Paolo Turrini

Erschienen in: Agreement Technologies

Verlag: Springer Netherlands

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

This chapter summarizes two main views on norms and games as emerging in literature on game theory, social science, philosophy and artificial intelligence. The first view originates in the field of mechanism design or implementation theory and characterizes norms as mechanisms enforcing desirable social properties in classes of games. According to the second view, originating from work in the social sciences and evolutionary game theory, norms are studied via the notion of equilibrium and are viewed as emergent social contracts or conventions.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren
Vorheriges Kapitel (Social) Norms and Agent-Based Simulation
Nächstes Kapitel AI and Law
Fußnoten
1
We will often use the terms “norm” and “institution” as synonyms.
 
2
The phrase comes, as far as we know, from North (1990).
 
3
New institutional economics has brought institutions and norms to the agenda of modern economics, viewing them as the social and legal frameworks of economic behavior. See Coase (1960) for a representative paper.
 
4
This is the so-called Vickrey auction. See (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008, Chap.​ 11) for a neat exposition.
 
5
This problematic assumption has been put under discussion extensively in Hurwicz (2008).
 
6
See Parikh (2002) for an inspiring manifesto.
 
7
This fundamental distinction has been emphasized, for instance, in Hurwicz (1996).
 
8
It might be worth stressing that the two views are not incompatible as institutions as equilibria can be thought of arising within games defined on institutions as game forms.
 
9
Self-enforcement is the type of phenomenon captured by the so-called folk theorem. The theorem roughly says that, given a game, any outcome which guarantees to each player a payoff at least as good as the one guaranteed by her minimax strategy is a Nash equilibrium in the indefinite iteration of the initial game (cf. Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, Chap.​ 8).
 
10
The conditions considered are essentially three: how risk-seeking is i, what the probability of a violation to be detected is, and how prone is j to react upon a detection.
 
Literatur
Axelrod, R. 1986. An evolutionary approach to norms. The American Political Science Review 80(4): 1095–1111.CrossRef
Bicchieri, C. 2006. The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Binmore, K. 2007. The origins of fair play. Proceedings of the British Academy 151: 151–193.
Castelfranchi, C., M. Miceli, and A. Cesta. 1992. Dependence relations among autonomous agents. In Decentralized A.I.3, pp. 215–227, ed. E. Werner and Y. Demazeau. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Coase, R. 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44.CrossRef
Coleman, J. 1990. Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard.
Conte, R., and C. Castelfranchi. 1995. Cognitive and social action. London: UCL Press.
Gintis, H. 2010. The bounds of reason. Princenton: Princenton University Press.
Grossi, D., and P. Turrini. 2010. Dependence theory via game theory. In Proceedings of the 9th international conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems (AAMAS 2010), ed. W. van der Hoek and G. Kaminka, 1147–1154. Richland: IFAAMAS.
Hurwicz, L. 1996. Institutions as families of game forms. Japanese Economic Review 47(2): 113–132.CrossRef
Hurwicz, L. 2008. But who will guard the guardians? American Economic Review 98(3): 577–585.CrossRef
Lewis, D. 1969. Convention: A philosophical study. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Osborne, M. J., and A. Rubinstein. 1994. A course in game theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT.MATH
Schelling, T. 1966. The strategy of conflict. London: Oxford University Press.
Shoham, Y., and M. Tennenholtz. 1995. Social laws for artificial agent societies: Off-line design. Artificial Intelligence 73(12): 231–252.CrossRef
Shoham, Y., and K. Leyton-Brown. 2008. Multiagent systems: algorithmic. Game-Theoretic and Logical Foundations. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Skyrms, B. 1996. Evolution of the social contract. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Ulmann-Margalit, E. 1977. The emergence of norms. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
van der Hoek, W., M. Roberts, and M. Wooldridge. 2007. Social laws in alternating time: Effectiveness, feasibility, and synthesis. Synthese 156:1: 1–19.MathSciNetMATHCrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Norms in Game Theory
verfasst von
Davide Grossi
Luca Tummolini
Paolo Turrini
Copyright-Jahr
2013
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Buch
Agreement Technologies

Print ISBN: 978-94-007-5582-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-94-007-5583-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2013

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5583-3_12