6. Norway: Altruism under Strain

Engen Committee (1961); St.meld. nr. 23 (1961–1962); Innst. S. nr. 75 (1961–1962).

St.prp. nr. 109 (1966–1967), based on the Onarheim Committee (1967); Innst. S. nr. 167 (1967–1968).

Norad (1969); St.meld. nr. 29 (1971–1972); Innst. S. nr. 135 (1972–1973).

St.meld. nr. 94 (1974–1975); Innst. S. nr. 192 (1975–1976).

This does not mean that the notion of a Norwegian foreign policy during the period 1814–1905 makes no sense (“although Swedish historians seem to disagree”), Alf Kaartvedt posits. “It is beyond discussion that the arrangements of the union had as a consequence that Norway influenced the organization of the foreign service (the cabinet, diplomacy and the consular service)” (Kaartvedt 1995: 233; English translation, this author).

Ibid: 362. Nevertheless, Norwegian and Swedish foreign policy perspectives differed: “Since Norway lacked Sweden’s great-power tradition and ambitions, the country disassociated itself from the wish of its union partner to continue playing an active role in European politics. During the lifetime of the union, the east-oriented Sweden was also determined to protect its foreign-policy freedom of manoeuvre, while consequent neutrality became a Norwegian axiom. Norwegian foreign-policy interest and activity became concentrated on the trade policy” (Ibid: 363; English translation, this author).

Introducing a book series (six volumes) that analysed Norway’s foreign policy since the year 800, Olav Riste referred to such “geographical constants”. Its closeness to the sea made Norway, in old times, a maritime power (the Vikings) and provided a basis for fisheries and, in our time, oil and gas exploitation. “[T]he impression of being a relatively innocent prey of the power politics of other states goes further back, and had for centuries before 1814 been anchored in the history of conflicts and wars based in the conflicting sovereignty demands of three neighbouring countries—Denmark, Russia and Sweden—all with big-power ambitions” (Riste 1995: 8; English translation, this author).

Jørgen Løvland, minister of foreign affairs (1905–1907), prime minister (1907–1908); quoted in Riste 1993: 318; English translation, this author.

Halvard Lange’s programme as minister of foreign affairs was to cooperate with all, without taking part in any block formation. This in-between position was maintained until the beginning of 1948 (Sverdrup 1996: 347–348; Riste 1993).

Norway’s efforts within the League of Nations in building up an increasingly extensive international legal order had a long-term perspective. In the analysis of Odd-Bjørn Fure, this policy was connected “to a legalistic tradition in Norway’s foreign policy that went back to the 1890s. […] Up to 1936, the different Norwegian governments—with a certain exception for the agricultural-party government [1931–1933]—based their policy on the understanding that both the national interests of small states and world peace could be secured only through the improvement of the international legal order” (Fure 1996: 386–387; English translation, this author).

In the first years after the union with Sweden was dissolved in 1905, foreign policy relations with Sweden were more characterized by distrust and conflict than by cooperation (Berg 1995: 322–323). Also after WWII, Norway’s attitude to Scandinavian and Nordic cooperation was characterized by ambivalence. However, the general cooperation between the Nordic countries within the UN—“where the sovereignty-concern did not constitute a problem”—was close and without important frictions (Eriksen and Pharo 1997: 147, 166; English translation, this author).

An extensive literature deals with various aspects of this “pilot” project. The PhD thesis of Helge Ø. Pharo (Pharo 1986a, b) constitutes a major reference work on the history of the conception and running of the project. For an overview and analysis, see also Simensen (2003): chaps. 1–3 (pp. 21–78).

In Parliament’s concluding debate, “idealist and humanitarian justifications for the assistance dominated. Re-armament and the Communist threat did not come to the fore, what remained was the hope that the initiative might herald a new drive in international politics, and the belief that the action in Norway represented a milestone because, as the spokesman for the issue, Arne Strøm, put it, ‘it may create a strong desire […] in our people to assist where it is needed’” (Pharo 1986a: 54; English translation, this author).

The campaign is vividly described in Pharo (1986a: 106–111) and Simensen (2003: 49). The “People’s Action for the underdeveloped areas” was organized, independently from the Fund, by a committee that included prominent public people representing most political parties, industry and trade unions, religious and humanitarian organizations, sports, youth, schools and the media. The solemn launching of the “Action” took place in Oslo’s City Hall, addressed by the king, the president of Parliament and the minister of justice, representing the government, and was greeted by the former and the new secretary-generals of the UN (Lie and Hammarskjöld). Throughout, the media gave the campaign extensive and enthusiastic coverage, and the campaign itself issued its own weekly newspaper. It received active support from Norwegian Broadcasting (NRK). Norwegian Railways put a separate railway carriage at its disposal (with the name “The Indian Express” painted on it), which toured the country for about two weeks. Inside the carriage an office was provided for popular NRK reporters (with staff) who reported daily from the tour.

Pharo (1986a): 1ff. Initially, the project “should, by way of technological and economic innovation, contribute to a peaceful political and social revolution” (p. 2; English translation, this author).

Balsvik (1969), summarized in Simensen (2003: 46–49). The Cold War argument (“a practical instrument in the fight against Communism”) was, in the first place, used by Labour parliamentarians.

Idem; Pharo (1986a: 46). Later, with increasing allocations, self-interest arguments also came to the fore, although at a high level of generalization: how could European industry find future markets when East Europe and China were lost and a self-sufficient America was the only trading partner? (Simensen 2003: 46–48).

Pharo even found it tempting to make the internal political dimension—keeping the Labour Party together and suppressing the critical voices of the left wing—the main issue. He hastened to add, however, that it would be an oversimplification to consider this the whole or even the most important part of the history (Pharo 1986a: 55–56; also 29, 34–35, 112–113).

Pharo (1986a: 4–7) observed that many of the actors on the Norwegian side lacked both an interest in and understanding of development problems in general. Probably they were also too concerned with succeeding to take unfortunate side effects into account. Result-oriented Norwegians, impatient with administrative practices on the Indian side, nurtured conflicts (pp. 202–257). See Klausen (1968) for an analysis of the skewed outcome of the project during the early years.

See Simensen (2003) and Stokke (1975, 1979) for the aid policy and practice during the 1960s and early 1970s. By 1960, the MFA considered the Kerala project “partly irrelevant, partly an irritant, and partly a political liability. After the creation of the NU [the aid administration, 1962–1967], the Board of the Foundation was shuttled into a distinctly subordinate position and was to have a rather frosty relationship with the Secretary-General of NU/NORAD until the Kerala Project was discontinued in 1972” (Pharo 2013: 76–77).

Engen Committee (1961: 5–7). It distinguished, however, between idealist motives “based on the principle of human equality and in a feeling of solidarity with all countries and races”, political and economic motives. The political motives were to create “the political stability that constitutes a precondition for a peaceful development in developing countries and thereby in the whole world” (English translation, this author).

Ibid: 7. “Defined in this way, the expression ‘help’ is not limited to contributions provided free of charge or at a reduced charge for the benefit of the recipient only” (English translation, this author).

The report argued, inter alia, that aid aiming at economic profit for those providing it did not prevent it from also serving the interests of the recipients: “Through transfers of capital […] the industrial countries may, inter alia, secure industrial markets for themselves and promote their own economic expansion.” Related to the big powers’ Cold-War fight for influence by way of aid, the report argued that “[a]lso military-assistance programmes may be of great economic importance for recipient countries” (Ibid: 7; quotations to English by this author).

St.meld. nr. 23 (1961–1962): 1; Innst. S. nr. 75 (1961–1962): 1.

Innst. S. nr. 75 (1961–1962): 105.

“In principle, the Government’s policy is that as much as possible of the assistance should be channelled through multilateral institutions, in the first place the United Nations.” Many reasons were given: the need for coordination; a fairer means of distribution than bilateral aid; “an international agency may also more easily give advice to a developing country when it comes to economic assistance than a donor country, which often may be accused of intervening in the recipient country’s internal affairs”; an administrative capacity and knowledge of developing countries “that makes them particularly able to administer the aid” (St.meld. nr. 23 [1961–1962]: 5–6; English translation, this author).

The government referred to the role of the UN in the decolonization process and found it important that it was given the possibility and means to assist the new countries after they had become independent. “In this way, one may also contribute to meeting the wish of these countries to stay outside the East-West conflict” (Ibid: 6; English translation, this author).

By 1961, total Norwegian official contributions (1947–1961) amounted to NOK135.9 million (Engen Committee 1961). This amount may be compared with the assistance Norway received from the Marshall Plan during the years 1948 through 1952: about USD450 million (Simensen 2003: 37).

Stokke (2009): Table A.1. Measured as a percentage of GNP, its ODA varied between 0.11% and 0.18% between 1960 and 1967, increasing to 0.29% and 0.30% in 1968 and 1969, respectively.

Onarheim Committee (1967): 21–22; St.prp.nr. 109 (1966–1967): 7.

Engen Committee (1961): 21–22; St.meld. nr. 23 (1961–1962): 4–5; Innst. S. nr. 75 (1961–1962): 105–106.

Should the government increase the amount allocated for development assistance, it should either make cuts in other budgetary lines or increase taxes. Einar Gerhardsen, the prime minister, found that providing taxpayers’ money for other countries was so particular that it needed to be separated from other purposes. With the exception of the Liberals, the non-Socialist opposition parties voted against the special tax, arguing that it was psychologically wrong, creating repugnance for and hurting a worthy case (Simensen 2003: 112; Balsvik 1969).

St.prp. nr. 109 (1966–1967): 7. Decisions about the rate of the annual increases would be “based on political judgements and the economic situation, the finance policy, balance-of-payment situation, etc.”.

Innst. S. nr. 167 (1967–1968): 344–345.

Ibid: 345. The majority also emphasized “the importance of stimulating private investments in developing countries so that private efforts might be as high as possible in the time-span mentioned” (English translation, this author).

Idem.

St.meld. nr. 55 (1968–1969): 131–132. The commitment was followed up by a stepped-up budgetary plan in fixed prices for the years 1970–1973 for development assistance and international humanitarian assistance during that period—furthermore, this framework should be considered one step in the continuous development of Norwegian development assistance in the 1970s.

A communiqué from the MFA to Parliament’s finance committee dated 12 May 1970 related to the stepped-up budgetary plan: the 1% target, of which ODA should make up 0.75% of the GNP, was to be met in 1974. The majority (the representatives of the Conservatives, Christian Democrats, the Centre Party (SP) and the Liberals) agreed to the government proposal, asking it, however, to consider an even earlier increase if the budgetary situation at a later stage allowed it. The Labour representatives on the committee opted for meeting the target one year earlier (Innst. S. nr. 303 [1969–1970]: 520, 525–526).

In the Borten government (non-Socialist coalition), the prime minister (SP), the ministers of foreign affairs and trade (Lyng and Willoch, both prominent Conservatives) were critical of the kind of ear-marking in the budget suggested by Parliament. The stepped-up allocations, insisted on by the Liberals and Christian Democrats (constituting a majority in Parliament, together with Labour), created tensions within the government coalition.

St.prp. nr. 109 (1966–1967), based on an extensive report by a government-appointed review committee (Onarheim Committee 1967).

Norad (1972): 12–13. This “fair contribution to the efforts to bridge the gap between the rich and poor world” was, however, based on “continued growth in our own economy within a normal functioning world economy”. The government added that Norway, during the years after WWII, had net capital imports of more than 2% of GNP (English translation, this author).

The Bratteli government (Labour) resigned in the autumn of 1972 after losing in the plebiscite on whether Norway should join the EEC.

Innst. S. nr. 135 (1972–1973): 338. The Conservatives wanted to include private transfers in the target and emphasized the development effects of such transfers. Their spokesmen—who included one former and two later prime ministers—emphasized that their proposal was in accordance with the UN target and that they would “consider a further increase of Norwegian development assistance when this was considered sound economically” (English translation, this author).

St.meld. nr. 71 (1972–1973): 3, 33. The plan did not reiterate the previously stated economic conditions related to fulfilling the target (balance-of-payments situation, etc.).

St.meld. nr. 94 (1974–1975), detailed in St.meld nr. 75 (1976–1977): ODA should be increased by 0.1% of GNP annually until 1981, when it would amount to 1.3% of GNP. It was based on expectations of increasing oil incomes, and previous conditions were repeated (“continued growth in our own economy within a normally functioning world economy”). The ODA beyond 1.0% of GNP should be oriented towards support of Norwegian industries to adapt to the expected increased competition from developing countries, and a Credit Fund to stimulate Norwegian firms to engage in industrial enterprises in the Third World, along with other mechanisms with the same purpose.

The Christian Democrat members of the committee emphasized that “the concern to improve our foreign economy should not lead to a downgrading of the importance of development assistance. The problems in developing countries are much more fundamental than those hitting us, and problems related to fluctuations in international economic conjunctures have caused serious setbacks in several developing countries. The need for increased development assistance is therefore considerable” (Innst. S. nr. 360 [1977–1978]: 12; English translation, this author).

In the debate on the speech from the Throne, the leader of the Christian Democrats—former prime minister Korvald—stated that his party stood firm on its aim to increase ODA to 1.5–2.0% of GNP by 1981 (Stortingstidende [1977–1978]: 109).

Ibid: 875.

In the debate on the budget, one Labour MP, Sissel Rønbeck, argued that the 1.3% target should not disappear (“it is in bad times that solidarity must be proven”) (Stortingstidende [1977–1978]: 875). She tabled a proposal on behalf of seven members of Labour’s parliamentary group, asking the (Labour) government to come up with a plan for the aid policy that implied that the efforts were not weakened vis-à-vis the original aim of the government’s plan for 1978–1981 (p. 1793). The proposal was supported by the Christian Democrats and the Liberals.

The minority government had to accept the budget proposed by its predecessor (1.05% of GNP) for 1982—the parties that had proposed higher amounts voted for the Labour proposals. And for 1.1% of GNP the following year.

For a detailed overview of the ODA budget proposals of the governments since 1962 to the mid-1980s, see Stokke (1989: 207–209).

In principle, the Progress Party (FrP) was against all ODA. The party increased its strength from 3.7% in the 1985 general election to 24.1% in a public opinion poll three years later. In Parliament’s debate on the government’s white paper in 1987, its main spokesperson stated that it would be morally right “to let the taxpayers themselves keep the means that today are used to help various states in other parts of the world” (Stortingets forhandlinger (1986–1987) Nr. 39: 3607–3610; quotation 3608; English translation, this author). Nevertheless, the party was not consistent in its demand for cuts in “the imposed public assistance”, indirectly revealed by the party’s financial spokesperson (Stortingstidende (1987–1988). In Parliament’s budget debate (30 November 1987), the party suggested the proposed ODA budget be cut by NOK3.1 billion. This implied that the party accepted a budget that would provide 0.5% of GNP in ODA—far above the DAC average at the time. Much later, as partner in the Solberg government (Conservative-FrP coalition), the party accepted 1.0% of GNI in ODA (budgets 2014–2017). The government itself was pressed by the majority in Parliament to keep the 1% target.

OECD (1980: Table A.14, 1984: Table II.I.7). In 1982 (the date set for meeting the target), it was missed by a small margin (0.99% of GNP); in 1983, ODA reached 1.06% of GNP.

On 21 November 1977, when Parliament considered the government’s budget proposal for 1978 (1% of the calculated GNP in ODA), all political parties agreed. In its recommendation, Parliament’s committee on foreign and constitutional affairs noted with satisfaction that “the Government, despite the difficult economic situation, has found it possible to meet the target for Norwegian aid transfers” (Budsjett-innst. S. nr. 3 [1977–1978]). In Parliament (Stortingstidende [1977–1978]), the spokespersons of the political parties concurred.

The sudden decline in 1995 had a “technical” more than a political explanation: Norway was one of the first OECD countries to introduce a new system of national accounts. This revision raised the GNI substantially: the nominal growth between 1994 and 1995 was 33%. In the budget for 1995, ODA had been fixed in current NOK as a percentage of a much lower calculated GNI. As a percentage of GNI, ODA went down from 1.05% in 1994 to 0.87% in 1995. During the years after 1995, governments with different political-party platforms committed themselves to meeting the 1% target again as soon as possible.

Most political parties committed themselves to restoring the 1% target by 2005. In the budget for 2002, the outgoing Labour government proposed 1% of GNI as a target, but gave no date for its attainment. The incoming government (Bondevik II, non-Socialist) set the date, but did not follow up with a plan for stepped-up budget allocations. In 2004, the government repeated this commitment, although being vague with the time set for its attainment (St.meld. nr. 35 [2003–2004]: 86). The majority in Parliament’s committee on foreign affairs—all members, except the two representing the Progress Party—agreed (Innst. S. nr. 93 [2004–2005]: 6).

Peaking in 2010 (1.10% of GNI)—and performing above the 1% target also in 2009 and 2013 (OECD 2011: 178, 2014: 345).

Calculations based on the ODA for the years 2009–2012 (OECD 2011: Table A.1; 2013a: Table A.1). In the 1980s and 1990s, this share was 2.0% and 2.2%, respectively (Stokke 2009: Tables A.7 and A.10). In 2010, Norway ranked the ninth largest contributor of the DAC countries; in 2012, the tenth largest (OECD 2011: 178, 2013a: 218). Also during these years, Norway was among the top three providers of ODA in relative terms along with Luxembourg and Sweden—at the top in 2007 (0.95% of GNI), 2010 (1.10%) and 2013 (1.07%). It performed at about 1% of GNI (or above that level) since 2009 (OECD 2010: Table A.1, 2012: Table A.1, 2014: Table A.1). It peaked with 1.11% of GNI in 2016, largely due to an extraordinary increase of in-country refugee support that year, 18.4% of total ODA (https://​doi.​org/​10.​1787/​dcr-2017-33-en:​111)

It may seem strange that governments with Conservative prime ministers reached the peak of 1.17% of GNP in ODA (in 1986 and again in 1990). However, these were coalition governments that also included the Christian Democrats, for whom development cooperation has been and remains a high priority concern: the Conservatives had to accept a high ODA volume to be able to form the governments. This was also the case in more recent coalition governments in which the Christian Democrats participated or constituted part of the parliamentary basis (including the first Solberg government (2014–2017), minority coalition, Conservatives and FrP). Even the FrP, finding itself in a government coalition, had to agree to meet the 1% target.

St.meld. nr. 29 (1971–1972) established the basis for Norwegian aid policy for years. The policy received broad support in Parliament. Interestingly, in its argumentation for an increased focus on welfare, justice and income distribution, the government argued that these aspects should also be given greater attention, to ensure continued support in public opinion in the industrialized countries for development cooperation that involved long-term and substantial transfers of resources.

The political and humanitarian support for the liberations movements in Southern Africa—and in the “overseas provinces” of Portugal, where the colonial power (a NATO ally) was waging a colonial war—obtained broad political support in Parliament, although with some reluctance on the part of the Conservatives. It was especially justified by the UNGA resolution no. 1514 (1960)—which included the declaration on the end of colonial rule—and by following resolutions where UN member states were encouraged to provide moral and material support to the people and liberation movements in such areas. For a presentation and discussion of the initiation of this support, Stokke (1970, 1975: 28–31); for an overview and analysis of the follow-up, Eriksen (2000).

Norad (1972: 9ff). The government emphasized that radical changes in the economic and social structures of Third World countries would be necessary to ensure that the result of the growth process did not benefit only small, privileged groups, but produced a fair distribution of income throughout society. Development cooperation should aim at a combination of social welfare and growth, and the aspects of a fair distribution of income and general welfare should be given more prominence (pp. 10–11). Whereas the majority in Parliament gave emphasis to the political regime criteria for the selection of main recipients of bilateral aid (“priority”, later “programme” countries) as well as the poverty criterion (the need for aid), the Conservatives emphasized the poverty criterion.

The NIEO aimed at economic and social progress in developing countries, “a reduction of the gap between the rich and the poor part of the world and between the rich and the poor within the countries. Increased employment must therefore be a main objective, both for the national development efforts and for international economic cooperation. At the same time it must be aimed at meeting the basic needs in terms of food, clothing, shelter, drinking water, transport, health and education for all sections of the population” (St.meld. nr. 75 [1976–1977]: 92; English translation, this author).

Norad (1975: 13–15). It added that “our people firmly adhere to such fundamental precept of human values as the Christian philosophy of universal brotherhood and a general feeling of solidarity between all human beings. Guided by such fundamental precepts, we are in duty bound to accept our share of the burden towards achieving a more equitable international distribution of wealth” (p. 13).

“Norwegian aid originates from humanitarian and Christian traditions and the philosophy of solidarity. Development assistance is an extension to the international level of the efforts to create social justice, characteristic of the development of the Norwegian welfare state”. The 1984 white paper concluded that development assistance “is established as an important national obligation”. The satisfaction of social and economic human rights was an additional motive for the provision of ODA (St.meld. nr. 36 [1984–1985]: 19); English translation, this author).

Inter alia, Engen Committee (1961: 7); Innst. S. nr. 167 (1967–1968): 2; Stortingstidende (1967–1968): 343. In 1975, the government (Labour) observed that it was in the industrial countries’ best interest to promote better development in the Third World, arguing that “a society burdened with great social and economic inequalities is an unsafe society, and a world in which great inequalities exist between nations is an unsafe world” (St.meld. nr. 94 [1974–1975]: 11). In 1984, the government (non-Socialist coalition) added democratic development within countries (part of the justification for aid from the beginning) and liberation from economic dependence in external relations as formal objectives of development assistance (St.meld. nr. 36 [1984–1985]). In 1987, the government (Labour) included promotion of peace (always part of the justifications for aid) as an objective of development assistance in its own right (St.meld. nr. 34 [1986–1987]; English translation, this author).

St.meld. nr. 36 (1984–1985): 20; St.meld. nr. 34 (1986–1987); Innst. S. nr. 186 (1986–1987). For a discussion, Stokke (2005: 454–456).

St.meld. nr. 36 (1984–1985): 20.

The principle meant “partly, that Norwegian aid shall be channelled to the poorest developing countries; partly, that Norwegian development assistance shall be used to promote social and economic development for the broader sections of the population and particularly for the groups that were most problematically situated. In this connection, it is important to direct attention towards the mechanisms that affect the development of poverty. In this context, the socio-economic structure is of importance and so is the extent to which the authorities promote a policy that is socially just and development-oriented” (St.meld. nr. 51 [1991–1992]: 174; English translation, this author). In 1993, Parliament agreed (Innst. S. nr. 195 [1992–1993]: 38).

The Commission summarized the motives driving Norway’s engagement for international development issues as follows: “Solidarity, justice, equality and benevolence [nestekjærlighet] have for years been given as basic motives for Norway’s development assistance, the long-term development cooperation as well as disaster aid. Lately, a concern for the environment of the Earth and future generations has also entered as an important justification for why we engage ourselves. Our values are increasingly related to both human beings and the environment, given a perspective where the Earth and all living beings are integral parts of a whole. The increasing ecological and social crisis of global society affects all and needs to be solved in common. There is here a question about both common interest and self-interest” (NOU 1995: 5, 94–102, quotation 99; emphasis in original; English translation, this author).

Norway had won the trust of other countries, due to the solidarity expressed through many years of Norwegian development assistance, humanitarian aid and political support for poor countries, the government posited. “This has given Norway influence in international cooperation. The Government wishes to maintain and strengthen the instruments Norway has at its disposal to demonstrate solidarity with the weakest members of the world community”. Sustainable development in the South was of common interest to peoples in North and South alike and cooperation aimed at development must be based in the common interest in promoting certain common goals—involving trade, aid and international cooperation in other areas. The main task for Norway’s foreign policy was “to promote Norway’s interests in relation to foreign countries, which includes contributing to the world community in finding common solutions to international problems”. However, Norway’s interests in this regard, as perceived, were the decisive ones. These interests “are linked to several factors which affect our lives, national identity and international position in various ways. In our overall policy to safeguard these interests, the Government considers an active South policy as an important element” (St.meld. nr. 19 [1995–1996]: 5–10, quotes 5 and 10; English translation, this author).

By anchoring the objectives of development assistance in Norwegian foreign policy interests, the 1995 white paper provoked a heated debate that involved the very identity of the aid policy (international solidarity vs. national self-interests). The Christian Democrats even issued a counter-report (KrF 1995). Parliament’s standing committee on foreign affairs (all members, with one exception, representing the Progress Party) underscored “long-term common interests as the fundamental motivation for Norway’s aid policy towards the developing countries in the South. Aid must primarily be about securing rights for the weakest, founded on the basic philosophy that better distribution of the benefits will create a better world to live in for all. […] From a Norwegian perspective, it is of crucial importance to work for a greater international concern for the fight against poverty” (Innst. S. nr. 229 [1995–1996]: 7–8; English translation, this author). For a discussion, Stokke (2005: 454–456).

NMFA (2002). The development policy was defined as a core element in Norway’s foreign policy, and policy coherence—in the widest sense of the notion—was prescribed as the core strategy, necessary for attaining the main objective. A subsequent white paper followed up on the stated policy: fighting poverty was what development was all about (St.meld. nr. 35 [2003–2004]).

“The fight against poverty, the MDGs and the belief in a UN-led world order remain firm resolutions. The development policy shall be based on rights and contribute to strengthening the ability of states to meet their obligations and the ability of the individuals to claim their rights” (St.meld. nr 13 [2008–2009]: 5; English translation, this author).

In low-income countries that themselves wished a societal development with low inequality, the government will, in direct dialogue with the authorities, use the aid strategically for improved distribution and increased growth and continue with a policy that contributes to fighting poverty, such as strengthening the health and education sectors; in the dialogue with the authorities in middle-income countries, prepare them for the end of international aid and that they themselves must take a greater responsibility for the services to and welfare of their population; in countries characterized by authoritarian regimes, discrimination and/or secrecy, more emphasis will be given to cooperation with actors for change, within civil society, rather than to channelling aid through the authorities; in the international arena, the government will work for increased global attention to national distribution policy. More attention will be given to sustainable growth and more just distribution within countries (Meld. St. 25 [2012–2013]: 5–6; English translation, this author).

Fighting poverty and the humanitarian imperative was stated as the overarching objective of the policy, with four cross-cutting concerns—human rights; women’s rights and equality; climate and the environment; and fighting corruption—and with five thematic policy areas, namely education; health; industrial development and employment promotion; climate, renewable energy and the environment; and humanitarian assistance. The policy would be anchored in the new sustainable development goals and, inter alia, would maintain the poverty orientation of the development policy (Meld. St. 24 [2016–2017]).

Innst. 243 S (2016–2017); Innst. 440 S (2016–2017).

However, the mechanism came into use in a gradualist way (poor performance vis-à-vis the criteria might lead to slightly reduced annual allocations or freezing it at the existing level). Nevertheless, even in this regard, only minimal effects may be observed (Stokke 1988, 1989, 1991, 1995).

In 1990, Kenya broke off diplomatic relations with Norway, on the grounds of Norway’s “interference” in Kenya’s internal affairs. In the short term, this affected the aid programme to Kenya. However, Norway had no intention of ending the state-to-state ODA programme to Kenya due to violations of human rights. A few years earlier, Norwegian authorities situated in Kenya had even turned a blind eye to severe human rights violations. In a few other instances involving other programme countries, ODA has been frozen at the level already established, marginally reduced, redistributed, replaced with targeted aid or directed through other channels, including NGOs. The real reasons for these changes were seldom explicitly communicated to recipients. Sri Lanka is another case in point. The civil war cum ethnic conflict led to gross violations of human rights. In 1985, this made Norway renegotiate the ODA country programme—continuing programmes that were not directly affected by the conflict; giving increased emphasis to programmes benefiting the victims of the conflict; reducing commodity aid; and not committing aid for new activities (Stokke 1991: 49–51, 1995: 171–175). For Kenya, also infra, note 94; for Sri Lanka, also infra, notes 95, 96.

At an early stage, the regime criterion (social justice) may have influenced the assistance provided to Cuba (along with Norwegian shipping interest in harbour development). This assistance was, however, politically controversial (the Conservatives objected) and was terminated after a few years. It may also have affected the assistance provided to Vietnam after the war (as a follow-up on the previous humanitarian assistance)—and, later, the assistance to Nicaragua.

In 1977, the Conservatives, from the very start giving emphasis to the poverty criterion (poor countries), opposed the inclusion of Mozambique as a programme country both from a foreign policy perspective (East-West) and a domestic perspective (right-left). Other parties—particularly the Socialist Left Party—argued, based on the established selection criteria, for the exclusion of Kenya, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and the inclusion of Angola and Nicaragua, but also Zimbabwe (previously the party had argued for the inclusion of Vietnam and Nicaragua).

The disagreement within the non-Socialist government coalition (1983–1986) between the Christian Democrats, and the Conservatives, came into the open in 1986. In a note to the minister of development cooperation (Christian Democrat), the prime minister (Conservative) made it clear that increased development cooperation with Nicaragua was not in line with the government’s policy. The subsequent Labour minority government did not include Nicaragua among the programme countries, although Labour had earlier argued for its inclusion. However, in actual practice, the assistance was increased to the level provided to programme countries. Later, Nicaragua became included among the programme countries.

The guideline prescribing recipient orientation of ODA might represent a stumbling block for a donor government determined to insist on its own objectives—such as, in the Norwegian case, socially just development, poverty reduction, promotion of human rights, prioritizing women and children—as long as the recipient government, in its policy, did not give priority to these issues. The regime criteria for the selection of main partner countries were established to avoid such conflicts. In real life, however, this is not easily attained, especially, as in the Norwegian case, when partner countries are chosen first and the selection criteria established afterwards, or when a change of government takes place on the recipient side.

St.meld. 36 (1984–1985): 25–26; 34 (1986–1987): 29; Innst. S. nr. 186 (1986–1987): 31–32. In Parliament, the spokesperson for the recommendation, Kjell Magne Bondevik (previously the MFA [1983–1986]), justified the modification as follows: “In the same way as it is up to the authorities of the recipient countries to accept activities that are included in the state-to-state cooperation, also we on the aid-providing side set precise demands as to the choice of activities, the way projects are designed and other conditions related to the cooperation which makes sure that we can expect a development effect that justifies our efforts” (Stortingstidende (1986–1987): 3589; English translation, this author). State-to-state cooperation was, as noted, regulated through a rolling four-year country programme. The implication was that aid not included as a priority in the recipient government’s development plan, but prioritized by Norway (such as support for women-in-development programmes and the environment) might be financed outside the country programme. At the level of stated policy, this discussion continued within the aid agency, and a new policy guideline was formulated, combining recipient orientation with recipient responsibility—with an indicated threat of withdrawal should the recipient government not deliver (Norad 1990; St.meld. nr. 51 [1991–1992]).

Whereas the six priority countries in 1970 received 78% of the bilateral ODA, the share of the then nine programme countries in 1980 was 64%, going further down to 56% in 1987 (Stokke 1989: Table 2).

These exceptions should be used with great caution (St.prp. nr. 109 [1966–1967]). They were arrived at only reluctantly because of the government’s free trade ideology and shipping interests. In 1972, the governments (Labour; centre parties) confirmed the principle in more unreserved terms: when Norwegian commodities were considered expedient in the bilateral programme, deliveries “should not be made to the recipient country on appreciably less favourable terms than similar deliveries from other countries” (NORAD 1972: 31–32; English translation, this author).

Among the “traditional” mechanisms that were given substantially higher financial frameworks in 1975 and later was a facility, first established in 1963, involving a government guarantee scheme for political risks for investments in developing countries and an arrangement whereby the aid agency (Norwegian Agency for International Development—NORAD) covered 50% of the costs of pre-investment studies in the Norwegian priority countries. A new mechanism (NORFUND), from which Norwegian enterprises could apply for loans on favourable terms (or guarantees for such loans) for industrial development projects in developing countries, was proposed in 1975 and established in 1979. Most emphasis was, however, given to a mechanism—established in 1963, and progressively given extended financial frames after 1975 (and lax emphasis, let alone control, on their development effects)—to promote Norwegian exports to Third World countries. The NIEO-specific mechanisms included support for the promotion of imports from Third World countries to the Norwegian market and a mechanism (proposed, but not realized) to support restructuring and adjustment measures for Norwegian industries that were negatively affected by the liberalization of imports from developing countries.

The tying practice during these years may be illuminated by a statement by Parliament in 1981, intended to correct the practice: NORAD should, as a rule, buy at world market prices. It added, however, that in cases where special reasons should justify it, NORAD might favour Norwegian suppliers when it came to commodity, programme and project aid. Nevertheless, in such cases the assistance should not be provided on appreciably less favourable terms: Norwegian suppliers might be chosen “even if they should be up to 10% more expensive than what can be obtained elsewhere” (Innst. S. nr. 255 [1980–1981]: 6; English translation, this author). The “restrictions” by Parliament came as a response to intensified efforts by the authorities and the aid agency during the late 1970s to boost the inclusion of Norwegian commodities and services in the aid programme—examples were given of commodities that were up to 40% more expensive than what might be obtained on the international market. Contrary to Parliament’s intention, however, “up to 10% above” tended to develop into a norm.

The government stated that “we have to see to it that as little as possible of the aid disappears as a result of bad planning, corruption and inefficient administration in the recipient country. In a similar way, the aid administration must see to it that the aid does not disappear on the Norwegian side because of a too high price or a quality that is not adapted to the purpose”—adding that the purpose must meet the overarching demands set for Norwegian ODA (St.meld. nr. 36 [1984–1985]: 26ff; English translation, this author). The subsequent Labour government agreed (St.meld. nr. 34 [1986–1987]). However, it appears from the context that the main purpose was to obtain fair prices on the Norwegian market, not to ensure favourable prices through international competition.

However, the total financial frame given these arrangements was modest—it increased from 1.3% of the ODA budget in 1984 to 3.3% in 1991. The actual use of the funding was even less (Stokke 1991: 62–63). For an overview and discussion of the evolving relationship between aid and industrial interests during these years, see Eriksen (1987).

In the mid-1980s, the Parliament insisted that the arrangements to stimulate Norwegian firms to increase their activities in Norway’s main partner countries and in other least developed countries should be subordinated to the overarching objective set for Norwegian development assistance and oriented to contribute to building sustainable industry and other economic enterprises. The investment arrangements should be given clear priority vis-à-vis the export-support arrangements (Innst. S. nr. 186 [1986–1987]: 46–50). In the government’s 1984 report, the weight given to the various mechanisms was, in contrast, inversely proportional to their assumed development effects, given the stated objective set for the assistance. The two political parties that stood for the most opposite positions on the arrangements established to serve Norwegian export interests by way of ODA (apart from the Progress Party and the Socialist Left Party), namely the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats, found themselves in the coalition government. Both from its value perspective and principal standpoint, the Christian Democrats were strongly against the commercialization of the development assistance, but concession on this point was the price to pay for the Conservatives to agree to a high volume and a stronger poverty orientation of ODA. The Christian Democrats tightened the financial frames of the mechanisms it did not favour.

In 1990, 40.5% of total ODA was channelled multilaterally (kept outside the tying account). As reported by OECD, the bilateral aid added up to 59.9% of total ODA (excluding administrative costs); 36.7% of total ODA (commitments) was untied and 23.2% tied (OECD 1992: Table 6); in 1995, 77.0% of bilateral ODA (commitments, excluding technical assistance and administration) was untied and 23.0% tied; in 2000, 97.7% was untied and 2.3% tied; and in 2005, 99.6% untied and 0.4% tied (OECD 1998: Table 31; 2002: Table 23; 2007: Table 23). All ODAs (excluding administrative costs and in-country refugee costs) were untied in 2012–2014 (OECD 2016: 238).

The 1984 white paper emphasized the importance of avoiding an unacceptable form for intervention in the political life of programme countries. The strategy prescribed was to use ODA for specific purposes that might ensure human rights; aid should not be perceived as an instrument for “rewarding” some governments and “punishing” others. Human rights objectives should be pursued primarily through cooperation, taking, as the point of departure, the social and cultural conditions pertaining in each country. In certain contexts, however, the question of a redistribution, reduction or even termination of aid might be raised: when the responsible authorities of a partner country assisted in, tolerated or directly administered violations of human rights; when these violations were systematic and lasting, and the authorities did not make efforts to prevent and prosecute those responsible for the violations; and when the violations were gross and extensive (St.meld. nr. 36 [1984–1985]: 117–119).

Supra, note 79. The Norwegian state-to-state assistance was not reorganized to bypass the state by providing a larger share through NGOs.

Supra, note 79. The State Secretary of development cooperation identified the dilemma involved: cutting aid, in accordance with the guideline set for human rights, might conflict with the overall poverty norm set for Norwegian ODA. It was often the suppressed and poor who would suffer, he posited, arguing for a gradualist practice of the human rights criterion except in extreme cases (Sæter 1984: 4–5).

In a country study commissioned by the Ministry of Development Cooperation, the government of Sri Lanka was considered (a) to be implicated in causing—by errors of commission as well as omission—the escalating of the ethnic conflict; (b) to bear considerable responsibility for the brutality with which the conflict was pursued; and (c) to not being fully committed to negotiations (Sørbø et al. 1987: 166). Nevertheless, among the options discussed for future aid under different scenarios, the study recommended that although ODA was unjustified according to the human rights criterion, only some components of the aid programme should be immediately terminated and the final decision should be postponed. One of the justifications for this recommendation was the high quality of the Norwegian ODA programme that included assistance to groups directly affected by the armed conflict and benefited population groups that were given high priority in Norway’s development assistance (the poor, women, children).

Two Norwegian research groups—one at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, the other the Human Rights Project, which developed into the Human Rights Institute, and eventually became integrated in the University of Oslo—took advantage of the human rights commitment in the 1984 white paper to initiate an annual report on human rights in Norway’s programme countries. During the initial years, they obtained financial support for this initiative in external monitoring of human rights performance. The first volume appeared in 1985 (Andreassen et al. 1985).

This represented, if not a new policy course, a new emphasis—although these values had been part of previous strategies. The 1992 white paper stated that “[d]emocracy and human rights, social equality and popular participation in the development process, good governance and effective administration are all elements that have been given stronger emphasis in the 1980s. Earlier, such issues were rejected as interference in the internal affairs of developing countries, but a clear recognition has gradually emerged: positive development within these areas constitutes an important incentive for economic effectiveness and social justice, and the national authorities have the responsibility for the development” (St.meld. nr. 51 [1991–1992]: 50; English translation, this author).

As had been the case earlier with follow-up on high-profile policies within cross-cutting areas—first (in the mid-1980s) to promote gender issues, which in the 1990s became part of the human rights package: three special advisers on human rights were appointed (in the MFA, the Ministry of Development Cooperation and NORAD, respectively). After the Kenyan experience, an intra-administration committee for human rights issues was established in 1991.

The strategy was designed to support national and regional efforts for peace and stability, electoral processes and elected assemblies, judicial protection and the rule of law, economic planning and control, decentralization and organizational pluralism, and the promotion of mass media and information. The funding did not, however, constitute a heavy burden—the support for human rights and democracy projects increased from 0.55% of total ODA in 1990 to reach 3.73% five years later (Selbervik 1997: Appendix 1).

NOU (1995, 5: 94; English translation, this author). In 1996, Parliament came up with an almost identical definition (Innst. S. nr. 229 [1995–1996]).

Fighting corruption was central in the government’s “good governance” pillar. In 1999, Parliament agreed to make NORAD into a frontline organization in this fight, emphasizing that actors in the North that promoted corruption in developing countries should also be confronted (NMFA 1999: 9–11; Innst. S. nr. 28 [1999–2000]).

Bilateral and multilateral aid should be channelled to recipients according to their ability and willingness to improve such rights. Positive measures were considered more effective than aid conditionality. Four central human rights conventions were integrated into Norwegian law (St.meld. nr. 21 [1999–2000]: 109ff.).

Central to a human rights focus would be “efforts to improve democracy, but also a poverty orientation, with efforts for women, children and the handicapped” (Innst. S. nr. 23 [2000–2001]: 8; English translation, this author).

“Only through a joint effort for all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural human rights will we be able to pursue a foreign policy that promotes Norway’s interests and security, contributes to international peace and justice, and protects human rights. Based on such a holistic perspective, the Government will pursue an active human rights policy” (St.meld. nr. 21 (1999–2000): 8; English translation, this author). The new focus was to integrate development and human rights. “A recognition of possessing rights, and knowledge of how these rights may be claimed, might give increased self-confidence to marginalized groups and thereby be an incitement to higher participation in the development process, which is of decisive importance for creating a sustainable development” (p. 111). A manual (handbook) for human rights assessments of development projects was prepared by NORAD.

“Development policy is not about charity. Development policy is about the realization of human rights for all. […] Norway’s development policy […] is based on the fundamental principle that all people are equal in human dignity. Consequently, development policy also becomes an agenda for human rights. It is also about promoting human rights—economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. The fight against poverty is a fight for justice” (St.meld. nr. 35 [2003–2004]: 5; English translation, this author). Parliament’s committee on foreign affairs agreed on this (Innst. S. nr. 93 [2004–2005]: 2, 4).

The white paper repeated the distinction between a charity approach and a rights-based approach—the latter approach seeks “both to strengthen the ability of the authorities to meet the rights of the citizens and the citizens’ own knowledge about and ability to demand that their rights should be met. This is of great importance for the poor, not least for vulnerable groups, particularly among women, children, disabled people and minorities”. It placed emphasis on distribution of resources within countries, not only between countries. It considered rights-based development a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for attaining a more just distribution of resources (Meld.St. 25 [2012–2013]: 16ff; quote 16; English translation, this author).

Meld.St. 10 (2014–2015). It would, inter alia, “pose clear demands to recipients of Norwegian development assistance regarding a will to improvements within human rights, democracy and a state governed by law”. The aim of the development policy was “to contribute to increased democratization, realizing of human rights and to peoples being able to work themselves out of poverty”. A “stick” was more than indicated (p. 10, 51ff; quotes 10, 51; English translation, this author).

This should not come as a surprise. Gro Harlem Brundtland—minister for the environment already in the mid-1970s and Chair of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987)—took over for the second time as prime minister in mid-1986. This position provided her with resources for an active and enthusiastic follow-up on the report—nationally, but not least internationally (Tamnes 1997: 433ff). Tamnes posited that, at this point in time, Norway—along with the Netherlands and the neighbouring Scandinavian countries—tried “to be a spearhead in the environmental work” (p. 436)). In the government’s white paper (St.meld. nr. 34 [1986–1987]), responsibility in the administration of natural resources and the environment ranked first among the five prioritized objectives set for ODA. Parliament agreed: Norway should be a pioneer in prioritizing an ecological responsible basic-needs strategy for developing countries (Innst. S. nr. 186 [1986–1987]).

St.meld. nr. 51 (1991–1992): 55. The additional resources were to compensate for “the extra costs inflicted on developing countries by their choice of alternatives that contribute to protect the global environment” (Ibid; English translation, this author).

The heads of three Norwegian environmental and development NGOs (WWF, Norway; Rainforest Foundation of Norway; Development Fund Norway) stated, inter alia: “From rostrums around the world, all Norwegian prime ministers, ministers for development and the environment have, during the last decade, been praised as representatives of a seemingly environmental and development-friendly nation. Cold evidence, in contrast, shows that Norwegian environmental aid has been strongly declining, little of it systematic, and that very much of what the authorities has reported as environmental assistance has, in fact, little or nothing to do with environmental aid. The WWF, the Development Fund and other organizations have documented that as much as half of Norwegian environmental aid has been wrongly categorized as environmental efforts, and that the efforts, in addition, are small and declining” (www.​dagsavisen.​no [Published 11.04.2006—09:59]; attached to NMFA 2006; English translation, this author).

“We know that we must get a grip on environmental problems in order to solve the poverty and development problems confronting the world. We steadily also observe examples whereby cooperation on the environment provides important contributions to peace, reconciliation, security and regional development. Norway’s development-oriented environmental efforts shall be based on the developing countries’ own priorities”. The Plan of Action (2006–2015) anchored the activities in the UN MDGs (NMFA 2006: 4; English translation, this author).

The foreign and development policies had been more closely connected, the white paper posited. “It is necessary to see Norwegian domestic and development policy as connected”. Norway wanted to contribute to an international policy geared to strengthening international common goods (such as a stable climate, international peace and security, control of infectious diseases and a well-functioning finance system) (Ibid: 5–6, quote 5; English translation, this author).

“Norway’s initiative serves an important catalytic role through influencing the multilateral organizations and other countries to contribute to a necessary, global joint effort to prevent climatic change. […] Projects to preserve the rainforest aim at strengthening the life conditions and rights of the indigenous people and preserving ecological diversity, and at the same time contribute to reducing the emission of greenhouse gasses”. The government financed these efforts from the ODA budget (Ibid: 6; English translation, this author).

The 2009 white paper stated: “The environment and climate is the sector that will increase most on the budget for development cooperation in the coming years” (St.meld. nr. 13 [2008–2009]: 8). The minister for development cooperation, Erik Solheim, also took over responsibility for the environment—facilitating a budgetary development along the line stated.

Two activities may indicate the wide scope of the voluntary activities: (1) Operasjon Dagsverk (OD)—a national solidarity organization of volunteers from secondary and high schools, established in 1964 with a national leadership and 22 district committees and involving 550 schools (2012)—are organizing collective work to provide youths in other parts of the world a possibility of obtaining education. Students set aside one day for voluntary work every year for this purpose (the last Thursday in October). (2) Since 1974, the annual Television Action organized by the Norwegian Broadcasting (NRK)—in cooperation with a chosen national NGO, different from one year to the next—has mobilized for a benevolent purpose (an activity organized by the NGO selected), most often related to international development. The collection of money is organized in a variety of ways: about 100,000 collectors, organized by the selected NGO, call at the doors of Norway’s 1.8 million households; the government and municipalities contribute with cash, as do firms and institutions. Well ahead of the action day, the NRK prepares the ground through TV programmes adapted to the theme selected, with a focus on the situation pertaining in areas in which the resources are to be spent. The educational programmes are combined with entertainment—and reporting on the results at intervals. Municipalities compete to be among the best providers per capita. The money outcomes of the TV actions have been substantial—world-leading per capita for this type of actions.

These activities started early on and were extended over the years. Thus, while NORAD information office had eight hands and a budget of NOK2.5 million in 1972, the staff had increased to thirteen and the budget to NOK15 million ten years later. In 1982, the office published three running publications (of which Norkontakt, with 14.000 free subscribers, was the most important) and sixteen report series. In 1982, NORAD bought and distributed about 100 films to schools and organizations. In all, 186 journalists received travel support that year. A series of other information activities were also pursued (Ruud and Kjerland 2003: 59). This support continued into the new century. According to an OECD study of the DAC countries’ expenditure on information and development education in 2001–2002, Norway spent USD7.5 million (0.56% of total ODA; USD1.67 per capita) in 2001 (Donnell et al. 2003: 23, Table 1). Put into perspective: US spending was 0.007% of total ODA and USD0.003 per capita.

Reports of the Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway (CBSN 1972, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1984); Statistisk ukehefte nr. 48/86; OECD 1976: Table 2; 1985: Table 1 (performances, in percentages of GNP and USD million, in 1972 and 1983, respectively).

Teigum (1997: 13); Revold (2013: 5, 8, 56). The attitudes varied with age (youth being most in favour), gender (women most in favour); education (those with higher education most in favour); geography (those living in the largest towns most in favour) (Revold 2013: 8).

Revold (2013: 8–13). In 2013, 54% of those voting for the Progress Party were in favour of the provision of ODA to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America while 41% were against (5% did not know). However, the majority was against assistance to countries in Eastern Europe and the former USSR (53% against, 43% for, 5% did not know). The majority of those voting for the other parties represented in Parliament were in favour of this assistance (Liberals, 91%; Socialist Left Party, 90%; Christian Democrats, 80%; Labour, 77%; Centre Party, 68%; and Conservatives, 60%).

The political parties were divided along a centre-left/right axis on the (Labour) government’s stepped-up budgetary plan to attain the 1% target by 1978 involving more than a tripling of the ODA budget: an increase from NOK460 million in 1972 budget to NOK1.260 million (1972 NOK) calculated for 1978. Shortly before the debate in Parliament in early February 1973, a public opinion survey was published, showing that support for development assistance—and for an increase in the transfers—was rather modest. The spokesperson of the Centre Party warned that “if we are not able to turn around the opinion on this point, it will be impossible to attain this goal”. This triggered a debate in Parliament: almost all speakers—not the least the Conservatives—insisted that public polls should not dictate the positions of the political parties in this case. Politicians had an obligation to stay at the front and guide public opinion, particularly in this case, the spokespersons for Labour, Conservatives, Christian Democrats, Liberals and the Socialist People’s Party argued (Stortingstidende, 8 February 1973: 1832, 1834, 1841–1842, 1875, 1884 (Labour); 1837–1838, 1847, 1858–1859 (Conservatives); 1847 (Christian Democrats); 1849–1850, 1854 (Liberals); 1858 (Socialist People’ Party)—the spokesperson for the latter arguing that politicians should fulfil the dual function of listening to the opinions of the people and leading opinion.

The selection of voices focusing on the altruism/self-interest dimension of sixty-five years of development assistance has, by necessity, been selective and the extracts comprehensive.

Basically, Jarle Simensen agreed with this analysis, but in somewhat broader terms: by satisfying different opinion groups, “the development assistance became particularly useful to the Labour Party. This appears as the most prominent trigger of the initiative to provide assistance to India” (Simensen : 55; English translation, this author).

Norwegian assistance to Cuba and Vietnam in the 1970s and to Nicaragua in the 1980s and beyond—and US-Norwegian foreign policy relations—is discussed in more detail and with a somewhat different emphasis by the authors of Volume II of Norsk utviklingshjelps historie. The assistance to Nicaragua after the revolution in 1979—at the start cautious, but increasing during the following years (although the Conservatives were against)—mobilized activists, youth organizations, the Christian Democrats, Liberals and Labour. The authors even indicated that this assistance gave a boost to the aid policy, observing that it became a rallying point for many ideals. “Where some viewed [the Sandinastas as] Marxists, others viewed [them as] Social Democrats. Others again were engaged in liberation theology, the right to national self-determination, or by the Sandinistas’ prioritizing of health services and education for the common people. But the Reagan administration’s controversial support of the Contras was also decisive in creating the [Norwegian] support. This made the Nicaraguan [government] into an anti-American hero, a David against a Goliath” (Ruud and Kjerland 2003: 232–245, quote 244–245; English translation, this author).

Pharo (2008: 79). Additional explanations referred to were international pressure from the emerging development states and from the allies through the DAC and “the peer pressure from the other Scandinavian states. […] Most important, however, appears to have been the advent of a new generation of Norwegian politicians and activists more concerned with the world beyond Europe and the North Atlantic area, and by the turmoil caused by the Vietnam war and the last ditch struggles of the Portuguese, the Rhodesians and the South Africans against the liberation movements in Southern Africa […]”. See also Pharo (2003).

“The reorientation of Norwegian aid to cater for a wider range of tasks has provided both added visibility and popularity. Peace-making and humanitarian relief have also further reinforced the linkages between the state bureaucracy, the NGOs and business interests. The huge efforts involved require the active engagement of organizations such as the Norwegian Red Cross and Church Aid and of private sector firms that provide both the necessary goods and equipment. The Norwegian aid effort after the end of the Cold War appears to rest on an even more solid foundation by appealing widely to the altruistic impulse, to self-esteem, political priorities and bureaucratic and business interests” (Pharo 2013: 88).

The 1972 white paper brought redistribution more strongly to the fore and “poverty orientation” was initiated, Simensen noted. “Equality as an objective, the egalitarian tradition, has probably been more strongly founded in Norway than in most countries. Along with the green spirit of the 1970s—and a reaction against increasing class distinctions in many developing countries—the egalitarian tradition is part of the explanation why economic growth almost disappeared from the language of Norway’s aid strategy in the 1970s” (Simensen 2003: 274, emphasis in original; English translation, this author).

“From the early 1970s, all direct assistance was provided on a grant basis, with no credits. A main guideline was that the assistance should not be tied to deliveries of Norwegian commodities. […] Norway should appear as a genuine benefactor and a true friend of the developing countries with no selfish interests” (Ibid: 275; English translation, this author).

“The direct commodity deliveries, of dried fish and fertilizers, made up […] about 30% of the aid budget in 1970. Equipment to the projects run by Norad was in the first place delivered from Norway although formally untied. Experts created exports. […] Overall, more than half of the development assistance [up to 1975] was used to pay for Norwegian commodity deliveries and salaries to Norwegian experts” (idem).

The Norwegian authorities hesitated, in the 1980s, to criticize the leadership and policy of developing countries, inter alia to avoid providing ammunition to the FrP. However, in the 1990s this changed. The white papers described, with no reservations, “the developing countries’ misuse of money, […] large projects that did not benefit the people, general lack of governance, lacking democracy, insufficient economic judgements on the part of the authorities in developing countries, the existence of an unsound monopoly power, overregulation, corruption, etc.” (Liland and Kjerland 2003: 78–79; English translation, this author).

Many have seen the upgrading of the engagement policy as an increasing emphasis on idealism and altruism in Norway’s foreign policy, the authors observed. “It has been quite common to see the Norwegian urge to assist and its humanism as a continuation of the line from Wergeland and Fridtjof Nansen, the rhetoric in the League of Nations […] and the UN enthusiasm and ‘bridge-building’ of the early post-war period. In the 1990s, the theme that earlier had dominated Norwegian foreign policy, the security policy, demanded less attention […] opening up the possibility to turn the attention towards other themes, such as several of those belonging to the engagement policy: economic development, fighting poverty, preventing and alleviating humanitarian catastrophes, prevention of war and conflict, etc. […] The new Norwegian engagement within peaceful parts of international conflict management might thereby become an alternative to the more traditional military activities. To this it may be added that the oil income gave Norway a room for manoeuvre that other countries did not have” (Ibid: 81; English translation, this author).

During the 1990s, this policy, in which development assistance was integrated, had solid support in Parliament and from shifting governments. It was criticized—particularly by the Conservatives and in the public discourse—for moving away from core Norwegian foreign policy interests, such as the security policy concerns related to relations with the US and NATO, and other foreign policy issues considered much more important to Norway. “Much of the engagement policy demonstrated, the critics maintained, a self-satisfied, arrogant and ‘besserwisser’ attitude” (Ibid: 88–89). For other critical comments on the engagement policy of the 1990s and into the new century, and of special aspects of this policy, including its realism and effectiveness, inter alia, Lundestad (1999); Østerud (2006). For a more multidimensional and conceptual criticism, including the engagement policy, but also the immigration, refugee and integration policy, Tvedt 1995, 1998, 2003, 2017). For a sober discussion and analysis, Hveem 2015 (10–16; 20ff.).

The authors are far from alone in noting the influence of societal norms on the aid policy. Rolf Tamnes observed that the aid policy had, “at all times, reflected the dominant ideological perceptions in Norwegian society”. At the beginning of the 1990s, “the welfare idea and the poverty orientation remained [in the aid policy]. However, at the same time, the basic ideas of the 1960s about modernizing and productivity underwent a renaissance and environmental protection was added as a central problem” (Tamnes 1997: 408–409; English translation, this author).

The organized world community has been “the long-term and overarching object for Norwegian foreign policy. As a small state with a vulnerable foreign economy, we have a special interest in a world where integration, rules and agreements between states make violent conflict less possible: it is Norway’s interest-policy” (Sørbø 1997: 240; English translation, this author).

“The broad agreement across political parties, that for long has existed around Norwegian development assistance, is based on an alliance of Social Democrat, Socialist and Christian groups that have had as a common ideological platform a sentiment of international responsibility for doing something with poverty, inequality, and violation of fundamental human rights. These idealist motives have all along been prominent in the justification for Norwegian development activities and are brought most strongly to the fore in public opinion polls” (Ibid: 242; English translation, this author).

Sørbø referred to the selection of main partner countries and occasions where Norwegian authorities used development assistance to signal disagreement with the US and other security policy partners, with particular reference to the humanitarian support to Vietnam during the war and to the liberation movements in southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies. In the 1990s, development assistance became particularly strongly integrated in the foreign policy, Sørbø observed, referring to the assistance provided to newly independent Namibia, to South Africa (mainly in support of the democratization process), to Yugoslavia, and to the follow-up on the peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. With this came the increased assistance provided to humanitarian relief activities that increasingly became related to efforts to promote human rights, support for democratic societal development and national and regional peace and stabilization efforts (Ibid: 247–248).

It has been particularly difficult for many to accept “that we should use Norwegian development assistance to subsidize Norwegian firms that want to establish themselves abroad, but tensions have also appeared vis-à-vis parts of our trade and import policy, where it has been pointed out that the Norwegian benevolence towards developing countries, by and large, has been modified when it has collided with other Norwegian objectives to protect its own economy, particularly within agriculture and some industrial sectors.” “Risk capital, administrative experience and technological cooperation with investors in the South might provide development effects beyond the resources invested—if succeeding”. However, the various subsidy arrangements established to stimulate participation of Norwegian industry (mixed credits, parallel financing) have “a discriminatory effect vis-à-vis industries in other countries (also in the South)” (Ibid: 254–255; English translation, this author).

Inter alia, OECD (1982: 150–151 (ODA continued to consist “virtually only of bilateral grants and multilateral contributions”; had a “pronounced poverty orientation”; the sectoral distribution of bilateral ODA “is characterized by a strong emphasis on socially-oriented activities in favour of the poorest strata of the population”); 1990: 149–150, 1992: 106 (“Norway’s development assistance continues to be characterized by a pronounced poverty orientation. Three-quarters of bilateral ODA is channelled to least developed and other low-income countries.”)).

It added that “[t]his concentrated effort enables Norway to punch above its weight on the global stage” (idem). See also OECD (2008: 10 (“Norway has a long, proud history of more than 50 years’ involvement in development co-operation. It is a progressive donor, prepared to promote new and innovative ways of thinking”); 2005: 10, 2000: 13 ff).

These aspects of the aid policy are discussed on a comparative basis in Chap. 10 (infra). For an evaluation of the Norwegian assistance to Afghanistan—the long-term development effects found to be next to nil—see Chap. 10, especially note 18.

Lunde et al. (2008).

“Norway should not give with the one hand and take with the other,” the party argued in a new “white paper” (KrF undated [2016]), with a similar effect as the 1995 “white paper” (supra, note 72)—see Innst. S. 243 (2016–2017); Innst. S. 440 (2016–2017).