4. Nuclear Doctrine as a Continuation of Factional Politics by Other Means, 1964–1971

General Curtis E. LeMay, Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary of Defence, “Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability,” April 29, 1963, with report on “Chinese Communist Vulnerability” attached, Top Secret (NSA: http://​nsarchive.​gwu.​edu/​NSAEBB/​NSAEBB38/​document6.​pdf).

Mao Zedong’s Talk at a Meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group (Excerpt), March 15, 1969 (WC/DAIHD: http://​digitalarchive.​wilsoncenter.​org/​document/​111241).

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by Warsaw Pact forces was an ominous reminder that this could really happen. As Chen Jian puts it (2001: 243): “During the height of the Cultural Revolution, and especially after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Beijing charged that the Soviet Union had become a ‘social imperialist country’. Consequently, both in the Chinese Communist definition of the ‘main contradiction’ in the world and in Chinese propaganda, ‘Soviet social-imperialism’ gradually replaced ‘US imperialism’ to become the primary and most dangerous enemy of the world proletarian revolution”.

U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Intelligence Note, “Communist China: Peking Inflates Soviet War Threat”, June 3, 1969 (NSA: http://​nsarchive.​gwu.​edu/​NSAEBB/​NSAEBB49/​sino.​sov.​4.​pdf).

Robert McNamara, Department of State Bulletin, October 9, 1967 (https://​archive.​org/​stream/​departmentofstat​571967unit#page/​442/​mode/​1up).

“According to leninist principles, party is the paramount authority of political system. It defines general guidelines, establish ‘political line’ that frames all sectorial policies and can order all other institutions to adapt to its orders” (Teiwes 2000: 113).

The charismatic nature of Maoist leadership was essential, according to Frederick Teiwes, to explaining the lack or reaction and the passive attitude of the old comrades vis-à-vis the personal attacks during the Cultural Revolution: “Undoubtedly many factors influenced the refusal to fight. The previously noted fear that a direct attack on the regime’s founder would severely damage the system served as a restraint. Another factor of some significance was the apparent belief or the hope within leading circles that, the vandalism of the Red Guards notwithstanding, Mao would ultimately act within the bounds of propriety toward long-standing comrades. Other considerations included the fact that the course of the movement would take was not clear at the outset […] Yet certainly, as at Lushan, more than fear and calculation were involved. Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and the others undoubtedly felt a sense of duty as they stepped off the political stage. Once again, charisma based on the revolutionary cum nationalist victory of 1949—with its traditional overtones of founding a dynasty as well—carried the day” (Teiwes 1984: 71).

Mao, when stepping down from all the main party positions, never relinquished his role as chairman of the Central Military Commission, which is the party organization that controls military power.

A faction is a social relation based on a “clientelistic tie”—a social exchange—between a political leader (who offers goods: tenure, money, security, etc.) and another actor (who offers political loyalty and support) (Nathan 1973). On the pervasiveness of factionalism in Chinese society, see also Pye (1981), and Unger (2002). For Lucien Pye, factionalism is the result of historical features of Chinese society: the search for security by politically weak peoples. For William Whitson, it is the result of the compartmentalization of the Red Army during the civil and anti-Japanese Wars: the strong links between the field armies and their commanders were the roots of the following factions (Whitson 1973).

For a convincing explanation of this attitude towards successors, based on structural characteristics of Chinese politics and not on Mao’s personality, see Huang Jing (2008).

For a different view that tends to minimize the Lin-Mao conflict on this occasion, see Teiwes and Sun (1996: 114).

On the real danger of a Soviet preventive attack against the Chinese nuclear arsenal, see the documents available at http://​nsarchive.​gwu.​edu/​NSAEBB/​NSAEBB49/​index2.​html.

As reported by Lewis and Xue: “Zhou (Enlai) summoned General Huang and four member of the CMC Administrative group and demanded to know the background of the order and its current status. Who, he asked, had named the directive ‘Vice-Chairman Lin’s No. 1 Order’, and why had they permitted secret military orders to reach the street? Whose name would be put on a possible No. 2 Order since Lin’s name has been given to the first one?” (Lewis and Xue 2006: 68).

At that time, the US intelligence community believed that the strife provoked by the Cultural Revolution had slightly retarded the implementation of the nuclear programme: “It would be reasonable to assume from these reports that the Cultural Revolution has at least lapped at the edges of the weapons program, and may indeed have penetrated deeply and perhaps disruptively into it. The extent of its interference with the program, however, and the duration of any deleterious effects are impossible to determine”. US Department of State. Director of Intelligence and Research, May 3, 1968 (NSA: http://​nsarchive.​gwu.​edu/​NSAEBB/​NSAEBB26/​docs/​doc10.​pdf).

See Chapters 1 and 3.

On this point, see Zagoria (1968), Ra’anan (1968), Yahuda (1972), Harding and Gurtov (1971), Gottlieb (1977), Gurtov and Hwang (1980).

The following section is mainly based on Gottlieb (1977).

Peking Review, January 7, 1966 (available at: https://​www.​marxists.​org/​subject/​china/​peking-review/​1966/​PR1966-02c.​htm).

The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.”—Abolition of Military Ranks.—Purge of Communist Party, Press, and Universities.—Dismissal of Mr. Peng Chen, Mr. Lu Ting-yi, and General Lo Jui-ching.—Proposed Reform of Educational System.—“Anti-Bourgeois” Campaign by “Red Guards” (http://​www.​keesings.​com/​article/​19273).

Fourth Nuclear Test.—Firing of Guided Missile with Nuclear Warhead (http://​www.​keesings.​com/​article/​55435).

Peking Review, April 7, 1967 (available at: https://​www.​marxists.​org/​subject/​china/​peking-review/​1967/​PR1967-15.​pdf).

Peking Review, July 16, 1967 (available at: https://​www.​marxists.​org/​subject/​china/​peking-review/​1967/​PR1967-30.​pdf).

In their opposition to the US, radicals were supported by the military of Lin Biao.

Peking Review, May 5, 1967 (available at: https://​www.​marxists.​org/​subject/​china/​peking-review/​1967/​PR1967-19.​pdf).

In early 1968, approximately 500,000 US soldiers were deployed in Vietnam.

The four marshals were Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, Chen Yi and Xu Xiangqian.

Report by Four Chinese Marshals, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen, to the Central Committee, “A Preliminary Evaluation of the War Situation” (excerpt), July 11, 1969 (WC/DAIHD: http://​digitalarchive.​wilsoncenter.​org/​document/​117146).

See figures in Lewis (2007: 54).

The Lei Feng campaign is a case in point. In 1963, Lei Feng became the subject of a political propaganda campaign, “Follow the examples of Comrade Lei Feng”. Lei was portrayed as a model soldier and a good communist, and the masses were encouraged to emulate his altruism, modesty, political diligence, and devotion to Mao. The restoration of strong political control over the PLA began immediately after the dismissal of marshal Peng Dehuai in 1959 and the rise in the military ranks of Lin Biao. Lin, following Mao’s directive, immediately intensified the political education of the troops, in contrast with Luo Ruiqing, who was supportive of military training. In 1964, after three years of intensive political education, the campaign “to learn from the PLA” was launched (Gittings 1967: 254).

The following section on the Second Artillery is mainly based on Allen and Kivlehan-Wise (2005), and Lewis and Xue (2006: 174–178).

During the civil war, Xiang served in the second Field Army under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping.

“Thus, throughout its first decade, the Second Artillery struggled in near chaos to establish its professional military credentials and become a viable strategic force. Its senior officers wasted these years mostly jockeying for survival or launching political attack on their opponents, real or imagined. Even as Mao fretted about an ‘inevitable’ war with the Soviet Union and pressed the military to build a powerful strategic arsenal, his policies fostered indiscipline and indecision” (Lewis and Xue 2006: 178).