2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation and Secure Set-Intersection from Algebraic PRFs
verfasst von : Carmit Hazay
Erschienen in: Theory of Cryptography
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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In this paper we study the two fundamental functionalities
oblivious polynomial evaluation in the exponent
and
set-intersection
, and introduce a new technique for designing efficient secure protocols for these problems (and others). Our starting point is the [6] technique (CRYPTO 2011) for verifiable delegation of polynomial evaluations, using
algebraic PRFs
. We use this tool, that is useful to achieve
verifiability
in the
outsourced setting
, in order to achieve
privacy
in the
standard two-party
setting. Our results imply new simple and efficient oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE) protocols. We further show that our OPE protocols are readily used for secure set-intersection, implying much simpler protocols in the plain model. As a side result, we demonstrate the usefulness of algebraic PRFs for various search functionalities, such as keyword search and oblivious transfer with adaptive queries. Our protocols are secure under full simulation-based definitions in the presence of malicious adversaries.