2006 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
On Expected Constant-Round Protocols for Byzantine Agreement
verfasst von : Jonathan Katz, Chiu-Yuen Koo
Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2006
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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In a seminal paper, Feldman and Micali (STOC ’88) show an
n
-party Byzantine agreement protocol tolerating
t
<
n
/3 malicious parties that runs in expected constant rounds. Here, we show an expected constant-round protocol for
authenticated
Byzantine agreement assuming
honest majority
(i.e.,
t
<
n
/2), and relying only on the existence of a secure signature scheme and a public-key infrastructure (PKI). Combined with existing results, this gives the first expected constant-round protocol for secure computation with honest majority in a point-to-point network assuming only one-way functions and a PKI. Our key technical tool — a new primitive we introduce called
moderated VSS
— also yields a simpler proof of the Feldman-Micali result.
We also show a simple technique for sequential composition of protocols without simultaneous termination (something that is inherent for Byzantine agreement protocols using
o
(
n
) rounds) for the case of
t
<
n
/2.