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Erschienen in:
2011 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
On Related-Key Attacks and KASUMI: The Case of A5/3
verfasst von : Phuong Ha Nguyen, Matthew J. B. Robshaw, Huaxiong Wang
Erschienen in: Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2011
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Due to its widespread deployment in mobile telephony, the block cipher KASUMI is a prominent target for cryptanalysts. While the cipher offers excellent resistance to differential and linear cryptanalysis, in the related-key model there have been several impressive cryptanalytic results. In this paper we revisit these related-key attacks and highlight a small, but important, detail in the specification of KASUMI for the algorithm A5/3; namely that a 64- and not a 128-bit session key is used. We show that existing related-key attacks on KASUMI in the literature are (negatively) impacted by this feature and we provide evidence that repairing these attacks will be difficult.