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Group Decision and Negotiation

Erschienen in:

06.04.2019

On the Number of Group-Separable Preference Profiles

verfasst von: Alexander Karpov

Erschienen in: Group Decision and Negotiation | Ausgabe 3/2019

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Abstract

The paper studies group-separable preference profiles. Such a profile is group-separable if for each subset of alternatives there is a partition in two parts such that each voter prefers each alternative in one part to each alternative in the other part. We develop a parenthesization representation of group-separable domain. The precise formula for the number of group-separable preference profiles is obtained. The recursive formula for the number of narcissistic group-separable preference profiles is obtained. Such a profile is narcissistic group-separable if it is group-separable and each alternative is preferred the most by exactly one voter.

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Group separable preferences are also known as severe disagreement preferences (Van Deemen 2014).

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Titel: On the Number of Group-Separable Preference Profiles
verfasst von: Alexander Karpov
Publikationsdatum: 06.04.2019
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Group Decision and Negotiation / Ausgabe 3/2019
Print ISSN: 0926-2644
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9907
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09621-w

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