A future agenda for OC needs to address the criticisms made of both collaboration in general and OC in particular. This is not straightforward as those who criticise collaboration approach it from different directions. For example ‘traditionalists’ find Dewey’s view of collaboration excessively child centred (see Petrovic
1998) and ‘neo conservatives’, such as Hirsch (
2010), argue that education should focus on covering a common core curriculum. In contrast, and from another direction, Dewey is seen as sociologically naïve (Wilkinson
2012) and for some his implications for teaching and learning are too cautious. Another line of criticism is to accept the grounds for collaboration ‘in principle’ but argue that it is particularly difficult to achieve in practice or else will not suit particular groups of learners (see, for example, Li and Adamson
1992, in respect to very able learners, and Iovannone et al.
2003 who argued that there were benefits in systematic instruction and high level of individual support for learners with autism spectrum disorders). Others might argue that all teaching, including quite instructional teaching, is in a sense collaborative in that an engagement with any text broadens one’s experience and enables participation in an imagined community. In that sense collaboration takes care of itself.
This paper cannot address all these criticisms. Instead, it is broadly accepted that there are substantial benefits from collaboration but that there are weaknesses in its promotion to which it is worth drawing attention. Three problems stand out and they concern weaknesses in: the instrumental perspective on collaboration; the normative perspective; the view of learning as social participation.
5.1 Weaknesses within the instrumental perspective on collaboration
Instrumental and normative perspectives start from different places. The instrumental perspective looks for objective evidence of impact through the measurement of learning gains. Illustrative of this perspective have been the use of systematic review, which was central to the work of Johnson and Johnson, Slavin and others; experimental methods; and, more recently, learning analytics. These have allowed a considerable marshalling of evidence. However, less often aired, is that not all evidence on collaboration points the same way. For example the much-cited research of Hattie (
2013) suggested that key to learning was feedback while cooperative learning was a positive intervention, Hattie did not offer the same ringing endorsement as Johnson and Johnson. In similar vein, and using a learner analytics methodology, Agudo-Peregrina et al. (
2014) showed the value of peer interaction in relation to assessment outcomes and retention but also showed the enduring importance of teacher – learner interactions. Further issues arise in regard to experimental methods in that meaningful work comparing outcomes in online / off line contexts has become increasingly difficult and unhelpful. As Lehtinen et al. (
1999) and more recently Timmis (
2014) recognised, the research on OC often concerns short-term innovations and when compared to f2f classrooms online learning appears a messy and uncontrolled setting (see Lehtinen
2003).
A rather different line to the instrumental perspective on collaboration, particularly OC, is to stress its suitability for developing the skills needed for a networked knowledge economy. In other words what is being recommended about collaboration is the utility of the outcome rather than the process itself. However the argument on transferable skills is not wholly convincing. While there have been changes in professional practice that really do seem to require higher levels of collaboration, not least in the field of teacher education (e.g. Hargreaves
2003), these changes are not universal. In fact contemporary labour markets demand a very differentiated mix of knowledge and skills, in some cases a very low level of skills indeed. Much in the discourse of the knowledge society, and the type of education that best fits it, has been distorted by wishful thinking about market requirements and influenced by ‘rose tinted’, future narratives (see Peters
2001).
5.2 Weaknesses within the normative perspective on collaboration
In contrast to the instrumental perspective, the normative perspective on collaboration (drawing strongly on Dewey) stresses that core to learning is the reaching of warranted intersubjective agreement, the capacity each has for mutual recognition and awareness of shared reflective consciousness. Dewey and others called for a ‘democratic’ education on wider grounds than vocationalism. If this view is accepted it shifts the debate from ‘What works?’ (collaboration as a means to an end) to ‘What is ethical and ontologically valid?’ (collaboration as an end in itself). The only questions worth asking about collaboration are, not whether it leads to better learning outcomes, but how best to promote collaboration in the first place, and how to create a communicative process that is both rigorous and democratic.
This normative view is, however, open to critique precisely because it is normative; it is assuming, albeit with appeal to historical sources, that education is fundamentally concerned with goals such as a empowerment, emancipatory learning and democratic practice when others might, and frequently do propose, other goals such as knowledge of facts and acquisition of functional skills. Furthermore, critics point out that it is reasonable to question whether learners who are being empowered have asked for such empowerment in the first place; ‘power with’ may be empty rhetoric.
5.3 Weaknesses within the view of learning as always social
Those writing about collaboration agree to varying degrees that learning is social. This historically has been a particularly useful standpoint as it shifts the study of achievement to the quality of social interaction rather than effort, innate ability or personal resilience alone. As put by Pea (
1993: 48–49), in respect to distributed learning, we are moving away from ‘intelligence’ as an attribute of individuals, ‘carried primarily in internal transformations of mental representations of symbols of goals, objects and relations’ towards the artefacts which are ‘in constant use for structuring activity’. So far so good. However it is intuitively obvious too that learning is
also a personal achievement, a point well made and without irony, by Salomon (
1993: 114) in discussing the very individual and internal process of writing alone at his desk about distributed learning. In the same vein Dillenbourg (
1999) saw learning as involving a kind of internal dialogue or ‘collaboration with oneself’ as did Vygotsky in discussing egocentric speech. Indeed Vygotksy is justifiably enlisted in support of collaboration when arguing that ‘higher psychological function’ begin with the stimulus of external activity (Vygotsky [
1994]: 153). However the point for Vygotsky was that these functions need to be interiorised, that is separated from the context in which they were first developed. This strongly implies that learning is achieved
also at an in individual level (see Van der Veer and Valsiner
1994).
5.4 Recalibrating the argument for OC
Those seeking to recalibrate the argument for OC are challenged to address the weaknesses above and there are ways of doing this. As to the last of the three criticisms, it is not difficult to present a picture of learning as both individual and social and to agree with Sfard (
1998) that there is danger in identifying two metaphors for learning but choosing just one. Arguably this integration of social and individual perspectives on learning is achieved in Vygotsky. More difficult is to address the first and second criticisms. One means of doing so is to highlight the strengths of the normative and instrumental perspectives but see them as complementary, in other words to acknowledge the importance of evidence of impact but also to recognise that collaboration, OC or otherwise, is shaped by educational values, values which need to be articulated and reflexively critiqued. In practical terms this means that all evidence about outcomes will need to be considered but done so in respect to its ‘discursive location’ (Clegg
2005) and in recognition of its limitations. As regards collaboration the danger is having incompatible stances on knowledge and knowledge building. The instrumental view of collaboration, lying within an objectivist / positivist tradition, assumes that there are generalisable recommendations for practice based on comparative analysis. In contrast, the normative view takes knowledge as provisional, contextual and needing to be constructed through social interaction. A strategy for reconciliation is to take the evidence provided by objectivist methodologies as workable hypotheses, rather than recommendations, about collaboration which need to be explored, and if necessary discarded, in particular contexts.
5.5 Towards a differentiated view of collaboration
Underlying the problem of promoting OC is the need for a more differentiated account of learning and knowledge building. Of course such differentiation already exists in the well-worn distinction between collaboration and cooperative learning seen earlier, but there is an opportunity to present a more general distinction between weak and strong forms of collaboration (see Lehtinen
2003), based in part on the strength of ties between learners (e.g. Norris
2002). Weak tied collaboration seems capable of organic growth in otherwise formal learning setting as Goodband et al. (
2012) discuss in the case of Facebook groups to support students of mathematics and Lai and Gu (
2011) in considering online support for language students. Weak networks often emerge under the radar of institutions and instructors (e.g. Adams and Yin
2015; Dabbagh and Kitsantas
2012), though more could be done to support them. Of course informal collaboration may even under supportive conditions fail to take off but this should not led to a loss of esteem for designers. The case for weak collaboration need not be all encompassing and may include motivational gains, developing social identity and the value of sharing information. Siemens’s (
2005) presents the case for weak tied collaboration well by drawing attention to the myriad ways in which learners are connected and can share ideas:
Weak ties are links or bridges that allow short connections between information. Our small world networks are generally populated with people whose interests and knowledge are similar to ours. Finding a new job, as an example, often occurs through weak ties. This principle has great merit in the notion of serendipity, innovation, and creativity. Connections between disparate ideas and fields can create new innovations.
However, Siemens goes on to argue that ‘learning (defined as actionable knowledge) ….. is focused on connecting specialized information sets, and the connections that enable us to learn more are more important than our current state of knowing.’ This is much more problematic. More is implied in coming to know than picking up, what Siemens describes as, ‘chaotically ordered’ information in open networks and while connectivism may draw attention to new strategies for learning this does not make the case that a new learning theory is required (see Kop and Hill
2008).
In contrast to weak forms, strong forms of collaboration such as PBL and group assessment set the bar much higher in respect to levels of participation and evidence of knowledge building. Here instructors and evaluators would be expected to show evidence of regular interaction and symmetries in interaction patterns; it would matter greatly if social interaction failed to take off or if interaction was dominated by some and other voices were not heard. Those promoting strong collaboration would need, further, to be clear about the criteria by which the quality of any new knowledge can be judged, rather than fall back on the argument that learning has taken place because there is evidence of participation. In providing such criteria there are some helpful propositions about knowledge on which to draw.
One proposition about knowledge is that it should correspond to validated discipline knowledge. This appears to introduce quite objectivist assumptions about knowledge (‘Does the knowledge created correspond to reality?) but the correspondence could simply be to what a community holds to be important at a particular time, or to logical consequences of rule based inquiry, rather than immutable facts about the world. For example in discussing knowledge building in virtual maths teams Wee and Looi (
2009) are able to chart a process based around language functions such as making suggestions, disputing and reaching agreement. These language functions are discussed in the context of discipline knowledge, for example ‘Are learners following recognised mathematical problem solving strategies?, ‘Are their arguments logically true?, ‘Are they introducing facts which are mathematically correct? This is a coherent and operationalisable strategy for evaluating collaboration and enables researchers to distinguish between valid and invalid arguments. It offers a means of tracking a genuinely knowledge building process and would not need not be confined to one particular context. However a limitation of the approach is that it is wedded to a correspondence view, the knowledge created is new to the group but not ‘new knowledge’ as such. This can be contrasted to a more radical stance in other writers such as Scardamalia and Bereiter (
2006: 98) who see knowledge creation in their classroom as distinctive and as:
encapsulated by the comment of a fifth-grader on the work of a classmate: ‘Mendel worked on Karen’s problem’ (referring to Gregor Mendel, the great 19th century biologist). Not ‘Karen rediscovered Mendel’ or ‘Karen should read Mendel to find the answer to her problem.’ Rather than being overawed by authority, or dismissive, they see their own work as being legitimated by its connection to problems that have commanded the attention of respected scientists, scholars, and thinkers.
This is a far more ‘profane’ view of discipline knowledge but one that raises the kinds of questions over validity of knowledge (in what sense can it be said that learners’ work is ‘legitimated’?) which Wee and Looi are able to avoid.
A second justification for knowledge validation is a more pragmatic one, ‘Do the solutions generated by the group work in practice?’. Here the original Community of Inquiry model (CoI) (Garrison
2007) envisaged a mixing of online and offline inquiry. Drawing on Dewey, an inquiry was seen as entering different phases: an initiation phase / triggering event; an exploration phase in which participants ‘shift between the private, reflective world of the individual and the social exploration of ideas’; a third phase of integration, in which the applicability of ideas is considered; and a final phase the resolution of the dilemma or problem by means of direct or vicarious action. The criterion by which the success of an action could be judged was its consequences in practice with a process of knowledge validation in the online community. It is a subtle and promising argument but difficult to exemplify. Furthermore it might leave the online community with a rather weaker role (‘community mindedness’ rather than ‘community of learners’, Santos and Hammond
2008) with the real knowledge creation taking place off-line. Hence it is not surprising that discussion of CoI became focused on types of online presences (see Garrison et al.
2010) rather than its relationship to off line participation. Nonetheless this action oriented inquiry may yet have particular appeal for those undertaking inquiry into collaborative practice in the future.
A third criterion for judging knowledge creation is to examine the rigour and ethical depth of the communication process carried out. The obvious source of reference here is Habermas (e.g. Boyd
1996; Cecez-Kecmanovic and Webb
2000) and his proposition that there can be a collaborative search for truth in a kind of ideal speech situation (ISS) in which those with competence are allowed to speak, no one is constrained in speaking, all are allowed to question the grounds for any assertion and new assertions could be put forward (Habermas
1990: 58). Here Habermas’s distinction between instrumental and strategic orientations to communication and reaching consensus is important (see Mezirow
1997). A strategic orientation is one aimed at exercising power over others, based on a distorted understanding of the world and / or protecting one’s own group interest; an emancipatory orientation required an intense effort to see other view points, to understand the partial nature of one’s own understanding and reach a consensus in something that approached an ISS (Habermas
1990).
Habermas provides a lens through which to critically review the process of knowledge creation, bringing in strong ethical considerations. However his key concept of an ideal speech situation is very difficult to exemplify and some would argue too that it offers an almost endless invitation to discuss rather than the action oriented inquiry of the CoI.