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Erschienen in:

2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Optimal Ownership Pattern to Control Agency Conflict in Manufacturing Industry of Pakistan

verfasst von : Muhammad Kaleem Khan, He Ying, Umair Akram, Muhammad Hashim, Xiaoyue Yuan, Lv Gaoyu

Erschienen in: Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Asymmetric information always creates conflict of interest between stakeholders. Purpose of this study is to discuss agency conflict from perspective of financiers, and suggesting its remedies as controlling mechanism. Monitoring role of different types of ownerships is studied. Study has investigated the impact of four different types of ownership structures namely; managerial ownership, family ownership, institutional ownership and ownership of block-holders on agency issue. Role of financial institutions is also discussed. To explore the agency problem from view point of both equity-holders and debt-holders, Agency cost is divided into agency cost of equity (ACE) and agency cost of debt (ACD). Study has also given empirical evidences to check the robustness of each monitoring mechanism. Using financial data of top capitalized 100 companies of Pakistan from 2010 to 2015; results are drawn by fix and random effect (GLS) model. Ownership of insiders, block-holders and institutions were found to be most effective monitoring devices for firms’ growth. Study also contains recommendations for investors and debtors.

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Vorheriges Kapitel A Projection Pursuit Combined Method for PPP Risk Evaluation

Nächstes Kapitel The Impact of Institutional Investors on Stock Price Synchronicity: Evidence from the Shanghai Stock Market

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Titel: Optimal Ownership Pattern to Control Agency Conflict in Manufacturing Industry of Pakistan
verfasst von: Muhammad Kaleem Khan
He Ying
Umair Akram
Muhammad Hashim
Xiaoyue Yuan
Lv Gaoyu
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-59279-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-59280-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59280-0_129

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