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Social Choice and Welfare
Erschienen in:

20.06.2024 | Original Paper

Patent package structures and sharing rules for royalty revenue

verfasst von: Takaaki Abe, Emiko Fukuda, Shigeo Muto

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 2/2024

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Abstract

Der Artikel geht auf die Komplexität von Patentpools ein und konzentriert sich auf die Verteilung der Lizenzeinnahmen unter den Patentinhabern. Er baut auf früheren Forschungsergebnissen auf, die die Effizienzgewinne von Patentpools hervorheben, aber keine detaillierte Analyse der Regeln zur gemeinsamen Nutzung enthalten. Die Studie führt ein axiomatisches Rahmenwerk zur Charakterisierung der Regel des numerischen Verhältniswahlrechtes ein, die empirisch als stabil gegenüber Patentaustauschen erwiesen ist. Die Autoren erweitern diesen Rahmen, um die Substituierbarkeit zwischen Paketen zu berücksichtigen, wobei der Wert eines Pakets von der Struktur anderer Pakete abhängt, die der Vermittler anbietet. Diese Analyse zeigt, dass die Sharing-Regel, die den Gesamtumsatz gleichmäßig verteilt, einspruchsfreie und einkommensmaximierende Profile gewährleisten kann, was sie zu einem wertvollen Werkzeug für Patentanwälte macht. Die Forschungsergebnisse unterstreichen auch die Notwendigkeit weiterer Untersuchungen zur Einbeziehung von Faktoren wie Zitierungszahlen und Patentablauf in Sharing-Regeln, was potenzielle Wege für zukünftige Forschung nahelegt.
KI-Generiert

Diese Zusammenfassung des Fachinhalts wurde mit Hilfe von KI generiert.

Vorheriger Artikel Sequential school choice with public and private schools
Nächster Artikel On the optimality of policy choices in the face of biased beliefs, retrospective voting and the down-up problem

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Fußnoten
1
See Subsection 4.2 of Kim (2004) for the details. In the conclusion (Kim 2004), the author also mentioned the importance of exogenously specified sharing rules.
 
2
The Myerson value is an extension of the Shapley value (Shapley 1953). Myerson (1980) extended the Myerson value (for games with network structures) to the class of NTU-games with hypergraph structures. van den Nouweland et al. (1992) generalized the Myerson value to the class of TU-games with hypergraph structures.
 
3
A sharing rule assigns a share to each patent and a patent holder who contributes some patents to the agent receives the sum of the shares assigned to the patents. Moreover, an international agent usually calculates royalty revenue by country. Therefore, in this study, we focus on revenue sharing within one country.
 
4
Specifically, van den Nouweland et al. (1992) used component efficiency: for communication situations. The component efficiency requires an allocation to be efficient for every component (see van den Nouweland et al. (1992) for details). Moreover, the Shapley value (Shapley 1953) is defined as follows. For every \(i\in N\), \({\text {Sh}}_i(v)=\sum _{S:i\in S\subseteq N} \frac{(|S|-1)!(|N|-|S|)!}{|N|!}\left( v(S)-v(S{\setminus } \{i\})\right) \). For every S with \(i\in S\subseteq N\), \(v(S)-v(S{\setminus } \{i\})\) represents the marginal contribution of i to S. Therefore, the Shapley value can be seen as the expected value of the marginal contributions of i.
 
5
The original form of this concept was introduced by Thrall (1962) and Thrall and Lucas (1963) to describe externalities among coalitions and later called an embedded coalition in the class of partition function form games. We extend this concept to our framework.
 
6
This framework can be generated from the demand side for patent packages à la the Shapiro–Cournot model (Shapiro (2001)). Let \(\mathcal {H}=\{S_1,\ldots ,S_m\}\) be a package structure. For every \(S\in \mathcal {H}\), consider the demand \(D_S^\mathcal {H}(r_{S_1},\ldots ,r_{S_m})\) for package S, where \(r=(r_S)_{S\in \mathcal {H}}\) represents a profile of the license fees \(r_S\) for packages \(S\in \mathcal {H}\). Assuming the patent pool agent maximizes the total revenue obtained from \(\mathcal {H}\), let \(r^*=(r^*_S)_{S\in \mathcal {H}}=\arg \max _{r}\sum _{S\in \mathcal {H}}r_S D^\mathcal {H}_S(r)\) subject to \(0\le r_S\le \bar{r}_S\) for every \(S\in \mathcal {H}\). We set \(v(S,\mathcal {H})=r^*_S D^\mathcal {H}_S(r^*)\) for every \(S\in \mathcal {H}\).
 
7
No problem arises by assigning an arbitrary value to \(v(S,\mathcal {H}')\) for every \(\mathcal {H}'\subseteq 2^N{\setminus } \{\emptyset \}\) with \(\mathcal {H}'\not \in \{\mathcal {H}_1, \mathcal {H}_2, \mathcal {H}_3\}\) and every \(S\in \mathcal {H}'\)
 
8
As demonstrated in Table 2, the package-wise equal sharing rule does not straightforwardly obey F and PI in the presence of substitutability. This is because substitutability allows S to change its worth depending on \(\mathcal {H}\) and, hence, the requirements of F and PI become very demanding. Nevertheless, in the next section, we will propose another sharing rule that satisfies the generalized fairness requirement even in the presence of substitutability.
 
9
This example is also generated from the demand side with the following setups. For every \(\mathcal {H}=\mathcal {H}_2,\ldots ,\mathcal {H}_8\) and \(S\in \mathcal {H}\), let \(D_S^\mathcal {H}(r)=a^\mathcal {H}_S-b^\mathcal {H}_S \cdot (\sum _{S'\in \mathcal {H}}\theta _{SS'}r_{S'})\), where \(|\theta _{SS'}|\) represents the degree of substitutability between S and \(S'\): specifically, \(\theta _{SS'}=\theta _{S'S}\) for every \(S,S'\subseteq N\); \(\theta _{SS'}=1\) if \(S=S'\); and \(\theta _{SS'}\le 0\) if \(S\ne S'\). Note that \(\theta _{SS'}= 0\) states that there is no substitutability between the two packages. The numerical example Table 3 is obtained from, for example, the following parameters: \((\theta _{\{1\}\{1\}},\theta _{\{1\}\{2\}},\theta _{\{1\}\{1,2\}})=(1,0,-1)\), \((\theta _{\{2\}\{1\}},\theta _{\{2\}\{2\}},\theta _{\{2\}\{1,2\}})=(0,1,-1)\), and \((\theta _{\{1,2\}\{1\}},\theta _{\{1,2\}\{2\}},\theta _{\{1,2\}\{1,2\}})=(-1,-1,1)\); \(a^{\mathcal {H}_2}_{\{1\}}=a^{\mathcal {H}_3}_{\{2\}}=2\sqrt{2}\), \(a^{\mathcal {H}_4}_{\{1,2\}}=4\sqrt{2}\), \((a^{\mathcal {H}_5}_{\{1\}},a^{\mathcal {H}_5}_{\{2\}})=(2\sqrt{2},2\sqrt{2})\), \((a^{\mathcal {H}_6}_{\{1\}},a^{\mathcal {H}_6}_{\{1,2\}})=(a^{\mathcal {H}_7}_{\{2\}},a^{\mathcal {H}_7}_{\{1,2\}})=(2\sqrt{2},\sqrt{2})\), \((a^{\mathcal {H}_8}_{\{1\}},a^{\mathcal {H}_8}_{\{2\}},a^{\mathcal {H}_8}_{\{1,2\}})=(\sqrt{2},\sqrt{2},\sqrt{2} /2)\); \(b^\mathcal {H}_S=1/2\) for \((S,\mathcal {H})=(\{1,2\},\mathcal {H}_8)\) and 1 otherwise; and \(\bar{r}_{S}=\sqrt{2}\) for every \(S\subseteq N\).
 
10
In the absence of substitutability, the sharing rule readily achieves this requirement because the full profile \(\mathcal {H}= 2^N {\setminus } \{\emptyset \}\) maximizes \(\sum _{T\in \mathcal {H}}v(T)\), and no one has an incentive to withdraw its patents.
 
11
If condition (a) requires “weak inequalities \(\ge \) for all \(j\in S\) and strict one > for some \(i\in S\),” then the combination of PM and PE implies \(RM(v)=OF^\psi (v)\).
 
12
Note that for \(\mathcal {H}_0=\emptyset \), we have \(\psi _i(v,\mathcal {H}_0)=\psi '_i(v,\mathcal {H}_0)\) for every \(i\in N\) by PE and the non-negativity of \(\psi \).
 
13
For the details of components of a hypergraph, see van den Nouweland et al. (1992). The collection of the components of \(\mathcal {H}\), i.e., \(\mathcal {C}(\mathcal {H})\), partitions N, and every pair of the components has an empty intersection.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Patent package structures and sharing rules for royalty revenue
verfasst von
Takaaki Abe
Emiko Fukuda
Shigeo Muto
Publikationsdatum
20.06.2024
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 2/2024
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01532-3

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